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Author SHA1 Message Date
Marcel
1ec4815e24 ci: add npm run build step to unit-tests job
Some checks failed
CI / Unit & Component Tests (push) Failing after 5m20s
CI / OCR Service Tests (push) Successful in 51s
CI / Backend Unit Tests (push) Failing after 3m28s
CI / Unit & Component Tests (pull_request) Failing after 4m20s
CI / OCR Service Tests (pull_request) Successful in 52s
CI / Backend Unit Tests (pull_request) Failing after 3m17s
The prerender fix only prevents regression if the build is actually run in
CI. Without this gate, a future prerendered route that becomes unreachable
behind auth would fail silently until someone runs the build manually.

Fits after the test step in the existing unit-tests job — no new job needed
since node_modules is already cached for the Playwright container.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 08:52:20 +02:00
Marcel
a7bbf2424f fix(build): add prerender entry for /hilfe/transkription
The SvelteKit prerender crawler cannot reach this route because
hooks.server.ts redirects all non-public paths to /login before the
crawler follows links. Explicitly listing the route in kit.prerender.entries
tells SvelteKit to render it directly without crawling.

Also removes a misleading comment that claimed the auth hook guards
prerendered static files — it does not. Prerendered HTML is served as a
static file by the reverse proxy; hooks.server.ts only runs for SSR requests.

Closes #472

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 08:51:45 +02:00
360 changed files with 1688 additions and 46496 deletions

View File

@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ Never Kafka for teams under 10 or <100k events/day. Never gRPC inside a monolith
| PR contains | Required doc update |
|---|---|
| New Flyway migration adding/removing/renaming a table or column | `docs/architecture/db/db-orm.puml` and `docs/architecture/db/db-relationships.puml`**except** framework-owned tables (e.g. Spring Session JDBC's `spring_session*`, Flyway's `flyway_schema_history`), which are opaque to app code; reference the relevant ADR if an exclusion is load-bearing |
| New Flyway migration adding/removing/renaming a table or column | `docs/architecture/db/db-orm.puml` and `docs/architecture/db/db-relationships.puml` |
| New `@ManyToMany` join table or FK | Both DB diagrams |
| New backend package or domain module | `CLAUDE.md` package table + matching `docs/architecture/c4/l3-backend-*.puml` |
| New controller or service in an existing backend domain | Matching `docs/architecture/c4/l3-backend-*.puml` |

View File

@@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ Mark with `@pytest.mark.asyncio` so pytest runs the coroutine. Without it, the t
| What changed in code | Doc(s) to update |
|---|---|
| New Flyway migration adds/removes/renames a table or column | `docs/architecture/db/db-orm.puml` (add/remove entity or attribute) **and** `docs/architecture/db/db-relationships.puml` (add/remove relationship line)**except** framework-owned tables (e.g. Spring Session JDBC's `spring_session*`, Flyway's `flyway_schema_history`), which are opaque to app code; reference the relevant ADR if an exclusion is load-bearing |
| New Flyway migration adds/removes/renames a table or column | `docs/architecture/db/db-orm.puml` (add/remove entity or attribute) **and** `docs/architecture/db/db-relationships.puml` (add/remove relationship line) |
| New `@ManyToMany` join table or FK relationship | Both DB diagrams above |
| New backend package / domain module | `CLAUDE.md` (package structure table) **and** the matching `docs/architecture/c4/l3-backend-*.puml` diagram for that domain |
| New Spring Boot controller or service in an existing domain | The matching `docs/architecture/c4/l3-backend-*.puml` for that domain |

View File

@@ -26,46 +26,6 @@ PORT_MAILPIT_SMTP=1025
# Generate with: python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"
OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN=change-me-in-production
# --- Observability ---
# Optional stack — start with: docker compose -f docker-compose.observability.yml up -d
# Requires the main stack to already be running (docker compose up -d creates archiv-net).
# In production the stack is managed from /opt/familienarchiv/ (see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §4).
# Ports for host access
PORT_GRAFANA=3003
PORT_GLITCHTIP=3002
PORT_PROMETHEUS=9090
# Grafana admin password — change this before exposing Grafana beyond localhost
GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD=changeme
# GlitchTip domain — production: use https://glitchtip.archiv.raddatz.cloud (must match Caddy vhost)
GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN=http://localhost:3002
# GlitchTip secret key — Django SECRET_KEY equivalent, used to sign sessions and tokens.
# REQUIRED in production — must not be empty or 'changeme'. Fail-closed: GlitchTip will
# refuse to start with an invalid key.
# Generate with: python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(50))"
GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY=changeme-generate-a-real-secret
# PostgreSQL hostname for GlitchTip's db-init job and workers.
# Override when only the staging stack is running (container name differs from archive-db).
# Default (archive-db) is correct for production with the full stack up.
POSTGRES_HOST=archive-db
# $$ escaping note: passwords in /opt/familienarchiv/.env that contain a literal '$' must
# use '$$' so Docker Compose does not expand them as variable references.
# Example: a password 'p@$$word' should be written as 'p@$$$$word' in the .env file.
# Error reporting DSNs — leave empty to disable the SDK (safe default).
# SENTRY_DSN: backend (Spring Boot) — used by the GlitchTip/Sentry Java SDK
SENTRY_DSN=
SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=
# VITE_SENTRY_DSN: frontend (SvelteKit) — injected at build time via Vite
VITE_SENTRY_DSN=
# Sentry/GlitchTip auth token for source map upload at build time (optional)
SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN=
# Production SMTP — uncomment and fill in to send real emails instead of catching them
# APP_BASE_URL=https://your-domain.example.com
# MAIL_HOST=smtp.example.com

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
jobs:
@@ -33,125 +32,27 @@ jobs:
run: npx @inlang/paraglide-js compile --project ./project.inlang --outdir ./src/lib/paraglide
working-directory: frontend
- name: Sync SvelteKit
run: npx svelte-kit sync
working-directory: frontend
- name: Lint
run: npm run lint
working-directory: frontend
- name: Assert no banned vi.mock patterns
shell: bash
run: |
# Literal pdfjs-dist (libLoader pattern — ADR 012)
if grep -rF "vi.mock('pdfjs-dist'" frontend/src/; then
echo "FAIL: banned vi.mock('pdfjs-dist') pattern found — see ADR 012. Use the libLoader prop injection pattern instead."
exit 1
fi
# Async factory with dynamic import in body (named mechanism — ADR 012 / #553).
# Multiline PCRE matches `vi.mock(<arg>, async ... { ... await import(...) ... })`
# across line breaks. __meta__ is excluded because it contains fixture strings
# demonstrating the very pattern this check is meant to forbid.
if grep -rPzln 'vi\.mock\([^)]+,\s*async[^{]*\{[\s\S]*?await\s+import\s*\(' \
--include='*.spec.ts' --include='*.test.ts' \
--exclude-dir='__meta__' \
frontend/src/; then
echo "FAIL: banned async vi.mock factory with dynamic import in body — see ADR 012 / #553. Use a synchronous factory + vi.hoisted instead."
exit 1
fi
- name: Assert no (upload|download)-artifact past v3
shell: bash
run: |
# Self-test: verify the regex catches v4+ and does not catch v3.
tmp=$(mktemp)
printf ' uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5\n' > "$tmp"
grep -qP '^\s+uses:\s+actions/(upload|download)-artifact@v[4-9]' "$tmp" \
|| { echo "FAIL: guard self-test — regex missed upload-artifact@v5"; rm "$tmp"; exit 1; }
printf ' uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3\n' > "$tmp"
grep -qvP '^\s+uses:\s+actions/(upload|download)-artifact@v[4-9]' "$tmp" \
|| { echo "FAIL: guard self-test — regex incorrectly flagged upload-artifact@v3"; rm "$tmp"; exit 1; }
rm "$tmp"
# Guard: Gitea Actions (act_runner) does not implement the v4 artifact protocol.
# Both upload-artifact and download-artifact share the same incompatibility.
# Pin to @v3. See ADR-014 / #557.
if grep -RPn '^\s+uses:\s+actions/(upload|download)-artifact@v[4-9]' .gitea/workflows/; then
echo "::error::actions/(upload|download)-artifact@v4+ is unsupported on Gitea Actions (act_runner). Pin to @v3. See ADR-014 / #557."
exit 1
fi
- name: Run unit and component tests with coverage
shell: bash
run: |
set -eo pipefail
npm run test:coverage 2>&1 | tee /tmp/coverage-test-${{ github.run_id }}.log
- name: Run unit and component tests
run: npm test
working-directory: frontend
env:
TZ: Europe/Berlin
# Diagnostic guard: covers the coverage run only. If `npm test` (above)
# exits 1 with a birpc error, the named pattern appears here — not there.
- name: Assert no birpc teardown race in coverage run
shell: bash
if: always()
run: |
if grep -qF "[birpc] rpc is closed" /tmp/coverage-test-${{ github.run_id }}.log 2>/dev/null; then
echo "FAIL: [birpc] rpc is closed teardown race detected in coverage run"
grep -F "[birpc] rpc is closed" /tmp/coverage-test-${{ github.run_id }}.log
exit 1
fi
# Gitea Actions (act_runner) does not implement upload-artifact v4 protocol — pinned per ADR-014. Do NOT upgrade. See #557.
- name: Upload coverage reports
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: coverage-reports
path: |
frontend/coverage/
/tmp/coverage-test-${{ github.run_id }}.log
- name: Build frontend
run: npm run build
working-directory: frontend
# ── Prerender output is exactly the public help page ───────────────────
# SvelteKit prerender + crawl follows nav links and bakes "redirect to
# /login" HTML for every protected route, served BEFORE runtime hooks
# (see #514). With `crawl: false` only the explicit entry should land
# in build/prerendered/. Anything else is a regression — fail the build.
- name: Assert prerender output is only /hilfe/transkription
run: |
cd frontend
set -e
extra=$(find build/prerendered -type f \
-not -path 'build/prerendered/hilfe/*' \
-not -name '*.br' -not -name '*.gz' \
|| true)
if [ -n "$extra" ]; then
echo "FAIL: unexpected prerendered files (would shadow runtime hooks):"
echo "$extra"
exit 1
fi
# And the help page must still be there.
test -f build/prerendered/hilfe/transkription.html \
|| { echo "FAIL: /hilfe/transkription.html missing from prerender output"; exit 1; }
echo "PASS: only /hilfe/transkription.html prerendered."
# Gitea Actions (act_runner) does not implement upload-artifact v4 protocol — pinned per ADR-014. Do NOT upgrade. See #557.
- name: Upload screenshots
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: unit-test-screenshots
path: frontend/test-results/screenshots/
# ─── OCR Service Unit Tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Only stdlib/lightweight tests — no ML stack (PyTorch/Surya/Kraken) required.
# test_tmpdir.py covers the TMPDIR env var and entrypoint mkdir behaviour (ADR-021).
# test_tmpdir_is_inside_persistent_cache_volume is skipped in CI (TMPDIR not
# set to /app/cache here); it runs inside the deployed Docker container.
# Only spell_check.py, test_confidence.py, test_sender_registry.py — no ML stack required.
ocr-tests:
name: OCR Service Tests
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -163,11 +64,11 @@ jobs:
python-version: '3.11'
- name: Install test dependencies
run: pip install "pyspellchecker==0.9.0" "fastapi==0.115.6" pytest pytest-asyncio
run: pip install "pyspellchecker==0.9.0" pytest pytest-asyncio
working-directory: ocr-service
- name: Run OCR unit tests (no ML stack required)
run: python -m pytest test_spell_check.py test_confidence.py test_sender_registry.py test_tmpdir.py -v
run: python -m pytest test_spell_check.py test_confidence.py test_sender_registry.py -v
working-directory: ocr-service
# ─── Backend Unit & Slice Tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -177,8 +78,6 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
DOCKER_API_VERSION: "1.43" # NAS runner runs Docker 24.x (max API 1.43); Testcontainers 2.x defaults to 1.44
DOCKER_HOST: unix:///var/run/docker.sock
TESTCONTAINERS_RYUK_DISABLED: "true"
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -197,155 +96,5 @@ jobs:
- name: Run backend tests
run: |
chmod +x mvnw
./mvnw clean verify
working-directory: backend
- name: Upload surefire reports
if: always()
# Gitea Actions (act_runner) does not implement upload-artifact v4 protocol — pinned per ADR-014. Do NOT upgrade. See #557.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: surefire-reports
path: backend/target/surefire-reports/
# ─── fail2ban Regex Regression ────────────────────────────────────────────────
# The filter parses Caddy's JSON access log; a Caddy upgrade that reorders
# the JSON keys would silently break it (fail2ban-regex would return
# "0 matches", fail2ban would stop banning, no error surface). This job
# pins the contract against a deterministic sample line.
fail2ban-regex:
name: fail2ban Regex
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install fail2ban
run: |
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y fail2ban
- name: Matches /api/auth/login 401
run: |
echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/auth/login"},"status":401}' > /tmp/sample.log
out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
echo "$out"
echo "$out" | grep -qE '1 matched' \
|| { echo "expected 1 match for /api/auth/login 401"; exit 1; }
- name: Matches /api/auth/login 429
run: |
echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/auth/login"},"status":429}' > /tmp/sample.log
out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
echo "$out"
echo "$out" | grep -qE '1 matched' \
|| { echo "expected 1 match for /api/auth/login 429"; exit 1; }
- name: Matches /api/auth/forgot-password 401
run: |
echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/auth/forgot-password"},"status":401}' > /tmp/sample.log
out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
echo "$out"
echo "$out" | grep -qE '1 matched' \
|| { echo "expected 1 match for /api/auth/forgot-password 401"; exit 1; }
- name: Does not match /api/auth/login 200
run: |
echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/auth/login"},"status":200}' > /tmp/sample.log
out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
echo "$out"
echo "$out" | grep -qE '0 matched' \
|| { echo "expected 0 matches for /api/auth/login 200"; exit 1; }
- name: Does not match /api/documents (unrelated 401)
run: |
echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"GET","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/documents"},"status":401}' > /tmp/sample.log
out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
echo "$out"
echo "$out" | grep -qE '0 matched' \
|| { echo "expected 0 matches for /api/documents 401"; exit 1; }
# ── Backend resolves to file-polling, not systemd ─────────────────────
# The Debian/Ubuntu fail2ban package ships defaults-debian.conf with
# `[DEFAULT] backend = systemd`. Without `backend = polling` in our
# jail, the daemon loads the jail but reads from journald and never
# touches /var/log/caddy/access.log — i.e. the regex above passes in
# isolation while the live jail is inert. See issue #503.
- name: Jail resolves with polling backend (not inherited systemd)
run: |
sudo ln -sfn "$PWD/infra/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf" /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf
sudo ln -sfn "$PWD/infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf" /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf
dump=$(sudo fail2ban-client -d 2>&1)
echo "$dump" | grep -E "add.*familienarchiv-auth" || true
echo "$dump" | grep -qE "\['add', 'familienarchiv-auth', 'polling'\]" \
|| { echo "FAIL: familienarchiv-auth jail did not resolve to 'polling' backend"; exit 1; }
# ─── Semgrep Security Scan ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Catches XXE-unprotected XML parser factories and similar patterns defined in
# .semgrep/security.yml. Runs in parallel with backend-unit-tests for fast feedback.
# Uses local rules only (no SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN / OIDC — act_runner does not support it).
semgrep-scan:
name: Semgrep Security Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: '3.11'
cache: 'pip'
- name: Install Semgrep
run: pip install semgrep==1.163.0
- name: Run security rules
run: semgrep --config .semgrep/security.yml --error --metrics=off backend/src/
# ─── Compose Bucket-Bootstrap Idempotency ─────────────────────────────────────
# docker-compose.prod.yml's create-buckets service runs on every
# `docker compose up` (one-shot, no restart). Must be idempotent — a
# re-deploy must not fail just because the bucket / user / policy
# already exists. Validated by running create-buckets twice against a
# throwaway minio stack and asserting both invocations exit 0.
compose-idempotency:
name: Compose Bucket Idempotency
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Write stub env file
run: |
cat > .env.test <<'EOF'
TAG=test
PORT_BACKEND=18080
PORT_FRONTEND=13000
APP_DOMAIN=localhost
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=stub
MINIO_PASSWORD=stubrootpassword
MINIO_APP_PASSWORD=stubapppassword
OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN=stub
APP_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin@local
APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=stub
MAIL_HOST=mailpit
MAIL_PORT=1025
APP_MAIL_FROM=noreply@local
IMPORT_HOST_DIR=/tmp/dummy-import
COMPOSE_NETWORK_NAME=test-idem-archiv-net
EOF
- name: Bring up minio
run: |
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p test-idem --env-file .env.test up -d --wait minio
- name: First create-buckets run
run: |
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p test-idem --env-file .env.test run --rm create-buckets
- name: Second create-buckets run (idempotency check)
run: |
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p test-idem --env-file .env.test run --rm create-buckets
- name: Teardown
if: always()
run: |
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p test-idem --env-file .env.test down -v
rm -f .env.test
./mvnw clean test
working-directory: backend

View File

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
name: Coverage Flake Probe
# Manually-triggered probe for the birpc teardown race documented in ADR 012
# / #553. Runs the full coverage suite 20× in parallel against a single SHA
# and asserts zero `[birpc] rpc is closed` lines across every cell. Verifies
# the acceptance criterion that the race no longer surfaces under coverage.
on:
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
coverage-flake-probe:
name: Coverage flake probe (run ${{ matrix.run }})
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container:
image: mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.58.2-noble
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
run: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Cache node_modules
id: node-modules-cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: frontend/node_modules
key: node-modules-${{ hashFiles('frontend/package-lock.json') }}
- name: Install dependencies
if: steps.node-modules-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
run: npm ci
working-directory: frontend
- name: Compile Paraglide i18n
run: npx @inlang/paraglide-js compile --project ./project.inlang --outdir ./src/lib/paraglide
working-directory: frontend
- name: Run unit and component tests with coverage
shell: bash
run: |
set -eo pipefail
npm run test:coverage 2>&1 | tee /tmp/coverage-test-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ matrix.run }}.log
working-directory: frontend
env:
TZ: Europe/Berlin
- name: Assert no birpc teardown race
shell: bash
if: always()
run: |
if grep -qF "[birpc] rpc is closed" /tmp/coverage-test-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ matrix.run }}.log 2>/dev/null; then
echo "FAIL: [birpc] rpc is closed teardown race detected in run ${{ matrix.run }}"
grep -F "[birpc] rpc is closed" /tmp/coverage-test-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ matrix.run }}.log
exit 1
fi
# Gitea Actions (act_runner) does not implement upload-artifact v4 protocol — pinned per ADR-014. Do NOT upgrade. See #557.
- name: Upload coverage log on failure
if: failure()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: coverage-log-run-${{ matrix.run }}
path: /tmp/coverage-test-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ matrix.run }}.log

