security(import): add canonical path escape guard in findFileRecursive
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A symlink placed inside importDir pointing to a file outside it would pass
isValidImportFilename (no forbidden chars in the symlink name) and be found
by Files.walk. Now checks candidate.getCanonicalPath() against
baseDir.getCanonicalPath() — if the resolved path escapes importDir,
throws DomainException.internal and aborts the import. Adds regression
test using @TempDir + Files.createSymbolicLink.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit was merged in pull request #650.
This commit is contained in:
Marcel
2026-05-21 10:16:18 +02:00
parent 4e33f52add
commit eca4f1f0e8
2 changed files with 25 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -490,11 +490,18 @@ public class MassImportService {
}
private Optional<File> findFileRecursive(String filename) {
try (Stream<Path> walk = Files.walk(Paths.get(importDir))) {
return walk.filter(p -> !Files.isDirectory(p))
File baseDir = new File(importDir);
try (Stream<Path> walk = Files.walk(baseDir.toPath())) {
Optional<Path> match = walk.filter(p -> !Files.isDirectory(p))
.filter(p -> p.getFileName().toString().equals(filename))
.map(Path::toFile)
.findFirst();
if (match.isEmpty()) return Optional.empty();
File candidate = match.get().toFile();
String baseDirCanonical = baseDir.getCanonicalPath();
if (!candidate.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(baseDirCanonical + File.separator)) {
throw DomainException.internal(ErrorCode.INTERNAL_ERROR, "Path escape detected: " + candidate);
}
return Optional.of(candidate);
} catch (IOException e) {
return Optional.empty();
}

View File

@@ -758,6 +758,21 @@ class MassImportServiceTest {
.containsExactly(MassImportService.SkipReason.FILE_READ_ERROR);
}
// ─── findFileRecursive — symlink escape security regression — do not remove ─
@Test
void findFileRecursive_throwsDomainException_whenSymlinkEscapesImportDir(
@TempDir Path importDirPath, @TempDir Path outsideDir) throws Exception {
Path outsideFile = outsideDir.resolve("secret.pdf");
Files.writeString(outsideFile, "sensitive content");
Files.createSymbolicLink(importDirPath.resolve("secret.pdf"), outsideFile);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "importDir", importDirPath.toString());
assertThatThrownBy(() -> ReflectionTestUtils.invokeMethod(service, "findFileRecursive", "secret.pdf"))
.isInstanceOf(DomainException.class);
}
// ─── readOds — XXE security regression ───────────────────────────────────
// Security regression — do not remove.