View File

@@ -1,280 +0,0 @@
name: nightly
# Builds and deploys the staging environment from main every night.
# Runs on the self-hosted runner using Docker-out-of-Docker (the docker
# socket is mounted in), so `docker compose build` produces images on
# the host daemon and `docker compose up` consumes them directly — no
# registry hop.
#
# Operational assumptions (see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §3 for the full setup):
#
# 1. Single-tenant self-hosted runner. The "Write staging env file" step
# writes every secret to .env.staging on the runner filesystem; the
# `if: always()` cleanup step removes it. A multi-tenant runner
# would need to switch to docker compose --env-file <(stdin) instead.
#
# 2. Host docker layer cache is authoritative. There is no
# actions/cache; we rely on the host daemon to keep Maven and npm
# layers warm between runs. A `docker system prune` on the host
# will cause the next nightly build to be cold (510 min slower).
#
# Staging environment isolation:
# - project name: archiv-staging
# - host ports: backend 8081, frontend 3001
# - profile: staging (starts mailpit instead of a real SMTP relay)
#
# Required Gitea secrets:
# STAGING_POSTGRES_PASSWORD
# STAGING_MINIO_PASSWORD
# STAGING_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD
# STAGING_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN
# STAGING_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME
# STAGING_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD
# GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD
# GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY
# SENTRY_DSN (set after GlitchTip first-run; empty = Sentry disabled)
on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 2 * * *"
workflow_dispatch:
env:
# Ensures the backend Dockerfile's `RUN --mount=type=cache` lines are
# honoured (Maven cache survives between runs).
DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
jobs:
deploy-staging:
# `ubuntu-latest` matches our self-hosted runner's advertised label
# (the runner has labels: ubuntu-latest / ubuntu-24.04 / ubuntu-22.04).
# `self-hosted` would never match — no runner advertises it — so the
# job parks in the queue forever. ADR-011's "single-tenant" promise
# is at the repo level; sharing this runner between CI and deploys
# for the same repo is within that boundary.
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Write staging env file
run: |
cat > .env.staging <<EOF
TAG=nightly
PORT_BACKEND=8081
PORT_FRONTEND=3001
APP_DOMAIN=staging.raddatz.cloud
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_POSTGRES_PASSWORD }}
MINIO_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_MINIO_PASSWORD }}
MINIO_APP_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD }}
OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN=${{ secrets.STAGING_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN }}
APP_ADMIN_USERNAME=${{ secrets.STAGING_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME }}
APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD }}
MAIL_HOST=mailpit
MAIL_PORT=1025
MAIL_USERNAME=
MAIL_PASSWORD=
MAIL_SMTP_AUTH=false
MAIL_STARTTLS_ENABLE=false
APP_MAIL_FROM=noreply@staging.raddatz.cloud
IMPORT_HOST_DIR=/srv/familienarchiv-staging/import
POSTGRES_USER=archiv
SENTRY_DSN=${{ secrets.SENTRY_DSN }}
EOF
- name: Verify backend /import:ro mount is wired
# Regression guard for #526: the /admin/system mass-import card
# only works when the backend service mounts the host import
# payload at /import (read-only). If a future "compose cleanup"
# PR drops the volumes block, mass import silently breaks again.
# `compose config` renders both shorthand and longform mounts as
# `target: /import` + `read_only: true`, so we assert against
# the rendered form rather than the raw source YAML.
run: |
set -e
docker compose \
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
-p archiv-staging \
--env-file .env.staging \
--profile staging \
config > /tmp/compose-rendered.yml
grep -q '^[[:space:]]*target: /import$' /tmp/compose-rendered.yml \
|| { echo "::error::backend is missing the /import bind mount (see #526)"; exit 1; }
grep -A2 '^[[:space:]]*target: /import$' /tmp/compose-rendered.yml \
| grep -q 'read_only: true' \
|| { echo "::error::backend /import mount is not read-only (see #526)"; exit 1; }
- name: Build images
# `--pull` forces re-fetching pinned base images so a CVE
# re-publication of the same tag (e.g. node:20.19.0-alpine3.21,
# postgres:16-alpine) is picked up instead of being served
# from the host's stale Docker layer cache.
run: |
docker compose \
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
-p archiv-staging \
--env-file .env.staging \
--profile staging \
build --pull
- name: Deploy staging
run: |
docker compose \
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
-p archiv-staging \
--env-file .env.staging \
--profile staging \
up -d --wait --remove-orphans
- name: Deploy observability configs
# Copies the compose file and config tree from the workspace checkout
# into /opt/familienarchiv/ — the permanent location that persists
# between CI runs. Containers started in the next step bind-mount
# from there, so a future workspace wipe cannot corrupt a running
# config file.
#
# obs-secrets.env is written fresh from Gitea secrets on every run so
# Gitea is always the single source of truth for secret rotation.
# Non-secret config lives in infra/observability/obs.env (tracked in git).
run: |
rm -rf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability
mkdir -p /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability
cp -r infra/observability/. /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/
cp docker-compose.observability.yml /opt/familienarchiv/
cat > /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env <<'EOF'
GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD }}
GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY=${{ secrets.GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY }}
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_POSTGRES_PASSWORD }}
POSTGRES_HOST=archiv-staging-db-1
EOF
# Note: POSTGRES_HOST is derived from the Compose project name (archiv-staging)
# and service name (db). A project rename requires updating this value.
chmod 600 /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env
- name: Validate observability compose config
# Dry-run: resolves all variable substitutions and reports any missing
# required keys before containers start. Catches undefined variables and
# YAML errors in config files updated by the previous step.
# --env-file order: obs.env first (git-tracked defaults), obs-secrets.env
# second (CI-written secrets). Later files win on duplicate keys, so
# obs-secrets.env overrides POSTGRES_HOST set in obs.env.
run: |
docker compose \
-f /opt/familienarchiv/docker-compose.observability.yml \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/obs.env \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env \
config --quiet
- name: Start observability stack
# Runs with absolute paths so bind mounts resolve to stable host paths
# that survive workspace wipes between nightly runs (see ADR-016).
# Non-secret config from obs.env (git-tracked); secrets from obs-secrets.env
# (written fresh from Gitea secrets above). --env-file order: obs.env first,
# obs-secrets.env second — later file wins on duplicate keys.
run: |
docker compose \
-f /opt/familienarchiv/docker-compose.observability.yml \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/obs.env \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env \
up -d --wait --remove-orphans
- name: Assert observability stack health
# docker compose up --wait covers services WITH healthcheck directives only.
# obs-promtail, obs-cadvisor, obs-node-exporter, and obs-glitchtip-worker have
# no healthcheck — they are considered "started" as soon as the process runs.
# This step explicitly asserts the five healthchecked critical services are
# healthy before the smoke test proceeds.
run: |
set -e
unhealthy=""
for svc in obs-loki obs-prometheus obs-grafana obs-tempo obs-glitchtip; do
status=$(docker inspect "$svc" --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "missing")
if [ "$status" != "healthy" ]; then
echo "::error::$svc is not healthy (status: $status)"
unhealthy="$unhealthy $svc"
fi
done
[ -z "$unhealthy" ] || exit 1
echo "All critical observability services are healthy"
- name: Reload Caddy
# Apply any committed Caddyfile changes before smoke-testing the
# public surface. Without this step, a Caddyfile edit lands in the
# repo but Caddy keeps serving the previous config until someone
# reloads it manually — the smoke test would then catch a stale
# header or a still-proxied /actuator route rather than confirming
# the current config is live.
#
# The runner executes job steps inside Docker containers (DooD).
# `systemctl` is not present in container images and cannot reach
# the host's systemd directly. We use the Docker socket (mounted
# into every job container via runner-config.yaml) to spin up a
# privileged sibling container in the host PID namespace; nsenter
# then enters the host's namespaces so systemctl talks to the real
# host systemd daemon. No sudoers entry is required — the Docker
# socket already grants root-equivalent host access.
#
# Alpine is used: ~5 MB vs ~70 MB for ubuntu, no unnecessary
# tooling, and the digest is pinned so any upstream change requires
# an explicit bump PR. util-linux (which ships nsenter) is installed
# at run time; apk add takes ~1 s on the warm VPS cache.
#
# `reload` not `restart`: reload sends SIGHUP so Caddy re-reads its
# config in-process without dropping TLS connections. `restart`
# would briefly stop the service, losing in-flight requests.
#
# If Caddy is not running this step fails fast before the smoke test
# issues a misleading "port 443 refused" error.
run: |
docker run --rm --privileged --pid=host \
alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d \
sh -c 'apk add --no-cache util-linux -q && nsenter -t 1 -m -u -n -p -i -- /bin/systemctl reload caddy'
- name: Smoke test deployed environment
# Healthchecks confirm containers are healthy; they do NOT confirm the
# public surface works. This step catches: Caddy not reloaded, HSTS
# header dropped, /actuator block bypassed.
#
# --resolve pins staging.raddatz.cloud to the Docker bridge gateway IP
# (the host) so we do NOT depend on hairpin NAT on the host router.
# 127.0.0.1 cannot be used: job containers run in bridge network mode
# (runner-config.yaml), so 127.0.0.1 is the container's loopback, not
# the host's. The bridge gateway IS the host; Caddy binds 0.0.0.0:443
# and is therefore reachable from the container via that IP.
# SNI still uses the public hostname so the TLS cert validates correctly.
#
# Gateway detection reads /proc/net/route (always present, no package
# required) instead of `ip route` to avoid a dependency on iproute2.
# Field $2=="00000000" is the default route; field $3 is the gateway as
# a little-endian 32-bit hex value which awk decodes to dotted-decimal.
run: |
set -e
HOST="staging.raddatz.cloud"
URL="https://$HOST"
HOST_IP=$(awk 'NR>1 && $2=="00000000"{h=$3;printf "%d.%d.%d.%d\n",strtonum("0x"substr(h,7,2)),strtonum("0x"substr(h,5,2)),strtonum("0x"substr(h,3,2)),strtonum("0x"substr(h,1,2));exit}' /proc/net/route)
[ -n "$HOST_IP" ] || { echo "ERROR: could not detect Docker bridge gateway via /proc/net/route"; exit 1; }
RESOLVE="--resolve $HOST:443:$HOST_IP"
echo "Smoke test: $URL (pinned to $HOST_IP via bridge gateway)"
curl -fsS "$RESOLVE" --max-time 10 "$URL/login" -o /dev/null
# Pin the preload-list-eligible HSTS value, not just header presence:
# a degraded `max-age=1` or a dropped `includeSubDomains; preload` must
# fail this check rather than pass it silently.
curl -fsS "$RESOLVE" --max-time 10 -I "$URL/" \
| grep -Eqi 'strict-transport-security:[[:space:]]*max-age=31536000.*includeSubDomains.*preload'
# Permissions-Policy denies APIs the app does not use (camera,
# microphone, geolocation). A regression that loosens or drops the
# header now fails the smoke step.
curl -fsS "$RESOLVE" --max-time 10 -I "$URL/" \
| grep -Eqi 'permissions-policy:[[:space:]]*camera=\(\),[[:space:]]*microphone=\(\),[[:space:]]*geolocation=\(\)'
status=$(curl -s "$RESOLVE" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 10 "$URL/actuator/health")
[ "$status" = "404" ] || { echo "expected 404 from /actuator/health, got $status"; exit 1; }
echo "All smoke checks passed"
- name: Cleanup env file
# LOAD-BEARING: `if: always()` is the linchpin of the ADR-011
# single-tenant runner trust model. Every secret in .env.staging
# is plain text on the runner filesystem until this step runs.
# If a future refactor drops `if: always()`, a failed deploy
# leaves the env-file behind. Do not remove this conditional
# without first re-evaluating ADR-011.
if: always()
run: rm -f .env.staging

View File

@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
name: release
# Builds and deploys the production environment on `v*` tag push.
# Runs on the self-hosted runner via Docker-out-of-Docker; images are
# tagged with the actual git tag (e.g. v1.0.0) so rollback is
# `TAG=<previous> docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-production up -d --wait`
#
# Operational assumptions (see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §3 for the full setup):
#
# 1. Single-tenant self-hosted runner. The "Write production env file"
# step writes every secret to .env.production on the runner
# filesystem; the `if: always()` cleanup step removes it. A
# multi-tenant runner would need to switch to
# `docker compose --env-file <(stdin)` instead.
#
# 2. Host docker layer cache is authoritative. There is no
# actions/cache; we rely on the host daemon to keep Maven and npm
# layers warm between runs. A `docker system prune` on the host
# will cause the next release build to be cold (510 min slower).
#
# Production environment:
# - project name: archiv-production
# - host ports: backend 8080, frontend 3000
# - profile: (none) — mailpit is excluded; real SMTP relay is used
#
# Required Gitea secrets:
# PROD_POSTGRES_PASSWORD
# PROD_MINIO_PASSWORD
# PROD_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD
# PROD_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN
# PROD_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME (CRITICAL: see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md)
# PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD (CRITICAL: locked in on first deploy)
# MAIL_HOST
# MAIL_PORT
# MAIL_USERNAME
# MAIL_PASSWORD
# GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD
# GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY
# SENTRY_DSN (set after GlitchTip first-run; empty = Sentry disabled)
on:
push:
tags:
- "v*"
env:
DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
jobs:
deploy-production:
# See nightly.yml — same rationale: `ubuntu-latest` matches the
# advertised label of our single-tenant self-hosted runner.
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Write production env file
run: |
cat > .env.production <<EOF
TAG=${{ gitea.ref_name }}
PORT_BACKEND=8080
PORT_FRONTEND=3000
APP_DOMAIN=archiv.raddatz.cloud
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_POSTGRES_PASSWORD }}
MINIO_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_MINIO_PASSWORD }}
MINIO_APP_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD }}
OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN=${{ secrets.PROD_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN }}
APP_ADMIN_USERNAME=${{ secrets.PROD_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME }}
APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD }}
MAIL_HOST=${{ secrets.MAIL_HOST }}
MAIL_PORT=${{ secrets.MAIL_PORT }}
MAIL_USERNAME=${{ secrets.MAIL_USERNAME }}
MAIL_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.MAIL_PASSWORD }}
MAIL_SMTP_AUTH=true
MAIL_STARTTLS_ENABLE=true
APP_MAIL_FROM=noreply@raddatz.cloud
IMPORT_HOST_DIR=/srv/familienarchiv-production/import
POSTGRES_USER=archiv
SENTRY_DSN=${{ secrets.SENTRY_DSN }}
EOF
- name: Build images
# `--pull` forces re-fetching pinned base images so a CVE
# re-publication of the same tag is picked up rather than served
# from the host's stale Docker layer cache.
run: |
docker compose \
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
-p archiv-production \
--env-file .env.production \
build --pull
- name: Deploy production
run: |
docker compose \
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
-p archiv-production \
--env-file .env.production \
up -d --wait --remove-orphans
- name: Deploy observability configs
# Mirrors the nightly approach: copies obs compose file and config tree
# to /opt/familienarchiv/ (permanent path, survives workspace wipes — ADR-016),
# then writes obs-secrets.env fresh from Gitea secrets.
# Non-secret config lives in infra/observability/obs.env (tracked in git).
run: |
rm -rf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability
mkdir -p /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability
cp -r infra/observability/. /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/
cp docker-compose.observability.yml /opt/familienarchiv/
cat > /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env <<'EOF'
GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD }}
GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY=${{ secrets.GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY }}
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_POSTGRES_PASSWORD }}
POSTGRES_HOST=archiv-production-db-1
EOF
# Note: POSTGRES_HOST is derived from the Compose project name (archiv-production)
# and service name (db). A project rename requires updating this value.
chmod 600 /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env
- name: Validate observability compose config
# Dry-run: resolves all variable substitutions and reports any missing
# required keys before containers start. Catches undefined variables and
# YAML errors in config files updated by the previous step.
# --env-file order: obs.env first (git-tracked defaults), obs-secrets.env
# second (CI-written secrets). Later files win on duplicate keys, so
# obs-secrets.env overrides POSTGRES_HOST set in obs.env.
# Keep in sync with the equivalent step in nightly.yml (#603).
run: |
docker compose \
-f /opt/familienarchiv/docker-compose.observability.yml \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/obs.env \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env \
config --quiet
- name: Start observability stack
# Runs with absolute paths so bind mounts resolve to stable host paths
# that survive workspace wipes between runs (see ADR-016).
# Non-secret config from obs.env (git-tracked); secrets from obs-secrets.env
# (written fresh from Gitea secrets above). --env-file order: obs.env first,
# obs-secrets.env second — later file wins on duplicate keys.
# Keep in sync with the equivalent step in nightly.yml (#603).
run: |
docker compose \
-f /opt/familienarchiv/docker-compose.observability.yml \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/obs.env \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env \
up -d --wait --remove-orphans
- name: Assert observability stack health
# docker compose up --wait covers services WITH healthcheck directives only.
# obs-promtail, obs-cadvisor, obs-node-exporter, and obs-glitchtip-worker have
# no healthcheck — they are considered "started" as soon as the process runs.
# This step explicitly asserts the five healthchecked critical services are
# healthy before the smoke test proceeds.
# Keep in sync with the equivalent step in nightly.yml (#603).
run: |
set -e
unhealthy=""
for svc in obs-loki obs-prometheus obs-grafana obs-tempo obs-glitchtip; do
status=$(docker inspect "$svc" --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "missing")
if [ "$status" != "healthy" ]; then
echo "::error::$svc is not healthy (status: $status)"
unhealthy="$unhealthy $svc"
fi
done
[ -z "$unhealthy" ] || exit 1
echo "All critical observability services are healthy"
- name: Reload Caddy
# See nightly.yml — same rationale and mechanism: DooD job containers
# cannot call systemctl directly; nsenter via a privileged sibling
# container reaches the host systemd. Must run after deploy (so the
# latest Caddyfile is on disk) and before the smoke test (so the
# public surface reflects the current config). Alpine with pinned
# digest; reload not restart — see nightly.yml for full rationale.
run: |
docker run --rm --privileged --pid=host \
alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d \
sh -c 'apk add --no-cache util-linux -q && nsenter -t 1 -m -u -n -p -i -- /bin/systemctl reload caddy'
- name: Smoke test deployed environment
# See nightly.yml — same three checks, against the prod vhost.
# --resolve pins to the bridge gateway IP (the host), not 127.0.0.1
# — see nightly.yml for the full network topology explanation.
run: |
set -e
HOST="archiv.raddatz.cloud"
URL="https://$HOST"
HOST_IP=$(ip route show default | awk '/default/ {print $3}')
[ -n "$HOST_IP" ] || { echo "ERROR: could not detect Docker bridge gateway via 'ip route'"; exit 1; }
RESOLVE="--resolve $HOST:443:$HOST_IP"
echo "Smoke test: $URL (pinned to $HOST_IP via bridge gateway)"
curl -fsS "$RESOLVE" --max-time 10 "$URL/login" -o /dev/null
# Pin the preload-list-eligible HSTS value, not just header presence:
# a degraded `max-age=1` or a dropped `includeSubDomains; preload` must
# fail this check rather than pass it silently.
curl -fsS "$RESOLVE" --max-time 10 -I "$URL/" \
| grep -Eqi 'strict-transport-security:[[:space:]]*max-age=31536000.*includeSubDomains.*preload'
# Permissions-Policy denies APIs the app does not use (camera,
# microphone, geolocation). A regression that loosens or drops the
# header now fails the smoke step.
curl -fsS "$RESOLVE" --max-time 10 -I "$URL/" \
| grep -Eqi 'permissions-policy:[[:space:]]*camera=\(\),[[:space:]]*microphone=\(\),[[:space:]]*geolocation=\(\)'
status=$(curl -s "$RESOLVE" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 10 "$URL/actuator/health")
[ "$status" = "404" ] || { echo "expected 404 from /actuator/health, got $status"; exit 1; }
echo "All smoke checks passed"
- name: Cleanup env file
# LOAD-BEARING: `if: always()` is the linchpin of the ADR-011
# single-tenant runner trust model. Every secret in
# .env.production is plain text on the runner filesystem until
# this step runs. If a future refactor drops `if: always()`, a
# failed deploy leaves the env-file behind. Do not remove this
# conditional without first re-evaluating ADR-011.
if: always()
run: rm -f .env.production

View File

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
# Semgrep security rules for Familienarchiv backend.
# These rules catch the absence of XXE protection on XML parser factories.
# CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference.
# Run: semgrep --config .semgrep/security.yml --error backend/src/
rules:
# DocumentBuilderFactory without XXE hardening.
# All call sites must call setFeature("…disallow-doctype-decl", true) before use.
- id: dbf-xxe-default
patterns:
- pattern: $X = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
- pattern-not-inside: |
...
$X.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
...
message: >
DocumentBuilderFactory without XXE protection (CWE-611).
Call XxeSafeXmlParser.hardenedFactory() instead of DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().
See: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
languages: [java]
severity: ERROR
# SAXParserFactory without XXE hardening.
- id: sax-xxe-default
patterns:
- pattern: $X = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
- pattern-not-inside: |
...
$X.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
...
message: >
SAXParserFactory without XXE protection (CWE-611).
Set disallow-doctype-decl=true, external-general-entities=false, external-parameter-entities=false,
and load-external-dtd=false before use. Follow the pattern in XxeSafeXmlParser.hardenedFactory().
See: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
languages: [java]
severity: ERROR
# XMLInputFactory without XXE hardening (StAX parser).
- id: stax-xxe-default
patterns:
- pattern: $X = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();
- pattern-not-inside: |
...
$X.setProperty(XMLInputFactory.IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES, false);
...
message: >
XMLInputFactory without XXE protection (CWE-611).
Set IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES=false and SUPPORT_DTD=false before use.
Follow the pattern in XxeSafeXmlParser.hardenedFactory().
See: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
languages: [java]
severity: ERROR

View File

@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ npm run generate:api # Regenerate TypeScript API types from OpenAPI spec
```
backend/src/main/java/org/raddatz/familienarchiv/
├── audit/ Audit logging
├── auth/ AuthService, AuthSessionController, LoginRequest (Spring Session JDBC)
├── config/ Infrastructure config (Minio, Async, Web)
├── dashboard/ Dashboard analytics + StatsController/StatsService
├── document/ Document domain (entities, controller, service, repository, DTOs)
@@ -94,7 +93,7 @@ backend/src/main/java/org/raddatz/familienarchiv/
│ └── relationship/ PersonRelationship sub-domain
├── security/ SecurityConfig, Permission, @RequirePermission, PermissionAspect
├── tag/ Tag domain
└── user/ User domain — AppUser, UserGroup, UserService
└── user/ User domain — AppUser, UserGroup, UserService, auth controllers
```
### Layering Rules
@@ -160,7 +159,7 @@ Input DTOs live flat in the domain package. Response types are the model entitie
→ See [CONTRIBUTING.md §Error handling](./CONTRIBUTING.md#error-handling)
**LLM reminder:** use `DomainException.notFound/forbidden/conflict/internal()` from service methods — never throw raw exceptions. When adding a new `ErrorCode`: (1) add to `ErrorCode.java`, (2) add to `ErrorCode` type in `frontend/src/lib/shared/errors.ts`, (3) add a `case` in `getErrorMessage()`, (4) add i18n keys in `messages/{de,en,es}.json`.
**LLM reminder:** use `DomainException.notFound/forbidden/conflict/internal()` from service methods — never throw raw exceptions. When adding a new `ErrorCode`: (1) add to `ErrorCode.java`, (2) mirror in `frontend/src/lib/shared/errors.ts`, (3) add i18n keys in `messages/{de,en,es}.json`.
### Security / Permissions
@@ -203,7 +202,8 @@ frontend/src/routes/
├── profile/ User profile settings
├── users/[id]/ Public user profile page
├── login/ logout/ register/
── forgot-password/ reset-password/
── forgot-password/ reset-password/
└── demo/ Dev-only demos
```
### API Client Pattern
@@ -275,35 +275,6 @@ Back button pattern — use the shared `<BackButton>` component from `$lib/share
→ See [docs/DEPLOYMENT.md](./docs/DEPLOYMENT.md)
### Observability stack (separate compose file)
Run via `docker-compose.observability.yml` — requires the main stack to be running first. Full setup procedure: [docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §4](./docs/DEPLOYMENT.md#4-logs--observability).
| Service | Container | Default Port | Purpose |
|---------|-----------|-------------|---------|
| Grafana | `obs-grafana` | 3003 | Metrics / logs / traces dashboard |
| Prometheus | `obs-prometheus` | 9090 (dev only — `127.0.0.1` bound) | Metrics store |
| Loki | `obs-loki` | — (internal) | Log store |
| Tempo | `obs-tempo` | — (internal) | Trace store |
| GlitchTip | `obs-glitchtip` | 3002 | Error tracking (Sentry-compatible) |
### Observability env vars
| Variable | Purpose |
|----------|---------|
| `PORT_GRAFANA` | Host port for Grafana UI (default: `3003`) |
| `PORT_GLITCHTIP` | Host port for GlitchTip UI (default: `3002`) |
| `PORT_PROMETHEUS` | Host port for Prometheus UI (default: `9090`) |
| `GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Grafana `admin` login password — generate with `openssl rand -hex 32` |
| `GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY` | Django secret key for GlitchTip — generate with `python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"` |
| `GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN` | Public-facing base URL for GlitchTip (email links, CORS), e.g. `https://glitchtip.example.com` |
| `SENTRY_DSN` | GlitchTip/Sentry DSN for the backend (Spring Boot) — leave empty to disable |
| `VITE_SENTRY_DSN` | GlitchTip/Sentry DSN for the frontend (SvelteKit) — injected at build time via Vite |
## Observability
→ See [docs/OBSERVABILITY.md](./docs/OBSERVABILITY.md) — where to look for logs, traces, metrics, and errors.
## API Testing
HTTP test files are in `backend/api_tests/` for use with the VS Code REST Client extension.

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ Spring Boot 4.0 monolith serving the Familienarchiv REST API. Handles document m
```
src/main/java/org/raddatz/familienarchiv/
├── audit/ # Audit logging (AuditService, AuditLogQueryService)
├── auth/ # AuthService, AuthSessionController, LoginRequest (Spring Session JDBC — ADR-020)
├── config/ # Infrastructure config (MinioConfig, AsyncConfig, WebConfig)
├── dashboard/ # Dashboard analytics + StatsController/StatsService
├── document/ # Document domain — entities, controller, service, repository, DTOs
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ src/main/java/org/raddatz/familienarchiv/
│ └── relationship/ # PersonRelationship sub-domain
├── security/ # SecurityConfig, Permission, @RequirePermission, PermissionAspect
├── tag/ # Tag domain — Tag, TagService, TagController
└── user/ # User domain — AppUser, UserGroup, UserService
└── user/ # User domain — AppUser, UserGroup, UserService, auth controllers
```
For per-domain ownership and public surface, see each domain's `README.md`.
@@ -97,10 +96,7 @@ public class MyEntity {
- Annotated with `@Service`, `@RequiredArgsConstructor`, optionally `@Slf4j`.
- Write methods: `@Transactional`.
- Read methods: no annotation (default non-transactional)**except** when the method returns
an entity whose lazy associations must remain accessible to the caller after the method
returns. In that case, use `@Transactional(readOnly = true)` to keep the Hibernate session
open. Removing this annotation causes `LazyInitializationException` in production. See ADR-022.
- Read methods: no annotation (default non-transactional).
- Cross-domain access goes through the other domain's service, never its repository.
## Error Handling

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
<parent>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-parent</artifactId>
<version>4.0.6</version>
<version>4.0.0</version>
<relativePath/> <!-- lookup parent from repository -->
</parent>
<groupId>org.raddatz</groupId>
@@ -29,30 +29,11 @@
<properties>
<java.version>21</java.version>
</properties>
<dependencyManagement>
<dependencies>
<!-- opentelemetry-spring-boot-starter:2.27.0 was built against opentelemetry-api:1.61.0,
but Spring Boot 4.0.0 BOM only manages 1.55.0 (missing GlobalOpenTelemetry.getOrNoop()).
Import the core OTel BOM here to override it before the Spring Boot BOM applies. -->
<dependency>
<groupId>io.opentelemetry</groupId>
<artifactId>opentelemetry-bom</artifactId>
<version>1.61.0</version>
<type>pom</type>
<scope>import</scope>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
</dependencyManagement>
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-actuator</artifactId>
</dependency>
<!-- Spring Boot 4.0 splits Micrometer metrics export (incl. Prometheus scrape endpoint) into its own starter -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-micrometer-metrics</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-validation</artifactId>
@@ -69,10 +50,6 @@
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-session-jdbc</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-webmvc</artifactId>
@@ -211,7 +188,7 @@
<dependency>
<groupId>com.googlecode.owasp-java-html-sanitizer</groupId>
<artifactId>owasp-java-html-sanitizer</artifactId>
<version>20260101.1</version>
<version>20240325.1</version>
</dependency>
<!-- HTML → plain-text extraction for comment previews -->
@@ -220,42 +197,6 @@
<artifactId>jsoup</artifactId>
<version>1.18.1</version>
</dependency>
<!-- Observability: Prometheus metrics scrape endpoint (version managed by Spring Boot BOM) -->
<dependency>
<groupId>io.micrometer</groupId>
<artifactId>micrometer-registry-prometheus</artifactId>
</dependency>
<!-- Observability: Micrometer → OpenTelemetry tracing bridge (version managed by Spring Boot BOM) -->
<dependency>
<groupId>io.micrometer</groupId>
<artifactId>micrometer-tracing-bridge-otel</artifactId>
</dependency>
<!-- Observability: OTel Spring Boot auto-instrumentation — NOT in Spring Boot BOM, pinned explicitly -->
<dependency>
<groupId>io.opentelemetry.instrumentation</groupId>
<artifactId>opentelemetry-spring-boot-starter</artifactId>
<version>2.27.0</version>
<exclusions>
<!-- Excludes AzureAppServiceResourceProvider which references ServiceAttributes.SERVICE_INSTANCE_ID
that does not exist in the semconv version pulled by this project. -->
<exclusion>
<groupId>io.opentelemetry.contrib</groupId>
<artifactId>opentelemetry-azure-resources</artifactId>
</exclusion>
</exclusions>
</dependency>
<!-- Sentry error reporting (GlitchTip-compatible) — sentry-spring-boot-4 is the
Spring Boot 4 / Spring Framework 7 compatible module (replaces the jakarta starter
which crashes with SF7 due to bean-name generation for triply-nested @Import classes) -->
<dependency>
<groupId>io.sentry</groupId>
<artifactId>sentry-spring-boot-4</artifactId>
<version>8.41.0</version>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
@@ -301,7 +242,7 @@
<phase>verify</phase>
<goals><goal>report</goal></goals>
</execution>
<!-- Gate: ratchet at 0.77 — actual measured coverage after drift; raise via #496 -->
<!-- Gate: baseline 89.4% overall / service 90.2% / controller 80.0% -->
<execution>
<id>check</id>
<phase>verify</phase>
@@ -314,7 +255,7 @@
<limit>
<counter>BRANCH</counter>
<value>COVEREDRATIO</value>
<minimum>0.77</minimum>
<minimum>0.88</minimum>
</limit>
</limits>
</rule>
@@ -332,16 +273,6 @@
</profiles>
</configuration>
</plugin>
<plugin>
<groupId>org.apache.maven.plugins</groupId>
<artifactId>maven-surefire-plugin</artifactId>
<configuration>
<forkedProcessTimeoutInSeconds>600</forkedProcessTimeoutInSeconds>
<systemPropertyVariables>
<junit.jupiter.execution.timeout.default>90 s</junit.jupiter.execution.timeout.default>
</systemPropertyVariables>
</configuration>
</plugin>
</plugins>
</build>

View File

@@ -35,16 +35,7 @@ public enum AuditKind {
USER_DELETED,
/** Payload: {@code {"userId": "uuid", "email": "addr", "addedGroups": ["Admin"], "removedGroups": []}} */
GROUP_MEMBERSHIP_CHANGED,
/** Payload: {@code {"userId": "uuid", "ip": "1.2.3.4", "ua": "Mozilla/5.0..."}} */
LOGIN_SUCCESS,
/** Payload: {@code {"email": "addr", "ip": "1.2.3.4", "ua": "Mozilla/5.0..."}} — password NEVER included */
LOGIN_FAILED,
/** Payload: {@code {"userId": "uuid", "ip": "1.2.3.4", "ua": "Mozilla/5.0..."}} */
LOGOUT;
GROUP_MEMBERSHIP_CHANGED;
public static final Set<AuditKind> ROLLUP_ELIGIBLE = Set.of(
TEXT_SAVED, FILE_UPLOADED, ANNOTATION_CREATED,

View File

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.auth;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.audit.AuditKind;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.audit.AuditService;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception.DomainException;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.AppUser;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.UserService;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.AuthenticationManager;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken;
import org.springframework.security.core.Authentication;
import org.springframework.security.core.AuthenticationException;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Service;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.UUID;
@Service
@RequiredArgsConstructor
@Slf4j
public class AuthService {
private final AuthenticationManager authenticationManager;
private final UserService userService;
private final AuditService auditService;
/**
* Validates credentials and returns the authenticated user plus the Spring Security
* Authentication object. The caller is responsible for persisting the Authentication
* to the session via SecurityContextRepository.
*/
public LoginResult login(String email, String password, String ip, String ua) {
try {
Authentication auth = authenticationManager.authenticate(
new UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken(email, password));
AppUser user = userService.findByEmail(email);
auditService.log(AuditKind.LOGIN_SUCCESS, user.getId(), null, Map.of(
"userId", user.getId().toString(),
"ip", ip,
"ua", truncateUa(ua)));
return new LoginResult(user, auth);
} catch (AuthenticationException ex) {
// Audit login failure — intentionally does NOT log the attempted password.
// DaoAuthenticationProvider already runs a dummy BCrypt on unknown users to
// equalise timing between "user not found" and "wrong password" paths.
auditService.log(AuditKind.LOGIN_FAILED, null, null, Map.of(
"email", email,
"ip", ip,
"ua", truncateUa(ua)));
throw DomainException.invalidCredentials();
}
}
public void logout(String email, String ip, String ua) {
AppUser user = userService.findByEmail(email);
auditService.log(AuditKind.LOGOUT, user.getId(), null, Map.of(
"userId", user.getId().toString(),
"ip", ip,
"ua", truncateUa(ua)));
}
private static String truncateUa(String ua) {
if (ua == null) return "";
return ua.length() > 200 ? ua.substring(0, 200) : ua;
}
public record LoginResult(AppUser user, Authentication authentication) {}
}

View File

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.auth;
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpSession;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.AppUser;
import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
import org.springframework.security.core.Authentication;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContext;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder;
import org.springframework.security.web.authentication.session.SessionAuthenticationStrategy;
import org.springframework.security.web.context.HttpSessionSecurityContextRepository;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*;
// @RequirePermission is intentionally absent: login is unauthenticated by design;
// logout requires an authenticated session (enforced by SecurityConfig), not a specific permission.
@RestController
@RequestMapping("/api/auth")
@RequiredArgsConstructor
@Slf4j
public class AuthSessionController {
private final AuthService authService;
private final SessionAuthenticationStrategy sessionAuthenticationStrategy;
@PostMapping("/login")
public ResponseEntity<AppUser> login(
@RequestBody LoginRequest request,
HttpServletRequest httpRequest,
HttpServletResponse httpResponse) {
String ip = resolveClientIp(httpRequest);
String ua = resolveUserAgent(httpRequest);
AuthService.LoginResult result = authService.login(request.email(), request.password(), ip, ua);
// Session-fixation defense (CWE-384): rotate the session ID at the authentication
// boundary. ChangeSessionIdAuthenticationStrategy invalidates any pre-auth session ID
// an attacker may have planted and mints a fresh one before we attach the SecurityContext.
httpRequest.getSession(true);
sessionAuthenticationStrategy.onAuthentication(result.authentication(), httpRequest, httpResponse);
// Spring Session JDBC intercepts setAttribute() and persists the record under the
// (now rotated) opaque ID; the Set-Cookie: fa_session=<opaque-id> is added automatically.
SecurityContext context = SecurityContextHolder.createEmptyContext();
context.setAuthentication(result.authentication());
SecurityContextHolder.setContext(context);
httpRequest.getSession()
.setAttribute(HttpSessionSecurityContextRepository.SPRING_SECURITY_CONTEXT_KEY, context);
return ResponseEntity.ok(result.user());
}
@PostMapping("/logout")
public ResponseEntity<Void> logout(Authentication authentication, HttpServletRequest httpRequest) {
String email = authentication.getName();
String ip = resolveClientIp(httpRequest);
String ua = resolveUserAgent(httpRequest);
// CWE-613 defense: invalidate the session first — that is the contract the user
// is relying on when they click "Log out." Audit is best-effort and must not
// bubble up: if the user record was deleted while the session was live, the
// audit lookup throws, but the session row in spring_session must still die.
HttpSession session = httpRequest.getSession(false);
if (session != null) {
session.invalidate();
}
SecurityContextHolder.clearContext();
try {
authService.logout(email, ip, ua);
} catch (Exception ex) {
log.warn("Audit logout failed for {}; session was already invalidated", email, ex);
}
return ResponseEntity.noContent().build();
}
/**
* Resolves the client IP for audit-log purposes.
*
* <p>Trust model: the leftmost {@code X-Forwarded-For} value is taken at face value.
* This is correct <em>only</em> if the ingress (Caddy in production) strips any
* client-supplied XFF before forwarding — otherwise an attacker can pin audit-log
* IPs to whatever they want. Verify the reverse-proxy config before exposing this
* service behind a different ingress.
*/
private static String resolveClientIp(HttpServletRequest request) {
String forwarded = request.getHeader("X-Forwarded-For");
if (forwarded != null && !forwarded.isBlank()) {
return forwarded.split(",")[0].trim();
}
return request.getRemoteAddr();
}
private static String resolveUserAgent(HttpServletRequest request) {
String ua = request.getHeader("User-Agent");
return ua != null ? ua : "";
}
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.auth;
public record LoginRequest(String email, String password) {}

View File

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.config;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Bean;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Configuration;
import org.springframework.session.web.http.CookieSerializer;
import org.springframework.session.web.http.DefaultCookieSerializer;
@Configuration
public class SpringSessionConfig {
@Bean
public CookieSerializer cookieSerializer() {
DefaultCookieSerializer serializer = new DefaultCookieSerializer();
serializer.setCookieName("fa_session");
serializer.setSameSite("Strict");
// cookieHttpOnly: true is the DefaultCookieSerializer default
// useSecureCookie not set: auto-detects from request.isSecure().
// With forward-headers-strategy: native, Caddy's X-Forwarded-Proto: https
// causes isSecure() → true in production; direct HTTP in dev/tests → false.
return serializer;
}
}

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document;
import jakarta.persistence.*;
import lombok.*;
import org.hibernate.annotations.BatchSize;
import org.hibernate.annotations.CreationTimestamp;
import org.hibernate.annotations.UpdateTimestamp;
@@ -22,15 +21,6 @@ import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
@NamedEntityGraph(name = "Document.full", attributeNodes = {
@NamedAttributeNode("sender"),
@NamedAttributeNode("receivers"),
@NamedAttributeNode("tags")
})
@NamedEntityGraph(name = "Document.list", attributeNodes = {
@NamedAttributeNode("sender"),
@NamedAttributeNode("tags")
})
@Entity
@Table(name = "documents")
@Data // Lombok: Generiert Getter, Setter, ToString, etc.
@@ -128,27 +118,24 @@ public class Document {
@Builder.Default
private ScriptType scriptType = ScriptType.UNKNOWN;
@ManyToMany(fetch = FetchType.LAZY)
@ManyToMany(fetch = FetchType.EAGER)
@JoinTable(name = "document_receivers", joinColumns = @JoinColumn(name = "document_id"), inverseJoinColumns = @JoinColumn(name = "person_id"))
@BatchSize(size = 50)
@Builder.Default
private Set<Person> receivers = new HashSet<>();
@ManyToOne(fetch = FetchType.LAZY)
@ManyToOne
@JoinColumn(name = "sender_id")
private Person sender;
@ManyToMany(fetch = FetchType.LAZY)
@ManyToMany(fetch = FetchType.EAGER)
@JoinTable(name = "document_tags", joinColumns = @JoinColumn(name = "document_id"), inverseJoinColumns = @JoinColumn(name = "tag_id"))
@BatchSize(size = 50)
@Builder.Default
private Set<Tag> tags = new HashSet<>();
@ElementCollection(fetch = FetchType.LAZY)
@ElementCollection(fetch = FetchType.EAGER)
@CollectionTable(name = "document_training_labels", joinColumns = @JoinColumn(name = "document_id"))
@Column(name = "label")
@Enumerated(EnumType.STRING)
@BatchSize(size = 50)
@Builder.Default
private Set<TrainingLabel> trainingLabels = new HashSet<>();

View File

@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document.DocumentStatus;
import org.springframework.data.domain.Page;
import org.springframework.data.domain.Pageable;
import org.springframework.data.domain.Sort;
import org.springframework.data.jpa.domain.Specification;
import org.springframework.data.jpa.repository.EntityGraph;
import org.springframework.data.jpa.repository.JpaRepository;
import org.springframework.data.jpa.repository.JpaSpecificationExecutor;
import org.springframework.data.jpa.repository.Query;
@@ -25,18 +23,6 @@ import java.util.UUID;
@Repository
public interface DocumentRepository extends JpaRepository<Document, UUID>, JpaSpecificationExecutor<Document> {
@EntityGraph("Document.full")
Optional<Document> findById(UUID id);
@EntityGraph("Document.list")
Page<Document> findAll(Specification<Document> spec, Pageable pageable);
@EntityGraph("Document.list")
List<Document> findAll(Specification<Document> spec);
@EntityGraph("Document.list")
Page<Document> findAll(Pageable pageable);
// Findet ein Dokument anhand des ursprünglichen Dateinamens
// Wichtig für den Abgleich beim Excel-Import & Datei-Upload
Optional<Document> findByOriginalFilename(String originalFilename);
@@ -114,45 +100,7 @@ public interface DocumentRepository extends JpaRepository<Document, UUID>, JpaSp
ORDER BY ts_rank(d.search_vector, q.pq) DESC,
d.meta_date DESC NULLS LAST
""")
// Unpaged path — for bulk-edit "select all" and density chart
List<UUID> findAllMatchingIdsByFts(@Param("query") String query);
/**
* Returns one page of FTS-ranked document IDs with the total match count.
*
* <p>Each row contains (in column order):
* <ol>
* <li>UUID — document id</li>
* <li>double — ts_rank score</li>
* <li>long — COUNT(*) OVER () — full match count, not page count</li>
* </ol>
*
* <p>Returns an empty list when the query matches no documents (including
* stopword-only queries where websearch_to_tsquery returns an empty tsquery).
* Use findAllMatchingIdsByFts for the unpaged bulk-edit path.
*/
@Query(nativeQuery = true, value = """
WITH q AS (
SELECT CASE WHEN websearch_to_tsquery('german', :query)::text <> ''
THEN to_tsquery('simple', regexp_replace(
websearch_to_tsquery('german', :query)::text,
'''([^'']+)''',
'''\\1'':*',
'g'))
END AS pq
), matches AS (
SELECT d.id, ts_rank(d.search_vector, q.pq) AS rank
FROM documents d, q
WHERE d.search_vector @@ q.pq
)
SELECT id, rank, COUNT(*) OVER () AS total
FROM matches
ORDER BY rank DESC, id
OFFSET :offset LIMIT :limit
""")
List<Object[]> findFtsPageRaw(@Param("query") String query,
@Param("offset") int offset,
@Param("limit") int limit);
List<UUID> findRankedIdsByFts(@Param("query") String query);
/**
* Returns match-enrichment data for a set of documents identified by their IDs.

View File

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ public class DocumentService {
*/
private List<UUID> resolveFtsIds(String text) {
if (!StringUtils.hasText(text)) return null;
return documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts(text);
return documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts(text);
}
/** Loads matching documents and projects to non-null {@link LocalDate}s. */
@@ -447,7 +447,6 @@ public class DocumentService {
return saved;
}
@Transactional
public Document updateDocumentTags(UUID docId, List<String> tagNames) {
Document doc = documentRepository.findById(docId)
.orElseThrow(() -> DomainException.notFound(ErrorCode.DOCUMENT_NOT_FOUND, "Document not found: " + docId));
@@ -486,7 +485,7 @@ public class DocumentService {
boolean hasText = StringUtils.hasText(text);
List<UUID> rankedIds = null;
if (hasText) {
rankedIds = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts(text);
rankedIds = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts(text);
if (rankedIds.isEmpty()) return List.of();
}
@@ -636,9 +635,7 @@ public class DocumentService {
return saved;
}
// @Transactional(readOnly=true) keeps the Hibernate session open so the
// lazy-loaded sender and tags on returned documents remain accessible to callers.
@Transactional(readOnly = true)
// 0. Zuletzt aktive Dokumente (sortiert nach updatedAt DESC)
public List<Document> getRecentActivity(int size) {
return documentRepository.findAll(
PageRequest.of(0, size, Sort.by(Sort.Direction.DESC, "updatedAt"))
@@ -648,43 +645,39 @@ public class DocumentService {
// 1. Allgemeine Suche (für das Suchfeld im Frontend)
public DocumentSearchResult searchDocuments(String text, LocalDate from, LocalDate to, UUID sender, UUID receiver, List<String> tags, String tagQ, DocumentStatus status, DocumentSort sort, String dir, TagOperator tagOperator, Pageable pageable) {
boolean hasText = StringUtils.hasText(text);
// Pure-text RELEVANCE: push pagination into SQL — skip findAllMatchingIdsByFts entirely (ADR-008).
if (isPureTextRelevance(hasText, sort, from, to, sender, receiver, tags, tagQ, status)) {
return relevanceSortedPageFromSql(text, pageable);
}
List<UUID> rankedIds = null;
if (hasText) {
rankedIds = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts(text);
rankedIds = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts(text);
if (rankedIds.isEmpty()) return DocumentSearchResult.of(List.of());
}
Specification<Document> spec = buildSearchSpec(
hasText, rankedIds, from, to, sender, receiver, tags, tagQ, status, tagOperator);
// SENDER and RECEIVER sorts load the full match set and slice in-memory.
// SENDER, RECEIVER and RELEVANCE sorts load the full match set and slice in memory.
// JPA's Sort.by("sender.lastName") generates an INNER JOIN that silently drops
// documents with null sender/receivers. Cost scales with match count —
// acceptable while documents stays under ~10k rows. (ADR-008)
// documents with null sender/receivers; RELEVANCE maps a DB order to an external
// rank list. Cost scales linearly with match count — acceptable while documents
// stays under ~10k rows. Past that, replace with SQL-level LEFT JOIN sort.
if (sort == DocumentSort.RECEIVER) {
// In-memory sort on page slice (≤ page size rows) — acceptable
List<Document> sorted = sortByFirstReceiver(documentRepository.findAll(spec), dir);
return buildResultPaged(pageSlice(sorted, pageable), text, pageable, sorted.size());
}
if (sort == DocumentSort.SENDER) {
// In-memory sort on page slice (≤ page size rows) — acceptable
List<Document> sorted = sortBySender(documentRepository.findAll(spec), dir);
return buildResultPaged(pageSlice(sorted, pageable), text, pageable, sorted.size());
}
// RELEVANCE with active filters: load filtered subset and sort in-memory by rank.
// RELEVANCE: default when text present and no explicit sort given
boolean useRankOrder = hasText && (sort == null || sort == DocumentSort.RELEVANCE);
if (useRankOrder) {
List<Document> results = documentRepository.findAll(spec);
Map<UUID, Integer> rankMap = new HashMap<>();
for (int i = 0; i < rankedIds.size(); i++) rankMap.put(rankedIds.get(i), i);
List<Document> sorted = documentRepository.findAll(spec).stream()
.sorted(Comparator.comparingInt(doc -> rankMap.getOrDefault(doc.getId(), Integer.MAX_VALUE)))
List<Document> sorted = results.stream()
.sorted(Comparator.comparingInt(
doc -> rankMap.getOrDefault(doc.getId(), Integer.MAX_VALUE)))
.toList();
return buildResultPaged(pageSlice(sorted, pageable), text, pageable, sorted.size());
}
@@ -695,39 +688,6 @@ public class DocumentService {
return buildResultPaged(page.getContent(), text, pageable, page.getTotalElements());
}
private static boolean isPureTextRelevance(boolean hasText, DocumentSort sort,
LocalDate from, LocalDate to, UUID sender, UUID receiver,
List<String> tags, String tagQ, DocumentStatus status) {
return hasText && (sort == null || sort == DocumentSort.RELEVANCE)
&& from == null && to == null && sender == null && receiver == null
&& (tags == null || tags.isEmpty()) && (tagQ == null || tagQ.isBlank()) && status == null;
}
/**
* Pure-text RELEVANCE path — pagination and ts_rank ordering pushed into SQL.
* Called when no non-text filters are active (ADR-008).
*/
private DocumentSearchResult relevanceSortedPageFromSql(String text, Pageable pageable) {
long rawOffset = pageable.getOffset();
if (rawOffset > Integer.MAX_VALUE) return DocumentSearchResult.of(List.of());
int offset = (int) rawOffset;
int limit = pageable.getPageSize();
FtsPage ftsPage = toFtsPage(documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw(text, offset, limit));
if (ftsPage.hits().isEmpty()) return DocumentSearchResult.of(List.of());
// Preserve ts_rank order from SQL across the JPA findAllById call.
Map<UUID, Integer> rankMap = new HashMap<>();
List<UUID> pageIds = new ArrayList<>();
for (int i = 0; i < ftsPage.hits().size(); i++) {
rankMap.put(ftsPage.hits().get(i).id(), i);
pageIds.add(ftsPage.hits().get(i).id());
}
List<Document> docs = documentRepository.findAllById(pageIds).stream()
.sorted(Comparator.comparingInt(d -> rankMap.getOrDefault(d.getId(), Integer.MAX_VALUE)))
.toList();
return buildResultPaged(docs, text, pageable, ftsPage.total());
}
private static <T> List<T> pageSlice(List<T> sorted, Pageable pageable) {
int from = Math.min((int) pageable.getOffset(), sorted.size());
int to = Math.min(from + pageable.getPageSize(), sorted.size());
@@ -846,9 +806,6 @@ public class DocumentService {
documentRepository.save(doc);
}
// @Transactional(readOnly=true) keeps the Hibernate session open so the
// lazy-loaded tags and receivers on the returned document remain accessible to callers.
@Transactional(readOnly = true)
public Document getDocumentById(UUID id) {
Document doc = documentRepository.findById(id)
.orElseThrow(() -> DomainException.notFound(ErrorCode.DOCUMENT_NOT_FOUND, "Document not found: " + id));
@@ -1056,28 +1013,6 @@ public class DocumentService {
return result;
}
private static final int COL_ID = 0;
private static final int COL_RANK = 1;
private static final int COL_TOTAL = 2;
/**
* Maps raw Object[] rows from {@link DocumentRepository#findFtsPageRaw} to an
* {@link FtsPage}. Uses pattern-matching UUID cast to guard against driver-level
* type variance (some JDBC drivers return UUID as String).
*/
private static FtsPage toFtsPage(List<Object[]> rows) {
if (rows.isEmpty()) return new FtsPage(List.of(), 0);
long total = ((Number) rows.get(0)[COL_TOTAL]).longValue();
List<FtsHit> hits = rows.stream()
.map(r -> {
UUID id = r[COL_ID] instanceof UUID u ? u : UUID.fromString(r[COL_ID].toString());
double rank = ((Number) r[COL_RANK]).doubleValue();
return new FtsHit(id, rank);
})
.toList();
return new FtsPage(hits, total);
}
/** Clean text + highlight offsets parsed from a {@code ts_headline} sentinel-delimited string. */
public record ParsedHighlight(String cleanText, List<MatchOffset> offsets) {}

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document;
import java.util.UUID;
/** A single document hit from a paginated FTS query — id and its ts_rank score. */
record FtsHit(UUID id, double rank) {}

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document;
import java.util.List;
/** One page of FTS results — the ranked hit list for this page and the total match count. */
record FtsPage(List<FtsHit> hits, long total) {}

View File

@@ -27,9 +27,7 @@ public class CommentController {
// ─── Block (transcription) comments ────────────────────────────────────────
@GetMapping("/api/documents/{documentId}/transcription-blocks/{blockId}/comments")
public List<DocumentComment> getBlockComments(
@PathVariable UUID documentId,
@PathVariable UUID blockId) {
public List<DocumentComment> getBlockComments(@PathVariable UUID blockId) {
return commentService.getCommentsForBlock(blockId);
}
@@ -50,7 +48,6 @@ public class CommentController {
@RequirePermission({Permission.ANNOTATE_ALL, Permission.WRITE_ALL})
public DocumentComment replyToBlockComment(
@PathVariable UUID documentId,
@PathVariable UUID blockId,
@PathVariable UUID commentId,
@RequestBody CreateCommentDTO dto,
Authentication authentication) {

View File

@@ -39,11 +39,6 @@ public class DomainException extends RuntimeException {
return new DomainException(ErrorCode.UNAUTHORIZED, HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED, message);
}
public static DomainException invalidCredentials() {
return new DomainException(ErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
"Invalid email or password");
}
public static DomainException conflict(ErrorCode code, String message) {
return new DomainException(code, HttpStatus.CONFLICT, message);
}

View File

@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ public enum ErrorCode {
// --- Users ---
/** A user with the given ID or username does not exist. 404 */
USER_NOT_FOUND,
/** A group with the given ID does not exist. 404 */
GROUP_NOT_FOUND,
/** The supplied email address is already used by another account. 409 */
EMAIL_ALREADY_IN_USE,
/** The supplied current password does not match the stored hash. 400 */
@@ -54,18 +52,12 @@ public enum ErrorCode {
INVITE_REVOKED,
/** The invite has passed its expiry date. 410 */
INVITE_EXPIRED,
/** A group cannot be deleted because one or more active invites reference it. 409 */
GROUP_HAS_ACTIVE_INVITES,
// --- Auth ---
/** The request is not authenticated. 401 */
UNAUTHORIZED,
/** The authenticated user lacks the required permission. 403 */
FORBIDDEN,
/** The supplied email/password combination does not match any active account. 401 */
INVALID_CREDENTIALS,
/** The session has expired or been invalidated. 401 */
SESSION_EXPIRED,
/** The password-reset token is missing, expired, or already used. 400 */
INVALID_RESET_TOKEN,

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;
import io.sentry.Sentry;
import jakarta.validation.ConstraintViolationException;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception.DomainException;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception.ErrorCode;
@@ -64,7 +63,6 @@ public class GlobalExceptionHandler {
@ExceptionHandler(Exception.class)
public ResponseEntity<ErrorResponse> handleGeneric(Exception ex) {
Sentry.captureException(ex);
log.error("Unhandled exception", ex);
return ResponseEntity.internalServerError()
.body(new ErrorResponse(ErrorCode.INTERNAL_ERROR, "An unexpected error occurred"));

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.importing;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.annotation.JsonIgnore;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import org.apache.poi.ss.usermodel.*;
@@ -53,9 +52,9 @@ public class MassImportService {
public enum State { IDLE, RUNNING, DONE, FAILED }
public record ImportStatus(State state, String statusCode, @JsonIgnore String message, int processed, LocalDateTime startedAt) {}
public record ImportStatus(State state, String message, int processed, LocalDateTime startedAt) {}
private volatile ImportStatus currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.IDLE, "IMPORT_IDLE", "Kein Import gestartet.", 0, null);
private volatile ImportStatus currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.IDLE, "Kein Import gestartet.", 0, null);
public ImportStatus getStatus() {
return currentStatus;
@@ -100,9 +99,7 @@ public class MassImportService {
@Value("${app.import.col.transcription:13}")
private int colTranscription;
@Value("${app.import.dir:/import}")
private String importDir;
private static final String IMPORT_DIR = "/import";
private static final DateTimeFormatter GERMAN_DATE = DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern("d. MMMM yyyy", Locale.GERMAN);
// ODS XML namespaces
@@ -117,39 +114,30 @@ public class MassImportService {
if (currentStatus.state() == State.RUNNING) {
throw DomainException.conflict(ErrorCode.IMPORT_ALREADY_RUNNING, "A mass import is already in progress");
}
currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.RUNNING, "IMPORT_RUNNING", "Import läuft...", 0, LocalDateTime.now());
currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.RUNNING, "Import läuft...", 0, LocalDateTime.now());
try {
File spreadsheet = findSpreadsheetFile();
log.info("Starte Massenimport aus: {}", spreadsheet.getAbsolutePath());
int processed = processRows(readSpreadsheet(spreadsheet));
currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.DONE, "IMPORT_DONE",
currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.DONE,
"Import abgeschlossen. " + processed + " Dokumente verarbeitet.",
processed, currentStatus.startedAt());
} catch (NoSpreadsheetException e) {
log.error("Massenimport fehlgeschlagen: keine Tabellendatei", e);
currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.FAILED, "IMPORT_FAILED_NO_SPREADSHEET",
"Fehler: " + e.getMessage(), 0, currentStatus.startedAt());
} catch (Exception e) {
log.error("Massenimport fehlgeschlagen", e);
currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.FAILED, "IMPORT_FAILED_INTERNAL",
"Fehler: " + e.getMessage(), 0, currentStatus.startedAt());
currentStatus = new ImportStatus(State.FAILED, "Fehler: " + e.getMessage(), 0, currentStatus.startedAt());
}
}
private static class NoSpreadsheetException extends RuntimeException {
NoSpreadsheetException(String message) { super(message); }
}
private File findSpreadsheetFile() throws IOException {
try (Stream<Path> files = Files.list(Paths.get(importDir))) {
try (Stream<Path> files = Files.list(Paths.get(IMPORT_DIR))) {
return files
.filter(p -> {
String name = p.toString().toLowerCase();
return name.endsWith(".ods") || name.endsWith(".xlsx") || name.endsWith(".xls");
})
.findFirst()
.orElseThrow(() -> new NoSpreadsheetException(
"Keine Tabellendatei (.ods/.xlsx/.xls) in " + importDir + " gefunden!"))
.orElseThrow(() -> new RuntimeException(
"Keine Tabellendatei (.ods/.xlsx/.xls) in " + IMPORT_DIR + " gefunden!"))
.toFile();
}
}
@@ -168,14 +156,14 @@ public class MassImportService {
* Reads an ODS file by parsing its content.xml directly (no extra library needed).
* ODS is a ZIP archive; content.xml holds the spreadsheet data as XML.
*/
List<List<String>> readOds(File file) throws Exception {
private List<List<String>> readOds(File file) throws Exception {
List<List<String>> result = new ArrayList<>();
try (ZipFile zip = new ZipFile(file)) {
var entry = zip.getEntry("content.xml");
if (entry == null) throw new RuntimeException("Ungültige ODS-Datei: content.xml fehlt");
var factory = XxeSafeXmlParser.hardenedFactory();
var factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
factory.setNamespaceAware(true);
var builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder();
var doc = builder.parse(zip.getInputStream(entry));
@@ -390,7 +378,7 @@ public class MassImportService {
}
private Optional<File> findFileRecursive(String filename) {
try (Stream<Path> walk = Files.walk(Paths.get(importDir))) {
try (Stream<Path> walk = Files.walk(Paths.get(IMPORT_DIR))) {
return walk.filter(p -> !Files.isDirectory(p))
.filter(p -> p.getFileName().toString().equals(filename))
.map(Path::toFile)

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.importing;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException;
class XxeSafeXmlParser {
private XxeSafeXmlParser() {}
static DocumentBuilderFactory hardenedFactory() throws ParserConfigurationException {
var factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);
factory.setXIncludeAware(false);
factory.setExpandEntityReferences(false);
return factory;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.person;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.annotation.JsonIgnore;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.annotation.JsonIgnoreProperties;
import io.swagger.v3.oas.annotations.media.Schema;
import jakarta.persistence.*;
import lombok.*;
@@ -10,8 +9,6 @@ import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.DisplayNameFormatter;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.UUID;
@JsonIgnoreProperties({"hibernateLazyInitializer", "handler"})
@Entity
@Table(name = "persons")
@Data

View File

@@ -3,22 +3,16 @@ package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.security;
import lombok.RequiredArgsConstructor;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.CustomUserDetailsService;
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Bean;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Configuration;
import org.springframework.core.annotation.Order;
import org.springframework.core.env.Environment;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.AuthenticationManager;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.dao.DaoAuthenticationProvider;
import org.springframework.security.config.annotation.authentication.configuration.AuthenticationConfiguration;
import org.springframework.security.config.Customizer;
import org.springframework.security.config.annotation.web.builders.HttpSecurity;
import org.springframework.security.config.annotation.web.configuration.EnableWebSecurity;
import org.springframework.security.config.annotation.web.configurers.AbstractHttpConfigurer;
import org.springframework.security.crypto.bcrypt.BCryptPasswordEncoder;
import org.springframework.security.crypto.password.PasswordEncoder;
import org.springframework.security.web.SecurityFilterChain;
import org.springframework.security.web.authentication.session.ChangeSessionIdAuthenticationStrategy;
import org.springframework.security.web.authentication.session.SessionAuthenticationStrategy;
@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
@@ -40,59 +34,20 @@ public class SecurityConfig {
return authProvider;
}
@Bean
public AuthenticationManager authenticationManager(AuthenticationConfiguration config) throws Exception {
return config.getAuthenticationManager();
}
@Bean
public SessionAuthenticationStrategy sessionAuthenticationStrategy() {
// ChangeSessionIdAuthenticationStrategy rotates the session ID via the Servlet 3.1+
// HttpServletRequest.changeSessionId() — preserves attributes, mints a fresh ID.
// Used by AuthSessionController.login to defend against session fixation (CWE-384).
return new ChangeSessionIdAuthenticationStrategy();
}
@Bean
@Order(1)
public SecurityFilterChain managementFilterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
http
.securityMatcher("/actuator/**")
.authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> {
// Health and Prometheus are open — Docker health checks and Prometheus scraping need no credentials.
auth.requestMatchers("/actuator/health", "/actuator/prometheus").permitAll();
// All other actuator endpoints (metrics, info, env, heapdump…) require authentication.
auth.anyRequest().authenticated();
})
// Explicitly return 401 for any unauthenticated actuator request.
// Without this override, Spring Security's DelegatingAuthenticationEntryPoint
// would redirect browser-like clients to the form-login page (302 → /login),
// making it impossible to distinguish "not authenticated" from "not found" in tests.
.exceptionHandling(ex -> ex.authenticationEntryPoint(
(req, res, e) -> res.setStatus(HttpServletResponse.SC_UNAUTHORIZED)))
.formLogin(AbstractHttpConfigurer::disable)
.csrf(AbstractHttpConfigurer::disable);
return http.build();
}
@Bean
public SecurityFilterChain securityFilterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
http
// CSRF is intentionally disabled. The session model relies on:
// 1. SameSite=Strict on the fa_session cookie — a cross-site POST from
// evil.com cannot include the cookie.
// 2. CORS — Spring's default rejects cross-origin requests with credentials
// unless explicitly allowed (no allowedOrigins config).
//
// If either of those is ever weakened, CSRF protection MUST be re-enabled.
// Re-enabling CSRF (CookieCsrfTokenRepository) is planned for Phase 2 (#524).
// CSRF is intentionally disabled: every request from the SvelteKit frontend
// carries an explicit Authorization header (Basic Auth token injected by
// hooks.server.ts). Browsers block cross-origin requests from setting custom
// headers, so cross-site request forgery via a third-party page is not
// possible with this auth scheme. If the auth model ever changes to
// cookie-based sessions, CSRF protection must be re-enabled.
.csrf(csrf -> csrf.disable())
.authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> {
// Actuator endpoints are governed by managementFilterChain (@Order(1)) above.
auth.requestMatchers("/actuator/health", "/actuator/prometheus").permitAll();
// Login is unauthenticated by definition
auth.requestMatchers("/api/auth/login").permitAll();
// Health endpoint must be open so CI/Docker health checks work without credentials
auth.requestMatchers("/actuator/health").permitAll();
// Password reset endpoints are unauthenticated by nature
auth.requestMatchers("/api/auth/forgot-password", "/api/auth/reset-password").permitAll();
// Invite-based registration endpoints are public
@@ -112,10 +67,9 @@ public class SecurityConfig {
// erlaubt pdf im Iframe
.headers(headers -> headers
.frameOptions(frameOptions -> frameOptions.sameOrigin()))
// Return 401 (not 302 redirect to /login) for unauthenticated API requests.
// httpBasic and formLogin are removed — authentication is via Spring Session only.
.exceptionHandling(ex -> ex.authenticationEntryPoint(
(req, res, e) -> res.setStatus(HttpServletResponse.SC_UNAUTHORIZED)));
// Erlaubt Login via Browser-Popup oder REST-Header (Authorization: Basic ...)
.httpBasic(Customizer.withDefaults())
.formLogin(form -> form.usernameParameter("email"));
return http.build();
}

View File

@@ -2,12 +2,10 @@ package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.tag;
import java.util.UUID;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.annotation.JsonIgnoreProperties;
import io.swagger.v3.oas.annotations.media.Schema;
import jakarta.persistence.*;
import lombok.*;
@JsonIgnoreProperties({"hibernateLazyInitializer", "handler"})
@Entity
@Data
@NoArgsConstructor

View File

@@ -88,8 +88,7 @@ public class AppUser {
};
public static String computeColor(UUID id) {
// Math.floorMod avoids the Integer.MIN_VALUE overflow trap in Math.abs(hashCode())
return PALETTE[Math.floorMod(id.hashCode(), PALETTE.length)];
return PALETTE[Math.abs(id.hashCode()) % PALETTE.length];
}
@PrePersist

View File

@@ -52,11 +52,7 @@ public class InviteService {
public InviteToken createInvite(CreateInviteRequest dto, AppUser creator) {
Set<UUID> groupIds = new HashSet<>();
if (dto.getGroupIds() != null && !dto.getGroupIds().isEmpty()) {
Set<UUID> uniqueIds = new HashSet<>(dto.getGroupIds());
List<UserGroup> groups = userService.findGroupsByIds(new ArrayList<>(uniqueIds));
if (groups.size() != uniqueIds.size()) {
throw DomainException.notFound(ErrorCode.GROUP_NOT_FOUND, "One or more group IDs do not exist");
}
List<UserGroup> groups = userService.findGroupsByIds(dto.getGroupIds());
groups.forEach(g -> groupIds.add(g.getId()));
}

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,4 @@ public interface InviteTokenRepository extends JpaRepository<InviteToken, UUID>
@Query("SELECT t FROM InviteToken t ORDER BY t.createdAt DESC")
List<InviteToken> findAllOrderedByCreatedAt();
@Query("SELECT CASE WHEN COUNT(t) > 0 THEN true ELSE false END FROM InviteToken t JOIN t.groupIds g WHERE g = :groupId AND t.revoked = false AND (t.expiresAt IS NULL OR t.expiresAt > CURRENT_TIMESTAMP) AND (t.maxUses IS NULL OR t.useCount < t.maxUses)")
boolean existsActiveWithGroupId(@Param("groupId") UUID groupId);
}

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import org.springframework.boot.CommandLineRunner;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Bean;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Configuration;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Profile;
import org.springframework.core.env.Environment;
import org.springframework.security.crypto.password.PasswordEncoder;
import java.time.LocalDate;
@@ -32,51 +31,26 @@ import java.util.Set;
@DependsOn("flyway")
public class UserDataInitializer {
static final String DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL = "admin@familienarchiv.local";
static final String DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD = "admin123";
@Value("${app.admin.email:" + DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL + "}")
@Value("${app.admin.email:admin@familyarchive.local}")
private String adminEmail;
@Value("${app.admin.password:" + DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD + "}")
@Value("${app.admin.password:admin123}")
private String adminPassword;
private final AppUserRepository userRepository;
private final UserGroupRepository groupRepository;
private final Environment environment;
@Bean
public CommandLineRunner initAdminUser(PasswordEncoder passwordEncoder) {
return args -> {
if (userRepository.findByEmail(adminEmail).isEmpty()) {
// Fail-closed in production: refuse to seed with the well-known
// defaults. Otherwise an operator who forgets APP_ADMIN_USERNAME
// / APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD locks production to admin@…/admin123 PERMANENTLY
// (UserDataInitializer only seeds when the row is missing — see #513).
// Allowed in dev/test/e2e because those run without secrets configured.
boolean isLocalProfile = environment.matchesProfiles("dev", "test", "e2e");
if (!isLocalProfile
&& (DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL.equals(adminEmail)
|| DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD.equals(adminPassword))) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"Refusing to seed admin user with default credentials outside "
+ "the dev/test/e2e profiles. Set APP_ADMIN_USERNAME and "
+ "APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD to non-default values before first boot — "
+ "this lock-in is permanent."
);
}
log.info("Kein Admin-User '{}' gefunden. Erstelle Default-Admin...", adminEmail);
// Reuse the Administrators group if it already exists (e.g. a
// previous boot seeded the group but failed before creating
// the admin user, or the operator deleted just the user row
// to retry the seed with a new email). Blind-INSERTing would
// violate user_groups_name_key and abort the context. See #518.
UserGroup adminGroup = groupRepository.findByName("Administrators")
.orElseGet(() -> groupRepository.save(UserGroup.builder()
.name("Administrators")
.permissions(Set.of("ADMIN", "READ_ALL", "WRITE_ALL", "ANNOTATE_ALL", "ADMIN_USER", "ADMIN_TAG", "ADMIN_PERMISSION"))
.build()));
UserGroup adminGroup = UserGroup.builder()
.name("Administrators")
.permissions(Set.of("ADMIN", "READ_ALL", "WRITE_ALL", "ANNOTATE_ALL", "ADMIN_USER", "ADMIN_TAG", "ADMIN_PERMISSION"))
.build();
groupRepository.save(adminGroup);
AppUser admin = AppUser.builder()
.email(adminEmail)

View File

@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ public class UserService {
private final AppUserRepository userRepository;
private final UserGroupRepository groupRepository;
// Injected directly (not via InviteService) to avoid a constructor injection cycle:
// InviteService → UserService → InviteService. Spring Framework 7 forbids such cycles.
private final InviteTokenRepository inviteTokenRepository;
private final PasswordEncoder passwordEncoder;
private final AuditService auditService;
@@ -274,10 +271,9 @@ public class UserService {
@Transactional
public UserGroup createGroup(GroupDTO dto) {
UserGroup group = UserGroup.builder()
.name(dto.getName())
.permissions(dto.getPermissions() != null ? dto.getPermissions() : new HashSet<>())
.build();
UserGroup group = new UserGroup();
group.setName(dto.getName());
group.setPermissions(dto.getPermissions());
return groupRepository.save(group);
}
@@ -291,10 +287,6 @@ public class UserService {
@Transactional
public void deleteGroup(UUID id) {
if (inviteTokenRepository.existsActiveWithGroupId(id)) {
throw DomainException.conflict(ErrorCode.GROUP_HAS_ACTIVE_INVITES,
"Cannot delete group " + id + " — referenced by one or more active invites");
}
groupRepository.deleteById(id);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
spring:
jpa:
show-sql: true
# spring.session.cookie.secure is no longer a supported Boot 4.x property.
# DefaultCookieSerializer auto-detects Secure from request.isSecure().
# Direct HTTP in dev → isSecure()=false → cookie sent without Secure attribute.
springdoc:
api-docs:

View File

@@ -38,64 +38,10 @@ spring:
starttls:
enable: true
session:
timeout: 28800s # 8 h idle timeout (MaxInactiveIntervalInSeconds)
jdbc:
initialize-schema: never # Flyway owns schema creation (V67)
# Cookie name, SameSite, and Secure are configured via SpringSessionConfig#cookieSerializer
# (spring.session.cookie.* is not supported in Spring Boot 4.x).
server:
# Behind Caddy/reverse proxy: trust X-Forwarded-{Proto,For,Host} so that
# request.getScheme(), redirect URLs, and Spring Session "Secure" cookies
# reflect the original https client request, not the http hop from Caddy.
forward-headers-strategy: native
management:
server:
# Management port is separate from the app port so that:
# (a) Caddy never proxies /actuator/* (it only routes :8080 → the app port)
# (b) Prometheus scrapes backend:8081 directly inside archiv-net, not via Caddy
# Note: in Spring Boot 4.0 the management port shares the security filter chain; /actuator/health
# and /actuator/prometheus must be explicitly permitted in SecurityConfig — see SecurityConfig.java.
port: 8081
endpoints:
web:
exposure:
include: health,info,prometheus,metrics
endpoint:
prometheus:
enabled: true
# Spring Boot 4.0: metrics export is disabled by default — explicitly opt in for Prometheus
prometheus:
metrics:
export:
enabled: true
metrics:
tags:
# Common tag applied to every metric so Grafana's Spring Boot dashboard can filter by application name.
# Override via MANAGEMENT_METRICS_TAGS_APPLICATION env var.
application: ${spring.application.name}
health:
mail:
enabled: false
tracing:
sampling:
probability: 1.0 # 100% in dev; override via MANAGEMENT_TRACING_SAMPLING_PROBABILITY in prod compose
# OpenTelemetry trace export — failures are non-fatal (app starts cleanly without Tempo running)
# Port 4318 = OTLP HTTP (the default transport for Spring Boot's HttpExporter).
# Port 4317 is gRPC-only; sending HTTP/1.1 to it produces "Connection reset".
otel:
service:
name: familienarchiv-backend
exporter:
otlp:
endpoint: ${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT:http://localhost:4318}
logs:
exporter: none # Promtail captures Docker logs; disable OTLP log export (Tempo only accepts traces)
metrics:
exporter: none # Prometheus scrapes /actuator/prometheus; disable OTLP metric export to Tempo
springdoc:
api-docs:
@@ -117,11 +63,7 @@ app:
from: ${APP_MAIL_FROM:noreply@familienarchiv.local}
admin:
# Key must be `email`, not `username` — UserDataInitializer reads
# `${app.admin.email:...}`. The env-var name stays APP_ADMIN_USERNAME
# to match the existing Gitea secrets and DEPLOYMENT.md §3.3.
# See #513.
email: ${APP_ADMIN_USERNAME:admin@familienarchiv.local}
username: ${APP_ADMIN_USERNAME:admin}
password: ${APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD:admin123}
import:
@@ -141,12 +83,3 @@ ocr:
sender-model:
activation-threshold: 100
retrain-delta: 50
sentry:
dsn: ${SENTRY_DSN:}
environment: ${SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE:dev}
traces-sample-rate: ${SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE:1.0}
send-default-pii: false
enable-tracing: true
ignored-exceptions-for-type:
- org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception.DomainException

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-- Speeds up "documents by sender" queries used on /persons/[id] Korrespondenz-Überblick (#306),
-- /briefwechsel, and bulk-edit flows.
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_documents_sender_id
ON documents(sender_id);
-- Speeds up "comments by author" queries on admin user detail and (future) contributor profile.
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_comments_author_id
ON document_comments(author_id);

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-- Remove duplicate (group_id, permission) rows that accumulated without a UNIQUE constraint.
-- Keeps the row with the smallest ctid (earliest physical insertion order).
DELETE FROM group_permissions a
USING group_permissions b
WHERE a.ctid < b.ctid
AND a.group_id = b.group_id
AND a.permission = b.permission;

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-- Add NOT NULL and PRIMARY KEY to group_permissions.
-- Requires V63 to have run first (no duplicates can remain).
--
-- After this migration, future seed migrations can use:
-- INSERT INTO group_permissions ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
-- instead of the INSERT ... WHERE NOT EXISTS pattern used before V64.
ALTER TABLE group_permissions
ALTER COLUMN permission SET NOT NULL;
ALTER TABLE group_permissions
ADD CONSTRAINT pk_group_permissions PRIMARY KEY (group_id, permission);

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-- Promote the de-facto unique constraint on transcription_block_mentioned_persons to a named PK.
-- uq_tbmp_block_person (added in V57) is backed by a B-tree index identical to a PK;
-- this rename makes the naming convention explicit (pk_* vs uq_*).
ALTER TABLE transcription_block_mentioned_persons
DROP CONSTRAINT uq_tbmp_block_person;
ALTER TABLE transcription_block_mentioned_persons
ADD CONSTRAINT pk_tbmp PRIMARY KEY (block_id, person_id);

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-- The composite PK (invite_token_id, group_id) does not support efficient lookups by group_id alone.
-- Add a dedicated index to support existsActiveWithGroupId queries.
CREATE INDEX idx_itg_group_id ON invite_token_group_ids (group_id);

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-- Re-introduces the Spring Session JDBC tables that were dropped by V2 as unused.
-- DDL copied verbatim from Spring Session 3.x schema-postgresql.sql.
-- See ADR-020 and issue #523.
CREATE TABLE spring_session (
PRIMARY_ID CHAR(36) NOT NULL,
SESSION_ID CHAR(36) NOT NULL,
CREATION_TIME BIGINT NOT NULL,
LAST_ACCESS_TIME BIGINT NOT NULL,
MAX_INACTIVE_INTERVAL INT NOT NULL,
EXPIRY_TIME BIGINT NOT NULL,
PRINCIPAL_NAME VARCHAR(100),
CONSTRAINT spring_session_pk PRIMARY KEY (PRIMARY_ID)
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX spring_session_ix1 ON spring_session (SESSION_ID);
CREATE INDEX spring_session_ix2 ON spring_session (EXPIRY_TIME);
CREATE INDEX spring_session_ix3 ON spring_session (PRINCIPAL_NAME);
CREATE TABLE spring_session_attributes (
SESSION_PRIMARY_ID CHAR(36) NOT NULL,
ATTRIBUTE_NAME VARCHAR(200) NOT NULL,
ATTRIBUTE_BYTES BYTEA NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT spring_session_attributes_pk PRIMARY KEY (SESSION_PRIMARY_ID, ATTRIBUTE_NAME),
CONSTRAINT spring_session_attributes_fk FOREIGN KEY (SESSION_PRIMARY_ID)
REFERENCES spring_session (PRIMARY_ID) ON DELETE CASCADE
);

View File

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.boot.test.web.server.LocalManagementPort;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.web.client.DefaultResponseErrorHandler;
import org.springframework.web.client.RestTemplate;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import java.io.IOException;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.RANDOM_PORT)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
class ActuatorPrometheusIT {
@LocalManagementPort
private int managementPort;
@MockitoBean
S3Client s3Client;
@Test
void prometheus_endpoint_returns_200_without_credentials() {
ResponseEntity<String> response = noThrowTemplate().getForEntity(
"http://localhost:" + managementPort + "/actuator/prometheus", String.class);
assertThat(response.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(200);
}
@Test
void prometheus_endpoint_returns_jvm_metrics() {
ResponseEntity<String> response = noThrowTemplate().getForEntity(
"http://localhost:" + managementPort + "/actuator/prometheus", String.class);
assertThat(response.getBody()).contains("jvm_memory_used_bytes");
}
@Test
void actuator_metrics_requires_authentication() {
ResponseEntity<String> response = noThrowTemplate().getForEntity(
"http://localhost:" + managementPort + "/actuator/metrics", String.class);
assertThat(response.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(401);
}
private RestTemplate noThrowTemplate() {
RestTemplate template = new RestTemplate();
template.setErrorHandler(new DefaultResponseErrorHandler() {
@Override
public boolean hasError(org.springframework.http.client.ClientHttpResponse response) throws IOException {
return false;
}
});
return template;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.boot.test.web.server.LocalManagementPort;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.web.client.DefaultResponseErrorHandler;
import org.springframework.web.client.RestTemplate;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import java.io.IOException;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.RANDOM_PORT)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
class ActuatorSecurityTest {
@LocalManagementPort
private int managementPort;
@MockitoBean
S3Client s3Client;
@Test
void actuator_health_is_accessible_without_authentication() {
ResponseEntity<String> response = noThrowTemplate().getForEntity(
"http://localhost:" + managementPort + "/actuator/health", String.class);
assertThat(response.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(200);
}
@Test
void actuator_env_requires_authentication() {
ResponseEntity<String> response = noThrowTemplate().getForEntity(
"http://localhost:" + managementPort + "/actuator/env", String.class);
assertThat(response.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(401);
}
private RestTemplate noThrowTemplate() {
RestTemplate template = new RestTemplate();
template.setErrorHandler(new DefaultResponseErrorHandler() {
@Override
public boolean hasError(org.springframework.http.client.ClientHttpResponse response) throws IOException {
return false;
}
});
return template;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,14 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.boot.testcontainers.service.connection.ServiceConnection;
import org.springframework.context.ApplicationContext;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.testcontainers.containers.PostgreSQLContainer;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.NONE)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
@@ -21,18 +17,9 @@ class ApplicationContextTest {
@MockitoBean
S3Client s3Client;
@Autowired
ApplicationContext ctx;
@Test
void contextLoads() {
// verifies that the Spring context starts successfully with all beans wired,
// Flyway migrations applied, and no configuration errors
}
@Test
void sentry_is_disabled_when_no_dsn_is_configured() {
// application-test.yaml has no sentry.dsn — SDK must stay inactive so tests are clean
assertThat(io.sentry.Sentry.isEnabled()).isFalse();
}
}

View File

@@ -399,86 +399,6 @@ class MigrationIntegrationTest {
AND dc.annotation_id IS NOT NULL
""";
// ─── V62: indexes on FK columns ──────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void v62_idx_documents_sender_id_exists() {
Integer count = jdbc.queryForObject(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM pg_catalog.pg_indexes WHERE tablename = 'documents' AND indexname = 'idx_documents_sender_id'",
Integer.class);
assertThat(count).isEqualTo(1);
}
@Test
void v62_idx_comments_author_id_exists() {
Integer count = jdbc.queryForObject(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM pg_catalog.pg_indexes WHERE tablename = 'document_comments' AND indexname = 'idx_comments_author_id'",
Integer.class);
assertThat(count).isEqualTo(1);
}
// ─── V63+V64: group_permissions dedup + primary key ──────────────────────
@Test
void v64_pk_group_permissions_exists() {
Integer count = jdbc.queryForObject(
"""
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM pg_catalog.pg_constraint c
JOIN pg_catalog.pg_class t ON c.conrelid = t.oid
WHERE t.relname = 'group_permissions'
AND c.conname = 'pk_group_permissions'
AND c.contype = 'p'
""",
Integer.class);
assertThat(count).isEqualTo(1);
}
@Test
void v64_permission_column_isNotNullable() {
Integer count = jdbc.queryForObject(
"""
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_schema = 'public'
AND table_name = 'group_permissions'
AND column_name = 'permission'
AND is_nullable = 'NO'
""",
Integer.class);
assertThat(count).isEqualTo(1);
}
@Test
@Transactional(propagation = Propagation.NOT_SUPPORTED)
void v64_rejectsDuplicateGroupPermission() {
UUID groupId = createUserGroup("DuplicateTestGroup-" + UUID.randomUUID());
try {
jdbc.update("INSERT INTO group_permissions (group_id, permission) VALUES (?, 'READ_ALL')", groupId);
assertThatThrownBy(() ->
jdbc.update("INSERT INTO group_permissions (group_id, permission) VALUES (?, 'READ_ALL')", groupId)
).isInstanceOf(DataIntegrityViolationException.class);
} finally {
jdbc.update("DELETE FROM group_permissions WHERE group_id = ?", groupId);
jdbc.update("DELETE FROM user_groups WHERE id = ?", groupId);
}
}
// ─── V65: tbmp UNIQUE promoted to PRIMARY KEY ─────────────────────────────
@Test
void v65_pk_tbmp_exists() {
Integer count = jdbc.queryForObject(
"""
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM pg_catalog.pg_constraint c
JOIN pg_catalog.pg_class t ON c.conrelid = t.oid
WHERE t.relname = 'transcription_block_mentioned_persons'
AND c.conname = 'pk_tbmp'
AND c.contype = 'p'
""",
Integer.class);
assertThat(count).isEqualTo(1);
}
// ─── helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private UUID createPerson(String firstName, String lastName) {
@@ -562,10 +482,4 @@ class MigrationIntegrationTest {
""", id, recipientId, docId, commentId);
return id;
}
private UUID createUserGroup(String name) {
UUID id = UUID.randomUUID();
jdbc.update("INSERT INTO user_groups (id, name) VALUES (?, ?)", id, name);
return id;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.audit;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.PostgresContainerConfig;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.test.annotation.DirtiesContext;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.transaction.support.TransactionTemplate;
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import static org.awaitility.Awaitility.await;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.NONE)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
@DirtiesContext(classMode = DirtiesContext.ClassMode.AFTER_EACH_TEST_METHOD)
class AuditServiceIntegrationTest {
@MockitoBean S3Client s3Client;
@@ -25,11 +26,6 @@ class AuditServiceIntegrationTest {
@Autowired AuditLogRepository auditLogRepository;
@Autowired TransactionTemplate transactionTemplate;
@BeforeEach
void resetAuditLog() {
auditLogRepository.deleteAll();
}
@Test
void logAfterCommit_writes_ANNOTATION_CREATED_row_after_transaction_commits() {
transactionTemplate.execute(status -> {

View File

@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.auth;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.ExtendWith;
import org.mockito.InjectMocks;
import org.mockito.Mock;
import org.mockito.junit.jupiter.MockitoExtension;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.audit.AuditKind;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.audit.AuditService;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception.DomainException;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception.ErrorCode;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.AppUser;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.UserService;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.AuthenticationManager;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.BadCredentialsException;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken;
import org.springframework.security.core.Authentication;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThatThrownBy;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.*;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.*;
@ExtendWith(MockitoExtension.class)
class AuthServiceTest {
@Mock AuthenticationManager authenticationManager;
@Mock UserService userService;
@Mock AuditService auditService;
@InjectMocks AuthService authService;
private static final String IP = "127.0.0.1";
private static final String UA = "Mozilla/5.0 (Test)";
@Test
void login_returns_user_on_valid_credentials() {
UUID userId = UUID.randomUUID();
AppUser user = AppUser.builder().id(userId).email("user@test.de").build();
Authentication auth = new UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken("user@test.de", null, Set.of());
when(authenticationManager.authenticate(any())).thenReturn(auth);
when(userService.findByEmail("user@test.de")).thenReturn(user);
AuthService.LoginResult result = authService.login("user@test.de", "pass123", IP, UA);
assertThat(result.user()).isEqualTo(user);
assertThat(result.authentication()).isEqualTo(auth);
}
@Test
void login_fires_LOGIN_SUCCESS_audit_on_valid_credentials() {
UUID userId = UUID.randomUUID();
AppUser user = AppUser.builder().id(userId).email("user@test.de").build();
Authentication auth = new UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken("user@test.de", null, Set.of());
when(authenticationManager.authenticate(any())).thenReturn(auth);
when(userService.findByEmail("user@test.de")).thenReturn(user);
authService.login("user@test.de", "pass123", IP, UA);
verify(auditService).log(
eq(AuditKind.LOGIN_SUCCESS),
eq(userId),
isNull(),
argThat(payload -> userId.toString().equals(payload.get("userId").toString())
&& IP.equals(payload.get("ip"))
&& !payload.containsKey("password"))
);
}
@Test
void login_throws_INVALID_CREDENTIALS_on_bad_password() {
when(authenticationManager.authenticate(any())).thenThrow(new BadCredentialsException("bad"));
assertThatThrownBy(() -> authService.login("user@test.de", "wrong", IP, UA))
.isInstanceOf(DomainException.class)
.satisfies(ex -> assertThat(((DomainException) ex).getCode())
.isEqualTo(ErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS));
}
@Test
void login_fires_LOGIN_FAILED_audit_on_bad_credentials_without_password_in_payload() {
when(authenticationManager.authenticate(any())).thenThrow(new BadCredentialsException("bad"));
assertThatThrownBy(() -> authService.login("user@test.de", "wrong", IP, UA))
.isInstanceOf(DomainException.class);
verify(auditService).log(
eq(AuditKind.LOGIN_FAILED),
isNull(),
isNull(),
argThat(payload -> "user@test.de".equals(payload.get("email"))
&& IP.equals(payload.get("ip"))
&& !payload.containsKey("password")
&& !payload.containsKey("pwd")
&& !payload.containsKey("passwordAttempt"))
);
}
@Test
void login_treats_unknown_user_identically_to_bad_password() {
when(authenticationManager.authenticate(any()))
.thenThrow(new BadCredentialsException("unknown user hidden as bad creds"));
assertThatThrownBy(() -> authService.login("unknown@test.de", "any", IP, UA))
.isInstanceOf(DomainException.class)
.satisfies(ex -> assertThat(((DomainException) ex).getCode())
.isEqualTo(ErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS));
verify(auditService).log(eq(AuditKind.LOGIN_FAILED), isNull(), isNull(), anyMap());
}
@Test
void logout_fires_LOGOUT_audit() {
UUID userId = UUID.randomUUID();
AppUser user = AppUser.builder().id(userId).email("user@test.de").build();
when(userService.findByEmail("user@test.de")).thenReturn(user);
authService.logout("user@test.de", IP, UA);
verify(auditService).log(
eq(AuditKind.LOGOUT),
eq(userId),
isNull(),
argThat(payload -> userId.toString().equals(payload.get("userId").toString())
&& IP.equals(payload.get("ip"))
&& !payload.containsKey("password"))
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.auth;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.auth.AuthService.LoginResult;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception.DomainException;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception.ErrorCode;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.security.SecurityConfig;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.security.PermissionAspect;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.AppUser;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.CustomUserDetailsService;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.autoconfigure.aop.AopAutoConfiguration;
import org.springframework.boot.webmvc.test.autoconfigure.WebMvcTest;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.http.MediaType;
import org.springframework.security.core.Authentication;
import org.springframework.security.web.authentication.session.SessionAuthenticationStrategy;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.test.web.servlet.MockMvc;
import java.util.UUID;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.eq;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.*;
import static org.springframework.security.test.web.servlet.request.SecurityMockMvcRequestPostProcessors.user;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.request.MockMvcRequestBuilders.post;
import static org.springframework.test.web.servlet.result.MockMvcResultMatchers.*;
@WebMvcTest(AuthSessionController.class)
@Import({SecurityConfig.class, PermissionAspect.class, AopAutoConfiguration.class})
class AuthSessionControllerTest {
@Autowired MockMvc mockMvc;
@MockitoBean AuthService authService;
@MockitoBean CustomUserDetailsService customUserDetailsService;
@MockitoBean SessionAuthenticationStrategy sessionAuthenticationStrategy;
// ─── POST /api/auth/login ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void login_returns_200_with_user_on_valid_credentials() throws Exception {
UUID userId = UUID.randomUUID();
AppUser appUser = AppUser.builder().id(userId).email("user@test.de").build();
Authentication auth = mock(Authentication.class);
when(authService.login(anyString(), anyString(), anyString(), anyString()))
.thenReturn(new LoginResult(appUser, auth));
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/login")
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content("{\"email\":\"user@test.de\",\"password\":\"pass123\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.email").value("user@test.de"))
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.id").value(userId.toString()));
}
@Test
void login_returns_401_with_INVALID_CREDENTIALS_on_bad_credentials() throws Exception {
when(authService.login(anyString(), anyString(), anyString(), anyString()))
.thenThrow(DomainException.invalidCredentials());
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/login")
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content("{\"email\":\"user@test.de\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isUnauthorized())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.code").value(ErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS.name()));
}
@Test
void login_is_public_no_session_required() throws Exception {
UUID userId = UUID.randomUUID();
AppUser appUser = AppUser.builder().id(userId).email("pub@test.de").build();
Authentication auth = mock(Authentication.class);
when(authService.login(anyString(), anyString(), anyString(), anyString()))
.thenReturn(new LoginResult(appUser, auth));
// No WithMockUser — must be reachable without an active session
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/login")
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content("{\"email\":\"pub@test.de\",\"password\":\"pass\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isOk());
}
@Test
void login_delegates_to_SessionAuthenticationStrategy_for_fixation_protection() throws Exception {
UUID userId = UUID.randomUUID();
AppUser appUser = AppUser.builder().id(userId).email("fix@test.de").build();
Authentication auth = mock(Authentication.class);
when(authService.login(anyString(), anyString(), anyString(), anyString()))
.thenReturn(new LoginResult(appUser, auth));
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/login")
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content("{\"email\":\"fix@test.de\",\"password\":\"pass\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isOk());
// Session-fixation defense (CWE-384): the controller must hand the new
// Authentication to Spring Security's strategy, which rotates the session ID.
verify(sessionAuthenticationStrategy).onAuthentication(eq(auth), any(), any());
}
@Test
void login_response_body_does_not_contain_password_field() throws Exception {
// Regression guard: AppUser.password is @JsonProperty(WRITE_ONLY). If anyone
// ever drops that annotation, this assertion catches the credential leak on
// the very next CI run.
UUID userId = UUID.randomUUID();
AppUser appUser = AppUser.builder()
.id(userId)
.email("leak@test.de")
.password("$2a$10$shouldnotappearinresponse")
.build();
Authentication auth = mock(Authentication.class);
when(authService.login(anyString(), anyString(), anyString(), anyString()))
.thenReturn(new LoginResult(appUser, auth));
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/login")
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content("{\"email\":\"leak@test.de\",\"password\":\"pass\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.password").doesNotExist())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.pwd").doesNotExist())
.andExpect(content().string(org.hamcrest.Matchers.not(
org.hamcrest.Matchers.containsString("$2a$10$shouldnotappearinresponse"))));
}
@Test
void login_does_not_set_cookie_on_failure() throws Exception {
when(authService.login(anyString(), anyString(), anyString(), anyString()))
.thenThrow(DomainException.invalidCredentials());
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/login")
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content("{\"email\":\"user@test.de\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}"))
.andExpect(status().isUnauthorized())
.andExpect(header().doesNotExist("Set-Cookie"));
}
// ─── POST /api/auth/logout ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void logout_returns_204_when_authenticated() throws Exception {
doNothing().when(authService).logout(anyString(), anyString(), anyString());
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/logout")
.with(user("user@test.de")))
.andExpect(status().isNoContent());
}
@Test
void logout_returns_401_when_not_authenticated() throws Exception {
// No authentication at all — Spring Security must return 401
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/logout"))
.andExpect(status().isUnauthorized());
}
@Test
void logout_returns_204_even_when_audit_throws() throws Exception {
// CWE-613 defense: the session MUST be invalidated even if the audit lookup
// explodes (e.g. user deleted between login and logout). Audit is best-effort.
doThrow(new RuntimeException("audit DB down"))
.when(authService).logout(anyString(), anyString(), anyString());
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/auth/logout")
.with(user("ghost@test.de")))
.andExpect(status().isNoContent());
}
}

View File

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.auth;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.PostgresContainerConfig;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.AppUser;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.AppUserRepository;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.boot.test.web.server.LocalServerPort;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.http.HttpEntity;
import org.springframework.http.HttpHeaders;
import org.springframework.http.HttpMethod;
import org.springframework.http.MediaType;
import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
import org.springframework.http.client.ClientHttpResponse;
import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate;
import org.springframework.security.crypto.password.PasswordEncoder;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.web.client.DefaultResponseErrorHandler;
import org.springframework.web.client.RestTemplate;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.List;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.RANDOM_PORT)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
class AuthSessionIntegrationTest {
@LocalServerPort int port;
@MockitoBean S3Client s3Client;
@Autowired AppUserRepository userRepository;
@Autowired PasswordEncoder passwordEncoder;
@Autowired JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate;
private RestTemplate http;
private String baseUrl;
private static final String TEST_EMAIL = "session-it@test.de";
private static final String TEST_PASSWORD = "pass4Session!";
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
http = noThrowRestTemplate();
baseUrl = "http://localhost:" + port;
// spring_session_attributes cascades on delete — removing the parent row is enough
jdbcTemplate.update("DELETE FROM spring_session");
jdbcTemplate.update("DELETE FROM app_users WHERE email = ?", TEST_EMAIL);
userRepository.save(AppUser.builder()
.email(TEST_EMAIL)
.password(passwordEncoder.encode(TEST_PASSWORD))
.build());
}
// ─── Task 13: full session lifecycle ──────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void login_sets_opaque_fa_session_cookie() {
ResponseEntity<String> response = doLogin();
assertThat(response.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(200);
String cookie = extractFaSessionCookie(response);
assertThat(cookie).isNotBlank();
// Opaque token — must not look like Basic-auth credentials (email:password)
assertThat(cookie).doesNotContain(":");
}
@Test
void session_cookie_authenticates_subsequent_request() {
String cookie = extractFaSessionCookie(doLogin());
ResponseEntity<String> me = http.exchange(
baseUrl + "/api/users/me", HttpMethod.GET,
new HttpEntity<>(cookieHeaders(cookie)), String.class);
assertThat(me.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(200);
}
@Test
void logout_invalidates_session_and_cookie_returns_401_on_reuse() {
String cookie = extractFaSessionCookie(doLogin());
ResponseEntity<Void> logout = http.postForEntity(
baseUrl + "/api/auth/logout",
new HttpEntity<>(cookieHeaders(cookie)), Void.class);
assertThat(logout.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(204);
ResponseEntity<String> me = http.exchange(
baseUrl + "/api/users/me", HttpMethod.GET,
new HttpEntity<>(cookieHeaders(cookie)), String.class);
assertThat(me.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(401);
}
// ─── Task 14: idle-timeout ────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void session_expired_by_idle_timeout_returns_401() {
String cookie = extractFaSessionCookie(doLogin());
// Backdate LAST_ACCESS_TIME by 9 hours so lastAccess + maxInactiveInterval(8h) < now
long nineHoursAgoMs = System.currentTimeMillis() - 9L * 3600 * 1000;
jdbcTemplate.update(
"UPDATE spring_session SET LAST_ACCESS_TIME = ?, EXPIRY_TIME = ?",
nineHoursAgoMs, nineHoursAgoMs);
ResponseEntity<String> me = http.exchange(
baseUrl + "/api/users/me", HttpMethod.GET,
new HttpEntity<>(cookieHeaders(cookie)), String.class);
assertThat(me.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(401);
}
// ─── helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private ResponseEntity<String> doLogin() {
HttpHeaders headers = new HttpHeaders();
headers.setContentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON);
String body = "{\"email\":\"" + TEST_EMAIL + "\",\"password\":\"" + TEST_PASSWORD + "\"}";
return http.postForEntity(baseUrl + "/api/auth/login",
new HttpEntity<>(body, headers), String.class);
}
private HttpHeaders cookieHeaders(String sessionId) {
HttpHeaders headers = new HttpHeaders();
headers.set("Cookie", "fa_session=" + sessionId);
return headers;
}
private String extractFaSessionCookie(ResponseEntity<?> response) {
List<String> setCookieHeader = response.getHeaders().get("Set-Cookie");
if (setCookieHeader == null) return "";
return setCookieHeader.stream()
.filter(c -> c.startsWith("fa_session="))
.map(c -> c.split(";")[0].substring("fa_session=".length()))
.findFirst()
.orElse("");
}
private RestTemplate noThrowRestTemplate() {
RestTemplate template = new RestTemplate();
template.setErrorHandler(new DefaultResponseErrorHandler() {
@Override
public boolean hasError(ClientHttpResponse response) throws IOException {
return false;
}
});
return template;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.config;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.config.YamlPropertiesFactoryBean;
import org.springframework.boot.web.server.autoconfigure.ServerProperties.ForwardHeadersStrategy;
import org.springframework.boot.context.properties.bind.Binder;
import org.springframework.boot.context.properties.source.ConfigurationPropertySources;
import org.springframework.core.env.PropertiesPropertySource;
import org.springframework.core.io.ClassPathResource;
import java.util.Properties;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
/**
* Binds {@code server.forward-headers-strategy} from {@code application.yaml} into
* Spring Boot's typed {@link ForwardHeadersStrategy} enum. The binder rejects any
* value that is not a valid enum constant ({@code BindException}), so a typo
* ({@code "nativ"}, {@code "Native"}, {@code "framework "}) or a future Spring
* rename of the property fails the test, not silently degrades to {@code NONE}.
*
* <p>No Spring context, no embedded server, no Testcontainers — this is the
* cheapest test that pins the contract "Caddy's X-Forwarded-Proto is trusted".
*/
class ForwardHeadersConfigurationTest {
@Test
void forward_headers_strategy_binds_to_NATIVE() {
YamlPropertiesFactoryBean yaml = new YamlPropertiesFactoryBean();
yaml.setResources(new ClassPathResource("application.yaml"));
Properties props = yaml.getObject();
assertThat(props).as("application.yaml must be on the classpath").isNotNull();
Binder binder = new Binder(ConfigurationPropertySources.from(
new PropertiesPropertySource("application", props)));
ForwardHeadersStrategy strategy = binder
.bind("server.forward-headers-strategy", ForwardHeadersStrategy.class)
.orElseThrow(() -> new AssertionError(
"server.forward-headers-strategy is missing from application.yaml"));
assertThat(strategy)
.as("Spring must trust X-Forwarded-Proto from Caddy so that "
+ "request.getScheme(), redirect URLs, and the Spring Session "
+ "'Secure' cookie reflect the original https client request.")
.isEqualTo(ForwardHeadersStrategy.NATIVE);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document;
import jakarta.persistence.EntityManager;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.PostgresContainerConfig;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.config.FlywayConfig;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document.DocumentRepository;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document.Document;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document.DocumentStatus;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.data.jpa.test.autoconfigure.DataJpaTest;
import org.springframework.boot.jdbc.test.autoconfigure.AutoConfigureTestDatabase;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.test.annotation.DirtiesContext;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.UUID;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThatNoException;
/**
* Repository-level integration tests for {@code findFtsPageRaw}: verifies that the
* paginated FTS query returns exactly page-size rows and that the window-function
* total reflects the full match count, not just the page count.
*
* <p>Uses real Postgres via Testcontainers so the GIN index, tsvector trigger, and
* {@code websearch_to_tsquery} semantics are identical to production.
*
* <p>{@code AFTER_CLASS} dirty-context keeps the Spring context alive for all tests
* in this class and rebuilds it once at the end, rather than after every test.
*/
@DataJpaTest
@AutoConfigureTestDatabase(replace = AutoConfigureTestDatabase.Replace.NONE)
@Import({PostgresContainerConfig.class, FlywayConfig.class})
@DirtiesContext(classMode = DirtiesContext.ClassMode.AFTER_CLASS)
class DocumentFtsPagedIntegrationTest {
@Autowired DocumentRepository documentRepository;
@Autowired EntityManager em;
// 60 docs match "Walter"; 10 docs with "Hans" do not.
private static final int WALTER_COUNT = 60;
private static final int PAGE_SIZE = 50;
@BeforeEach
void seed() {
documentRepository.deleteAll();
em.flush();
for (int i = 0; i < WALTER_COUNT; i++) {
documentRepository.saveAndFlush(doc("Brief von Walter Nr. " + i));
}
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
documentRepository.saveAndFlush(doc("Brief von Hans Nr. " + i));
}
em.clear();
}
@Test
void findFtsPageRaw_firstPage_returnsPageSizeRows() {
List<Object[]> rows = documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw("Walter", 0, PAGE_SIZE);
assertThat(rows).hasSize(PAGE_SIZE);
}
@Test
void findFtsPageRaw_windowTotal_equalsFullMatchCount_notPageSize() {
List<Object[]> rows = documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw("Walter", 0, PAGE_SIZE);
long total = ((Number) rows.get(0)[2]).longValue();
assertThat(total).isEqualTo(WALTER_COUNT);
}
@Test
void findFtsPageRaw_lastPage_returnsRemainder() {
int remainder = WALTER_COUNT % PAGE_SIZE; // 60 % 50 = 10
List<Object[]> rows = documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw("Walter", PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
assertThat(rows).hasSize(remainder);
long total = ((Number) rows.get(0)[2]).longValue();
assertThat(total).isEqualTo(WALTER_COUNT);
}
@Test
void findFtsPageRaw_noMatches_returnsEmptyList() {
List<Object[]> rows = documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw("XYZ_KEIN_TREFFER", 0, PAGE_SIZE);
assertThat(rows).isEmpty();
}
@Test
void findFtsPageRaw_stopwordOnlyQuery_returnsEmptyList_noException() {
assertThatNoException().isThrownBy(() -> {
List<Object[]> rows = documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw("der die das und", 0, PAGE_SIZE);
assertThat(rows).isEmpty();
});
}
// ─── Helper ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private Document doc(String title) {
return Document.builder()
.title(title)
.originalFilename(title.replace(" ", "_") + ".pdf")
.status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED)
.build();
}
}

View File

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
documentRepository.saveAndFlush(document("Alter Brief"));
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Brief");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Brief");
assertThat(ids).hasSize(1);
}
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
documentRepository.saveAndFlush(document("Alter Brief"));
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Briefe");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Briefe");
assertThat(ids).hasSize(1);
}
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
documentRepository.saveAndFlush(document("Ein furchtbarer Brief"));
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("furchtb");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("furchtb");
assertThat(ids).hasSize(1);
}
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
documentRepository.saveAndFlush(document("Familienfoto"));
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Brief");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Brief");
assertThat(ids).isEmpty();
}
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
em.flush();
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("schreiben");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("schreiben");
assertThat(ids).contains(doc.getId());
}
@@ -125,14 +125,14 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
Document doc = documentRepository.saveAndFlush(document("Leeres Dokument"));
em.clear();
assertThat(documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Grundbuch")).isEmpty();
assertThat(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Grundbuch")).isEmpty();
UUID annotationId = annotation(doc.getId());
blockRepository.saveAndFlush(block(doc.getId(), annotationId, "Grundbuch Eintrag 1923", 0));
em.flush();
em.clear();
assertThat(documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Grundbuch")).contains(doc.getId());
assertThat(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Grundbuch")).contains(doc.getId());
}
@Test
@@ -144,13 +144,13 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
em.flush();
em.clear();
assertThat(documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Grundbuch")).contains(doc.getId());
assertThat(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Grundbuch")).contains(doc.getId());
blockRepository.deleteById(block.getId());
em.flush();
em.clear();
assertThat(documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Grundbuch")).doesNotContain(doc.getId());
assertThat(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Grundbuch")).doesNotContain(doc.getId());
}
// ─── Ranking ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
em.flush();
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Grundbuch");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Grundbuch");
assertThat(ids).hasSize(2);
assertThat(ids.get(0)).isEqualTo(docA.getId());
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
documentRepository.saveAndFlush(document("Ein Brief von der Oma"));
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("der die das und");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("der die das und");
assertThat(ids).isEmpty();
}
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
em.flush();
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Wille");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Wille");
assertThat(ids).contains(doc.getId());
}
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
documentRepository.saveAndFlush(document("Brief"));
em.clear();
assertThatNoException().isThrownBy(() -> documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("((("));
assertThatNoException().isThrownBy(() -> documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("((("));
}
// ─── Weight C: sender/receiver names ───────────────────────────────────────
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
em.flush();
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Schmidt");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Schmidt");
assertThat(ids).contains(doc.getId());
}
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
em.flush();
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Raddatz");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Raddatz");
assertThat(ids).contains(doc.getId());
}
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
em.flush();
em.clear();
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Familiengeschichte");
List<UUID> ids = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Familiengeschichte");
assertThat(ids).hasSize(1);
}
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ class DocumentFtsTest {
em.flush();
em.clear();
List<UUID> rankedIds = documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Grundbuch");
List<UUID> rankedIds = documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Grundbuch");
Specification<Document> spec = Specification.where(hasIds(rankedIds))
.and(hasStatus(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED));

View File

@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.PostgresContainerConfig;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.audit.AuditLogQueryService;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.dashboard.DashboardService;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.person.Person;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.person.PersonRepository;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.tag.Tag;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.tag.TagRepository;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.data.domain.PageRequest;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThatCode;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.NONE)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
class DocumentLazyLoadingTest {
@MockitoBean
S3Client s3Client;
@Autowired
DocumentRepository documentRepository;
@Autowired
PersonRepository personRepository;
@Autowired
TagRepository tagRepository;
@Autowired
DocumentService documentService;
@Autowired
DashboardService dashboardService;
@MockitoBean
AuditLogQueryService auditLogQueryService;
@AfterEach
void cleanup() {
documentRepository.deleteAll();
tagRepository.deleteAll();
personRepository.deleteAll();
}
@Test
void getDocumentById_tagsAndReceiversAccessible_afterReturnFromService() {
Person sender = savedPerson("Max", "LzSender");
Person receiver = savedPerson("Anna", "LzReceiver");
Tag tag = savedTag("LzTag");
Document doc = savedDocument("LazyTest", "lazy_test.pdf", sender, Set.of(receiver), Set.of(tag));
Document result = documentService.getDocumentById(doc.getId());
assertThatCode(() -> {
assertThat(result.getTags()).isNotEmpty();
result.getTags().forEach(t -> assertThat(t.getName()).isNotNull());
assertThat(result.getReceivers()).isNotEmpty();
result.getReceivers().forEach(r -> assertThat(r.getLastName()).isNotNull());
}).doesNotThrowAnyException();
}
@Test
void getRecentActivity_collectionsAccessibleAfterReturn() {
Person sender = savedPerson("Hans", "RaSender");
Tag tag = savedTag("RaTag");
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
savedDocument("RaDoc " + i, "ra_doc" + i + ".pdf", sender, Set.of(), Set.of(tag));
}
List<Document> results = documentService.getRecentActivity(3);
assertThatCode(() -> {
results.forEach(d -> assertThat(d.getSender()).isNotNull());
results.forEach(d -> assertThat(d.getSender().getLastName()).isNotNull());
results.forEach(d -> d.getTags().size());
}).doesNotThrowAnyException();
}
@Test
void searchDocuments_receiverSort_doesNotThrowLazyInitializationException() {
Person sender = savedPerson("Hans", "SrSender");
Person receiver = savedPerson("Anna", "SrReceiver");
Tag tag = savedTag("SrTag");
savedDocument("SrDoc", "sr_doc.pdf", sender, Set.of(receiver), Set.of(tag));
DocumentSearchResult result = documentService.searchDocuments(
null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null,
DocumentSort.RECEIVER, "asc", null,
PageRequest.of(0, 20));
assertThat(result.totalElements()).isGreaterThan(0);
assertThatCode(() ->
result.items().forEach(i -> i.document().getSender().getLastName()))
.doesNotThrowAnyException();
}
@Test
void searchDocuments_senderSort_doesNotThrowLazyInitializationException() {
Person sender = savedPerson("Hans", "SsSender");
Tag tag = savedTag("SsTag");
savedDocument("SsDoc", "ss_doc.pdf", sender, Set.of(), Set.of(tag));
assertThatCode(() -> documentService.searchDocuments(
null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null,
DocumentSort.SENDER, "asc", null,
PageRequest.of(0, 20)))
.doesNotThrowAnyException();
}
@Test
void dashboardService_getResume_accessesReceiversViaGetDocumentById_withoutException() {
Person sender = savedPerson("Max", "DsSender");
Person receiver = savedPerson("Anna", "DsReceiver");
Document doc = savedDocument("DashboardTest", "dashboard_test.pdf", sender, Set.of(receiver), Set.of());
UUID fakeUserId = UUID.randomUUID();
when(auditLogQueryService.findMostRecentDocumentForUser(any())).thenReturn(Optional.of(doc.getId()));
when(auditLogQueryService.findRecentContributorsPerDocument(any())).thenReturn(java.util.Map.of());
assertThatCode(() -> dashboardService.getResume(fakeUserId))
.doesNotThrowAnyException();
}
private Person savedPerson(String firstName, String lastName) {
return personRepository.save(Person.builder().firstName(firstName).lastName(lastName).build());
}
private Tag savedTag(String name) {
return tagRepository.save(Tag.builder().name(name).build());
}
private Document savedDocument(String title, String filename, Person sender,
Set<Person> receivers, Set<Tag> tags) {
return documentRepository.save(Document.builder()
.title(title).originalFilename(filename)
.status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED)
.sender(sender)
.receivers(new HashSet<>(receivers))
.tags(new HashSet<>(tags))
.build());
}
}

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document;
import jakarta.persistence.EntityManager;
import jakarta.persistence.EntityManagerFactory;
import org.hibernate.SessionFactory;
import org.hibernate.stat.Statistics;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.PostgresContainerConfig;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.config.FlywayConfig;
@@ -25,7 +21,6 @@ import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.jdbc.test.autoconfigure.AutoConfigureTestDatabase;
import org.springframework.boot.data.jpa.test.autoconfigure.DataJpaTest;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.data.jpa.domain.Specification;
import org.springframework.data.domain.Page;
import org.springframework.data.domain.PageRequest;
@@ -60,12 +55,6 @@ class DocumentRepositoryTest {
@Autowired
private TranscriptionBlockRepository transcriptionBlockRepository;
@Autowired
private EntityManagerFactory entityManagerFactory;
@Autowired
private EntityManager entityManager;
// ─── save and findById ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
@@ -501,117 +490,6 @@ class DocumentRepositoryTest {
assertThat(ids).containsExactlyInAnyOrder(grandparent.getId(), parent2.getId(), child2.getId());
}
// ─── query-count — entity-graph assertions ────────────────────────────────
@Test
void findAll_withSpecAndPageable_loadsDocumentsInAtMostFiveStatements() {
Person sender = personRepository.save(Person.builder().firstName("Hans").lastName("QcSender").build());
Person receiver = personRepository.save(Person.builder().firstName("Anna").lastName("QcReceiver").build());
Tag tag = tagRepository.save(Tag.builder().name("QcTag").build());
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
documentRepository.save(Document.builder()
.title("QcDoc " + i).originalFilename("qcdoc" + i + ".pdf")
.status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED)
.sender(sender)
.receivers(new HashSet<>(Set.of(receiver)))
.tags(new HashSet<>(Set.of(tag)))
.build());
}
entityManager.flush();
entityManager.clear();
Statistics stats = entityManagerFactory.unwrap(SessionFactory.class).getStatistics();
stats.setStatisticsEnabled(true);
stats.clear();
Specification<Document> allDocs = (root, query, cb) -> null;
documentRepository.findAll(allDocs, PageRequest.of(0, 10));
assertThat(stats.getPrepareStatementCount())
.as("@EntityGraph(Document.list) must load 10 docs in ≤5 statements, not N+1")
.isLessThanOrEqualTo(5);
}
@Test
void findById_loadsSenderReceiversAndTagsInAtMostTwoStatements() {
Person sender = personRepository.save(Person.builder().firstName("Max").lastName("FbSender").build());
Set<Person> receivers = new HashSet<>();
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
receivers.add(personRepository.save(
Person.builder().firstName("R" + i).lastName("FbReceiver").build()));
}
Set<Tag> tags = new HashSet<>();
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
tags.add(tagRepository.save(Tag.builder().name("FbTag" + i).build()));
}
Document doc = documentRepository.save(Document.builder()
.title("FindByIdQc").originalFilename("findbyid_qc.pdf")
.status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED)
.sender(sender).receivers(receivers).tags(tags)
.build());
entityManager.flush();
entityManager.clear();
Statistics stats = entityManagerFactory.unwrap(SessionFactory.class).getStatistics();
stats.setStatisticsEnabled(true);
stats.clear();
documentRepository.findById(doc.getId());
assertThat(stats.getPrepareStatementCount())
.as("@EntityGraph(Document.full) must load sender+receivers+tags in ≤2 statements, not 4")
.isLessThanOrEqualTo(2);
}
@Test
void findAll_withPageable_loadsSenderWithoutNPlusOne() {
Person sender = personRepository.save(Person.builder().firstName("Maria").lastName("RaSender").build());
Tag tag = tagRepository.save(Tag.builder().name("RaTag2").build());
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
documentRepository.save(Document.builder()
.title("RaDoc2 " + i).originalFilename("radoc2_" + i + ".pdf")
.status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED)
.sender(sender)
.tags(new HashSet<>(Set.of(tag)))
.build());
}
entityManager.flush();
entityManager.clear();
Statistics stats = entityManagerFactory.unwrap(SessionFactory.class).getStatistics();
stats.setStatisticsEnabled(true);
stats.clear();
documentRepository.findAll(PageRequest.of(0, 5, Sort.by(Sort.Direction.DESC, "updatedAt")));
assertThat(stats.getPrepareStatementCount())
.as("@EntityGraph(Document.list) via findAll(Pageable) must not N+1 sender for 5 docs")
.isLessThanOrEqualTo(5);
}
@Test
void findAll_withSpecOnly_appliesEntityGraphInAtMostFiveStatements() {
Person sender = personRepository.save(Person.builder().firstName("Otto").lastName("SoSender").build());
Tag tag = tagRepository.save(Tag.builder().name("SoTag").build());
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
documentRepository.save(Document.builder()
.title("SoDoc " + i).originalFilename("sodoc_" + i + ".pdf")
.status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED)
.sender(sender)
.tags(new HashSet<>(Set.of(tag)))
.build());
}
entityManager.flush();
entityManager.clear();
Statistics stats = entityManagerFactory.unwrap(SessionFactory.class).getStatistics();
stats.setStatisticsEnabled(true);
stats.clear();
Specification<Document> allDocs = (root, query, cb) -> null;
documentRepository.findAll(allDocs);
assertThat(stats.getPrepareStatementCount())
.as("@EntityGraph(Document.list) via findAll(Spec) must not N+1 sender for 5 docs")
.isLessThanOrEqualTo(5);
}
// ─── seeding helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private Document uploaded(String title) {

View File

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.data.domain.PageRequest;
import org.springframework.test.annotation.DirtiesContext;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import java.time.LocalDate;
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.NONE)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
@Transactional
@DirtiesContext(classMode = DirtiesContext.ClassMode.AFTER_EACH_TEST_METHOD)
class DocumentSearchPagedIntegrationTest {
private static final int FIXTURE_SIZE = 120;

View File

@@ -21,22 +21,17 @@ import org.springframework.data.domain.Pageable;
import org.springframework.data.jpa.domain.Specification;
import java.time.LocalDate;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.UUID;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyInt;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyString;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.never;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.verify;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
@ExtendWith(MockitoExtension.class)
class DocumentServiceSortTest {
private static final Pageable PAGE = org.springframework.data.domain.PageRequest.of(0, 10_000);
private static final Pageable UNPAGED = org.springframework.data.domain.PageRequest.of(0, 10_000);
@Mock DocumentRepository documentRepository;
@Mock PersonService personService;
@@ -48,12 +43,12 @@ class DocumentServiceSortTest {
@Mock TranscriptionBlockQueryService transcriptionBlockQueryService;
@InjectMocks DocumentService documentService;
// ─── DATE sort ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ─── searchDocuments — DATE sort ──────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void searchDocuments_with_DATE_sort_and_text_sorts_chronologically_not_by_relevance() {
UUID id1 = UUID.randomUUID(); // higher relevance, older doc
UUID id2 = UUID.randomUUID(); // lower relevance, newer doc
UUID id1 = UUID.randomUUID(); // rank position 0 (higher relevance, older doc)
UUID id2 = UUID.randomUUID(); // rank position 1 (lower relevance, newer doc)
Document older = Document.builder().id(id1)
.title("Brief").status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED)
@@ -62,48 +57,38 @@ class DocumentServiceSortTest {
.title("Brief").status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED)
.documentDate(LocalDate.of(1960, 1, 1)).build();
when(documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Brief")).thenReturn(List.of(id1, id2));
// FTS returns id1 first (higher rank), id2 second
when(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Brief")).thenReturn(List.of(id1, id2));
// findAll(spec, pageable) — the correct date path — returns date-DESC order
when(documentRepository.findAll(any(Specification.class), any(Pageable.class)))
.thenReturn(new PageImpl<>(List.of(newer, older)));
DocumentSearchResult result = documentService.searchDocuments(
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, DocumentSort.DATE, "DESC", null, PAGE);
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, DocumentSort.DATE, "DESC", null, UNPAGED);
// Expect: date order (newer 1960 first), NOT rank order (older 1940 first)
assertThat(result.items()).hasSize(2);
assertThat(result.items().get(0).document().getId()).isEqualTo(id2); // newer first
assertThat(result.items().get(0).document().getId()).isEqualTo(id2); // newer doc first
}
// ─── RELEVANCE sort — pure text (no filters) ──────────────────────────────
@Test
void searchDocuments_relevance_pureText_calls_findFtsPageRaw_not_findAllMatchingIds() {
UUID id1 = UUID.randomUUID();
List<Object[]> ftsRows = ftsRows(id1, 0.5d, 1L);
when(documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt())).thenReturn(ftsRows);
when(documentRepository.findAllById(any()))
.thenReturn(List.of(doc(id1)));
documentService.searchDocuments(
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, DocumentSort.RELEVANCE, null, null, PAGE);
verify(documentRepository).findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt());
verify(documentRepository, never()).findAllMatchingIdsByFts(anyString());
}
// ─── searchDocuments — RELEVANCE sort ─────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void searchDocuments_with_RELEVANCE_sort_and_text_preserves_fts_rank_order() {
UUID id1 = UUID.randomUUID(); // higher rank — must appear first
UUID id2 = UUID.randomUUID(); // lower rank
UUID id1 = UUID.randomUUID(); // rank position 0
UUID id2 = UUID.randomUUID(); // rank position 1
List<Object[]> ftsRows = new ArrayList<>();
ftsRows.add(new Object[]{id1, 0.8d, 2L});
ftsRows.add(new Object[]{id2, 0.3d, 2L});
when(documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt())).thenReturn(ftsRows);
when(documentRepository.findAllById(any())).thenReturn(List.of(doc(id2), doc(id1))); // unordered from JPA
Document doc1 = Document.builder().id(id1).title("Brief").status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED).build();
Document doc2 = Document.builder().id(id2).title("Brief").status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED).build();
when(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Brief")).thenReturn(List.of(id1, id2));
when(documentRepository.findAll(any(Specification.class)))
.thenReturn(List.of(doc2, doc1)); // unordered from DB
DocumentSearchResult result = documentService.searchDocuments(
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, DocumentSort.RELEVANCE, null, null, PAGE);
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, DocumentSort.RELEVANCE, null, null, UNPAGED);
// Expect: rank order restored (id1 first)
assertThat(result.items().get(0).document().getId()).isEqualTo(id1);
}
@@ -112,82 +97,16 @@ class DocumentServiceSortTest {
UUID id1 = UUID.randomUUID();
UUID id2 = UUID.randomUUID();
List<Object[]> ftsRows = new ArrayList<>();
ftsRows.add(new Object[]{id1, 0.8d, 2L});
ftsRows.add(new Object[]{id2, 0.3d, 2L});
when(documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt())).thenReturn(ftsRows);
when(documentRepository.findAllById(any())).thenReturn(List.of(doc(id2), doc(id1)));
Document doc1 = Document.builder().id(id1).title("Brief").status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED).build();
Document doc2 = Document.builder().id(id2).title("Brief").status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED).build();
when(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Brief")).thenReturn(List.of(id1, id2));
when(documentRepository.findAll(any(Specification.class)))
.thenReturn(List.of(doc2, doc1));
DocumentSearchResult result = documentService.searchDocuments(
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, PAGE);
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, UNPAGED);
assertThat(result.items().get(0).document().getId()).isEqualTo(id1);
}
// ─── RELEVANCE sort — overflow guard ─────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void searchDocuments_relevance_returns_empty_when_offset_exceeds_maxInt() {
// offset = pageNumber * pageSize; choose values so offset > Integer.MAX_VALUE
Pageable hugePage = org.springframework.data.domain.PageRequest.of(Integer.MAX_VALUE / 10 + 1, 10);
DocumentSearchResult result = documentService.searchDocuments(
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null,
DocumentSort.RELEVANCE, null, null, hugePage);
assertThat(result.items()).isEmpty();
verify(documentRepository, never()).findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt());
}
// ─── toFtsPage — UUID-as-String JDBC driver variance ────────────────────
@Test
void searchDocuments_relevance_handles_string_uuid_from_jdbc_driver() {
String stringId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
UUID uuidId = UUID.fromString(stringId);
// Simulate a JDBC driver that returns the id column as String instead of UUID
List<Object[]> ftsRows = new ArrayList<>();
ftsRows.add(new Object[]{stringId, 0.5d, 1L});
when(documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt())).thenReturn(ftsRows);
when(documentRepository.findAllById(any())).thenReturn(List.of(doc(uuidId)));
DocumentSearchResult result = documentService.searchDocuments(
"Brief", null, null, null, null, null, null, null,
DocumentSort.RELEVANCE, null, null, PAGE);
assertThat(result.items()).hasSize(1);
assertThat(result.items().get(0).document().getId()).isEqualTo(uuidId);
}
// ─── RELEVANCE sort — text + active filter ────────────────────────────────
@Test
void searchDocuments_relevance_with_active_filter_uses_inMemory_path() {
UUID id1 = UUID.randomUUID();
UUID id2 = UUID.randomUUID();
when(documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Brief")).thenReturn(List.of(id1, id2));
when(documentRepository.findAll(any(Specification.class)))
.thenReturn(List.of(doc(id2), doc(id1)));
// sender filter is active → triggers in-memory path, not findFtsPageRaw
LocalDate from = LocalDate.of(1900, 1, 1);
documentService.searchDocuments(
"Brief", from, null, null, null, null, null, null, DocumentSort.RELEVANCE, null, null, PAGE);
verify(documentRepository, never()).findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt());
verify(documentRepository).findAllMatchingIdsByFts("Brief");
}
// ─── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private static Document doc(UUID id) {
return Document.builder().id(id).title("Brief").status(DocumentStatus.UPLOADED).build();
}
private static List<Object[]> ftsRows(UUID id, double rank, long total) {
List<Object[]> rows = new ArrayList<>();
rows.add(new Object[]{id, rank, total});
return rows;
}
}

View File

@@ -1620,10 +1620,9 @@ class DocumentServiceTest {
// chr(1)=\u0001 marks start, chr(2)=\u0002 marks end of highlighted term
List<Object[]> rows = Collections.singletonList(new Object[]{docId, "\u0001Brief\u0002 an Anna", null, false, null, null, null});
List<Object[]> ftsRows = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
ftsRows.add(new Object[]{docId, 0.5d, 1L});
when(documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt())).thenReturn(ftsRows);
when(documentRepository.findAllById(any())).thenReturn(List.of(doc));
when(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Brief")).thenReturn(List.of(docId));
when(documentRepository.findAll(any(org.springframework.data.jpa.domain.Specification.class)))
.thenReturn(List.of(doc));
when(documentRepository.findEnrichmentData(any(), eq("Brief"))).thenReturn(rows);
DocumentSearchResult result = documentService.searchDocuments(
@@ -1655,10 +1654,9 @@ class DocumentServiceTest {
String snippetHeadline = "Hier ist der \u0001Brief\u0002 aus Berlin";
List<Object[]> rows = Collections.singletonList(new Object[]{docId, "Dok", snippetHeadline, false, null, null, null});
List<Object[]> snippetFtsRows = new java.util.ArrayList<>();
snippetFtsRows.add(new Object[]{docId, 0.5d, 1L});
when(documentRepository.findFtsPageRaw(anyString(), anyInt(), anyInt())).thenReturn(snippetFtsRows);
when(documentRepository.findAllById(any())).thenReturn(List.of(doc));
when(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("Brief")).thenReturn(List.of(docId));
when(documentRepository.findAll(any(org.springframework.data.jpa.domain.Specification.class)))
.thenReturn(List.of(doc));
when(documentRepository.findEnrichmentData(any(), eq("Brief"))).thenReturn(rows);
DocumentSearchResult result = documentService.searchDocuments(
@@ -2204,7 +2202,7 @@ class DocumentServiceTest {
@Test
void findIdsForFilter_returnsEmpty_whenFtsHasNoMatches() {
when(documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("xyz")).thenReturn(List.of());
when(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("xyz")).thenReturn(List.of());
List<UUID> result = documentService.findIdsForFilter(
"xyz", null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null);
@@ -2388,7 +2386,7 @@ class DocumentServiceTest {
@Test
void getDensity_shortCircuits_whenFtsReturnsNoMatches() {
when(documentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts("xyz")).thenReturn(List.of());
when(documentRepository.findRankedIdsByFts("xyz")).thenReturn(List.of());
DocumentDensityResult result = documentService.getDensity(
new DensityFilters("xyz", null, null, null, null, null, null));

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document.DocumentStatus;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.document.DocumentRepository;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.test.context.DynamicPropertyRegistry;
import org.springframework.test.context.DynamicPropertySource;
@@ -42,7 +41,6 @@ import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
* test pyramid mocks at the FileService boundary.
*/
@SpringBootTest
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
class ThumbnailServiceIntegrationTest {

View File

@@ -44,14 +44,6 @@ class CommentControllerTest {
// ─── Block comment endpoints ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
@WithMockUser
void getBlockComments_returns400_when_documentId_is_not_a_UUID() throws Exception {
UUID blockId = UUID.randomUUID();
mockMvc.perform(get("/api/documents/NOT-A-UUID/transcription-blocks/" + blockId + "/comments"))
.andExpect(status().isBadRequest());
}
@Test
@WithMockUser
void getBlockComments_returns200() throws Exception {
@@ -123,15 +115,6 @@ class CommentControllerTest {
// ─── Block reply endpoints ───────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
@WithMockUser(authorities = "ANNOTATE_ALL")
void replyToBlockComment_returns400_when_blockId_is_not_a_UUID() throws Exception {
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/documents/" + DOC_ID + "/transcription-blocks/NOT-A-UUID"
+ "/comments/" + COMMENT_ID + "/replies")
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON).content(COMMENT_JSON))
.andExpect(status().isBadRequest());
}
@Test
void replyToBlockComment_returns401_whenUnauthenticated() throws Exception {
UUID blockId = UUID.randomUUID();

View File

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.exception;
import io.sentry.Sentry;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.ExtendWith;
import org.mockito.InjectMocks;
import org.mockito.MockedStatic;
import org.mockito.junit.jupiter.MockitoExtension;
import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.mockStatic;
@ExtendWith(MockitoExtension.class)
class GlobalExceptionHandlerTest {
@InjectMocks
private GlobalExceptionHandler handler;
@Test
void handleGeneric_captures_exception_in_sentry_and_returns_500() {
RuntimeException ex = new RuntimeException("unexpected failure");
try (MockedStatic<Sentry> sentryMock = mockStatic(Sentry.class)) {
ResponseEntity<GlobalExceptionHandler.ErrorResponse> response = handler.handleGeneric(ex);
sentryMock.verify(() -> Sentry.captureException(ex));
assertThat(response.getStatusCode().value()).isEqualTo(500);
assertThat(response.getBody()).isNotNull();
assertThat(response.getBody().code()).isEqualTo(ErrorCode.INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
}
}

View File

@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.security.authentication.UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken;
import org.springframework.security.core.authority.SimpleGrantedAuthority;
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder;
import org.springframework.test.annotation.DirtiesContext;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import java.util.List;
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.NONE)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
@Transactional
@DirtiesContext(classMode = DirtiesContext.ClassMode.AFTER_EACH_TEST_METHOD)
class GeschichteServiceIntegrationTest {
@MockitoBean

View File

@@ -20,13 +20,7 @@ import software.amazon.awssdk.core.sync.RequestBody;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.model.PutObjectRequest;
import org.apache.poi.xssf.usermodel.XSSFWorkbook;
import org.xml.sax.SAXParseException;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.OutputStream;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.time.LocalDate;
@@ -35,8 +29,6 @@ import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.UUID;
import java.util.zip.ZipEntry;
import java.util.zip.ZipOutputStream;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThatThrownBy;
@@ -58,7 +50,6 @@ class MassImportServiceTest {
void setUp() {
service = new MassImportService(documentService, personService, tagService, s3Client, thumbnailAsyncRunner);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "bucketName", "test-bucket");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "importDir", "/import");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "colIndex", 0);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "colBox", 1);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "colFolder", 2);
@@ -78,64 +69,20 @@ class MassImportServiceTest {
assertThat(service.getStatus().state()).isEqualTo(MassImportService.State.IDLE);
}
@Test
void getStatus_hasStatusCode_IMPORT_IDLE_byDefault() {
assertThat(service.getStatus().statusCode()).isEqualTo("IMPORT_IDLE");
}
// ─── runImportAsync ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void runImportAsync_setsFailedStatus_whenImportDirectoryDoesNotExist() {
// /import directory doesn't exist in test environment → IOException → IMPORT_FAILED_INTERNAL
// /import directory doesn't exist in test environment → findSpreadsheetFile throws
service.runImportAsync();
assertThat(service.getStatus().state()).isEqualTo(MassImportService.State.FAILED);
assertThat(service.getStatus().statusCode()).isEqualTo("IMPORT_FAILED_INTERNAL");
}
@Test
void runImportAsync_readsFromConfiguredImportDir(@TempDir Path tempDir) {
// Empty temp dir → findSpreadsheetFile throws "no spreadsheet" with the
// configured path in the message. Proves the field, not a constant,
// drives the lookup.
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "importDir", tempDir.toString());
service.runImportAsync();
assertThat(service.getStatus().state()).isEqualTo(MassImportService.State.FAILED);
assertThat(service.getStatus().message()).contains(tempDir.toString());
}
@Test
void runImportAsync_setsStatusCode_IMPORT_FAILED_NO_SPREADSHEET_whenDirIsEmpty(@TempDir Path tempDir) {
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "importDir", tempDir.toString());
service.runImportAsync();
assertThat(service.getStatus().statusCode()).isEqualTo("IMPORT_FAILED_NO_SPREADSHEET");
}
@Test
void runImportAsync_setsStatusCode_IMPORT_DONE_whenSpreadsheetHasNoDataRows(@TempDir Path tempDir) throws Exception {
Path xlsx = tempDir.resolve("import.xlsx");
try (XSSFWorkbook wb = new XSSFWorkbook()) {
wb.createSheet("Sheet1");
try (OutputStream out = Files.newOutputStream(xlsx)) {
wb.write(out);
}
}
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "importDir", tempDir.toString());
service.runImportAsync();
assertThat(service.getStatus().statusCode()).isEqualTo("IMPORT_DONE");
}
@Test
void runImportAsync_throwsConflict_whenAlreadyRunning() {
MassImportService.ImportStatus running = new MassImportService.ImportStatus(
MassImportService.State.RUNNING, "IMPORT_RUNNING", "Running...", 0, LocalDateTime.now());
MassImportService.State.RUNNING, "Running...", 0, LocalDateTime.now());
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(service, "currentStatus", running);
assertThatThrownBy(() -> service.runImportAsync())
@@ -525,25 +472,6 @@ class MassImportServiceTest {
assertThat(result).isEqualTo("hello");
}
// ─── readOds — XXE security regression ───────────────────────────────────
// Security regression — do not remove.
@Test
void readOds_rejects_xxe_doctype_payload(@TempDir Path tempDir) throws Exception {
File malicious = buildXxeOds(tempDir, "file:///etc/hostname");
assertThatThrownBy(() -> service.readOds(malicious))
.isInstanceOf(SAXParseException.class)
.hasMessageContaining("DOCTYPE is disallowed");
}
@Test
void readOds_parses_valid_ods_correctly(@TempDir Path tempDir) throws Exception {
File valid = buildValidOds(tempDir, "Mustermann");
List<List<String>> rows = service.readOds(valid);
assertThat(rows).isNotEmpty();
assertThat(rows.get(0)).contains("Mustermann");
}
// ─── helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
@@ -577,48 +505,4 @@ class MassImportServiceTest {
"" // 13: transcription
);
}
/** Creates a minimal ODS ZIP containing a content.xml with an XXE payload. */
private File buildXxeOds(Path dir, String entityTarget) throws Exception {
String xml = "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>"
+ "<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"" + entityTarget + "\">]>"
+ "<office:document-content"
+ " xmlns:office=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:office:1.0\""
+ " xmlns:table=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:table:1.0\""
+ " xmlns:text=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:text:1.0\">"
+ "<office:body><office:spreadsheet>"
+ "<table:table><table:table-row><table:table-cell>"
+ "<text:p>&xxe;</text:p>"
+ "</table:table-cell></table:table-row></table:table>"
+ "</office:spreadsheet></office:body>"
+ "</office:document-content>";
return writeOdsZip(dir.resolve("malicious.ods"), xml);
}
/** Creates a minimal valid ODS ZIP containing a content.xml with the given cell value.
* cellValue must not contain XML metacharacters ({@code < > &}). */
private File buildValidOds(Path dir, String cellValue) throws Exception {
String xml = "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>"
+ "<office:document-content"
+ " xmlns:office=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:office:1.0\""
+ " xmlns:table=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:table:1.0\""
+ " xmlns:text=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:text:1.0\">"
+ "<office:body><office:spreadsheet>"
+ "<table:table><table:table-row><table:table-cell>"
+ "<text:p>" + cellValue + "</text:p>"
+ "</table:table-cell></table:table-row></table:table>"
+ "</office:spreadsheet></office:body>"
+ "</office:document-content>";
return writeOdsZip(dir.resolve("valid.ods"), xml);
}
private File writeOdsZip(Path destination, String contentXml) throws Exception {
try (OutputStream fos = Files.newOutputStream(destination);
ZipOutputStream zip = new ZipOutputStream(fos)) {
zip.putNextEntry(new ZipEntry("content.xml"));
zip.write(contentXml.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
zip.closeEntry();
}
return destination.toFile();
}
}

View File

@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.person.PersonRepository;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import org.springframework.test.annotation.DirtiesContext;
import org.springframework.test.context.ActiveProfiles;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.transaction.annotation.Transactional;
import software.amazon.awssdk.services.s3.S3Client;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.NONE)
@ActiveProfiles("test")
@Import(PostgresContainerConfig.class)
@Transactional
@DirtiesContext(classMode = DirtiesContext.ClassMode.AFTER_EACH_TEST_METHOD)
class PersonServiceIntegrationTest {
@MockitoBean S3Client s3Client;

View File

@@ -40,47 +40,6 @@ class AdminControllerTest {
@MockitoBean ThumbnailBackfillService thumbnailBackfillService;
@MockitoBean CustomUserDetailsService customUserDetailsService;
// ─── GET /api/admin/import-status ─────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
@WithMockUser(authorities = "ADMIN")
void importStatus_returns200_withStatusCode_whenAdmin() throws Exception {
MassImportService.ImportStatus status = new MassImportService.ImportStatus(
MassImportService.State.IDLE, "IMPORT_IDLE", "Kein Import gestartet.", 0, null);
when(massImportService.getStatus()).thenReturn(status);
mockMvc.perform(get("/api/admin/import-status"))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.state").value("IDLE"))
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.statusCode").value("IMPORT_IDLE"))
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.processed").value(0));
}
@Test
@WithMockUser(authorities = "ADMIN")
void importStatus_messageField_notPresentInApiResponse() throws Exception {
MassImportService.ImportStatus status = new MassImportService.ImportStatus(
MassImportService.State.IDLE, "IMPORT_IDLE", "Kein Import gestartet.", 0, null);
when(massImportService.getStatus()).thenReturn(status);
mockMvc.perform(get("/api/admin/import-status"))
.andExpect(status().isOk())
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.message").doesNotExist());
}
@Test
void importStatus_returns401_whenUnauthenticated() throws Exception {
mockMvc.perform(get("/api/admin/import-status"))
.andExpect(status().isUnauthorized());
}
@Test
@WithMockUser(authorities = "READ_ALL")
void importStatus_returns403_whenUserLacksAdminPermission() throws Exception {
mockMvc.perform(get("/api/admin/import-status"))
.andExpect(status().isForbidden());
}
@Test
void backfillVersions_returns401_whenUnauthenticated() throws Exception {
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/admin/backfill-versions"))

View File

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.ExtendWith;
import org.mockito.Mock;
import org.mockito.junit.jupiter.MockitoExtension;
import org.springframework.boot.CommandLineRunner;
import org.springframework.core.env.Environment;
import org.springframework.security.crypto.password.PasswordEncoder;
import org.springframework.test.util.ReflectionTestUtils;
import java.util.Optional;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThatThrownBy;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyString;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.eq;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.never;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.verify;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
/**
* UserDataInitializer must refuse to seed the admin user with the hardcoded
* dev defaults when running outside the {@code dev} profile.
*
* <p>Why this matters: per DEPLOYMENT.md §3.5 and ADR-011, the admin password
* is permanently locked on first deploy (UserDataInitializer only seeds when
* the row is missing). If an operator forgets to set {@code APP_ADMIN_USERNAME}
* / {@code APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD}, prod silently boots with the well-known dev
* defaults — a credential-disclosure foot-gun, not a config typo. See #513.
*/
@ExtendWith(MockitoExtension.class)
class AdminSeedFailClosedTest {
@Mock AppUserRepository userRepository;
@Mock UserGroupRepository groupRepository;
@Mock Environment environment;
@Mock PasswordEncoder passwordEncoder;
UserDataInitializer initializer;
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
initializer = new UserDataInitializer(userRepository, groupRepository, environment);
}
@Test
void refuses_to_seed_when_email_is_default_and_profile_is_not_dev() throws Exception {
when(userRepository.findByEmail(anyString())).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(environment.matchesProfiles("dev", "test", "e2e")).thenReturn(false);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminEmail", UserDataInitializer.DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminPassword", "operator-set-this-one");
CommandLineRunner runner = initializer.initAdminUser(passwordEncoder);
assertThatThrownBy(() -> runner.run())
.isInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class)
.hasMessageContaining("default credentials")
.hasMessageContaining("permanent");
verify(userRepository, never()).save(org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any());
}
@Test
void refuses_to_seed_when_password_is_default_and_profile_is_not_dev() throws Exception {
when(userRepository.findByEmail(anyString())).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(environment.matchesProfiles("dev", "test", "e2e")).thenReturn(false);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminEmail", "admin@archiv.raddatz.cloud");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminPassword", UserDataInitializer.DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD);
CommandLineRunner runner = initializer.initAdminUser(passwordEncoder);
assertThatThrownBy(() -> runner.run())
.isInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class)
.hasMessageContaining("default credentials");
}
@Test
void allows_seed_when_both_values_are_set_and_profile_is_not_dev() throws Exception {
when(userRepository.findByEmail(anyString())).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(groupRepository.findByName("Administrators")).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(groupRepository.save(any(UserGroup.class))).thenAnswer(inv -> inv.getArgument(0));
when(environment.matchesProfiles("dev", "test", "e2e")).thenReturn(false);
when(passwordEncoder.encode(anyString())).thenReturn("$2a$10$stub");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminEmail", "admin@archiv.raddatz.cloud");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminPassword", "a-real-strong-password");
CommandLineRunner runner = initializer.initAdminUser(passwordEncoder);
runner.run();
verify(userRepository).save(any(AppUser.class));
}
@Test
void allows_seed_with_defaults_when_profile_is_dev() throws Exception {
when(userRepository.findByEmail(anyString())).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(groupRepository.findByName("Administrators")).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(groupRepository.save(any(UserGroup.class))).thenAnswer(inv -> inv.getArgument(0));
when(environment.matchesProfiles("dev", "test", "e2e")).thenReturn(true);
when(passwordEncoder.encode(anyString())).thenReturn("$2a$10$stub");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminEmail", UserDataInitializer.DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminPassword", UserDataInitializer.DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD);
CommandLineRunner runner = initializer.initAdminUser(passwordEncoder);
runner.run();
verify(userRepository).save(any(AppUser.class));
}
@Test
void does_not_check_defaults_when_admin_already_exists() throws Exception {
AppUser existing = AppUser.builder()
.email("someone@example.com")
.password("$2a$10$stub")
.build();
when(userRepository.findByEmail(anyString())).thenReturn(Optional.of(existing));
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminEmail", UserDataInitializer.DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminPassword", UserDataInitializer.DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD);
CommandLineRunner runner = initializer.initAdminUser(passwordEncoder);
runner.run();
verify(userRepository, never()).save(org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any());
// Importantly, no IllegalStateException — re-deploys must not panic over
// historical default-seeded data they cannot retroactively fix.
}
@Test
void reuses_existing_Administrators_group_when_seeding_a_new_admin() throws Exception {
// Setup: admin user does not exist, but the Administrators group does
// (e.g. previous boot seeded the group then failed; operator deleted
// the bad user row to retry with a corrected APP_ADMIN_USERNAME). The
// re-seed must reuse the group, not blind-INSERT a duplicate. See #518.
UserGroup existingGroup = UserGroup.builder()
.name("Administrators")
.build();
when(userRepository.findByEmail(anyString())).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(groupRepository.findByName("Administrators")).thenReturn(Optional.of(existingGroup));
when(environment.matchesProfiles("dev", "test", "e2e")).thenReturn(false);
when(passwordEncoder.encode(anyString())).thenReturn("$2a$10$stub");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminEmail", "admin@archiv.raddatz.cloud");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminPassword", "a-real-strong-password");
CommandLineRunner runner = initializer.initAdminUser(passwordEncoder);
runner.run();
// Group must not be re-inserted — that would violate user_groups_name_key.
verify(groupRepository, never()).save(any(UserGroup.class));
// But the admin user IS created, with the existing group attached.
org.mockito.ArgumentCaptor<AppUser> captor = org.mockito.ArgumentCaptor.forClass(AppUser.class);
verify(userRepository).save(captor.capture());
assertThat(captor.getValue().getGroups()).containsExactly(existingGroup);
}
@Test
void creates_Administrators_group_when_seeding_admin_on_a_fresh_database() throws Exception {
when(userRepository.findByEmail(anyString())).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(groupRepository.findByName("Administrators")).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(groupRepository.save(any(UserGroup.class))).thenAnswer(inv -> inv.getArgument(0));
when(environment.matchesProfiles("dev", "test", "e2e")).thenReturn(false);
when(passwordEncoder.encode(anyString())).thenReturn("$2a$10$stub");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminEmail", "admin@archiv.raddatz.cloud");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(initializer, "adminPassword", "a-real-strong-password");
CommandLineRunner runner = initializer.initAdminUser(passwordEncoder);
runner.run();
// Group should be inserted exactly once.
verify(groupRepository).save(any(UserGroup.class));
verify(userRepository).save(any(AppUser.class));
}
}

View File

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Value;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.config.YamlPropertiesFactoryBean;
import org.springframework.boot.context.properties.bind.Binder;
import org.springframework.boot.context.properties.source.ConfigurationPropertySources;
import org.springframework.core.env.PropertiesPropertySource;
import org.springframework.core.io.ClassPathResource;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.Properties;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
/**
* Pins the admin-seed property key contract. {@code UserDataInitializer} reads
* {@code @Value("${app.admin.email:...}")} and {@code @Value("${app.admin.password:...}")}.
* The yaml MUST expose those exact keys, not e.g. {@code app.admin.username}, or
* the env vars {@code APP_ADMIN_USERNAME} / {@code APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD} are
* silently ignored and the admin user gets seeded with the hardcoded defaults.
*
* <p>Discovered as a HIGH bug during the production-deploy bootstrap (#513): on
* first deploy the prod admin password is permanently locked to whatever ends
* up in the database, so a key-name mismatch would lock prod to the dev defaults
* {@code admin@familyarchive.local} / {@code admin123}.
*
* <p>No Spring context — Binder reads application.yaml directly.
*/
class AdminSeedPropertyKeyTest {
@Test
void admin_email_key_binds_from_yaml() {
Binder binder = binderFromApplicationYaml();
String email = binder.bind("app.admin.email", String.class)
.orElseThrow(() -> new AssertionError(
"app.admin.email is missing from application.yaml. "
+ "UserDataInitializer reads this exact key; if the yaml uses "
+ "a different name (e.g. 'username'), the env var "
+ "APP_ADMIN_USERNAME is silently ignored."));
assertThat(email)
.as("app.admin.email must resolve from APP_ADMIN_USERNAME or its default")
.isNotBlank();
}
@Test
void admin_password_key_binds_from_yaml() {
Binder binder = binderFromApplicationYaml();
String password = binder.bind("app.admin.password", String.class)
.orElseThrow(() -> new AssertionError(
"app.admin.password is missing from application.yaml. "
+ "UserDataInitializer reads this exact key."));
assertThat(password)
.as("app.admin.password must resolve from APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD or its default")
.isNotBlank();
}
@Test
void userDataInitializer_reads_app_admin_email_not_username() throws NoSuchFieldException {
// Pin the Java side too: a future rename of the @Value placeholder
// (e.g. back to `${app.admin.username:...}`) would silently break the
// binding while the yaml-side assertions above still pass. See #513.
Field field = UserDataInitializer.class.getDeclaredField("adminEmail");
Value annotation = field.getAnnotation(Value.class);
assertThat(annotation)
.as("UserDataInitializer.adminEmail must be @Value-annotated")
.isNotNull();
assertThat(annotation.value())
.as("UserDataInitializer must read app.admin.email — not username or any other key")
.startsWith("${app.admin.email:");
}
@Test
void userDataInitializer_reads_app_admin_password() throws NoSuchFieldException {
Field field = UserDataInitializer.class.getDeclaredField("adminPassword");
Value annotation = field.getAnnotation(Value.class);
assertThat(annotation).isNotNull();
assertThat(annotation.value())
.as("UserDataInitializer must read app.admin.password")
.startsWith("${app.admin.password:");
}
private Binder binderFromApplicationYaml() {
YamlPropertiesFactoryBean yaml = new YamlPropertiesFactoryBean();
yaml.setResources(new ClassPathResource("application.yaml"));
Properties props = yaml.getObject();
assertThat(props).as("application.yaml must be on the classpath").isNotNull();
return new Binder(ConfigurationPropertySources.from(
new PropertiesPropertySource("application", props)));
}
}

View File

@@ -35,15 +35,4 @@ class AppUserTest {
.count();
assertThat(distinct).isGreaterThan(1);
}
@Test
void computeColor_returnsValidPaletteColorForIntegerMinValueHash() {
// UUID "80000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" has hashCode() == Integer.MIN_VALUE.
// Math.abs(Integer.MIN_VALUE) overflows back to Integer.MIN_VALUE (negative), making
// Math.abs(hashCode()) % n unsafe for palette sizes that don't evenly divide MIN_VALUE.
// Math.floorMod eliminates this edge case entirely.
UUID minHashId = UUID.fromString("80000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000");
assertThat(minHashId.hashCode()).isEqualTo(Integer.MIN_VALUE);
assertThat(EXPECTED_PALETTE).contains(AppUser.computeColor(minHashId));
}
}

View File

@@ -20,13 +20,10 @@ import org.springframework.security.test.context.support.WithMockUser;
import org.springframework.test.context.bean.override.mockito.MockitoBean;
import org.springframework.test.web.servlet.MockMvc;
import org.mockito.ArgumentCaptor;
import java.time.LocalDateTime;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.UUID;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.*;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.verify;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
@@ -150,30 +147,6 @@ class InviteControllerTest {
.andExpect(jsonPath("$.label").value("Für Familie"));
}
@Test
@WithMockUser(username = "admin@test.com", authorities = {"ADMIN_USER"})
void createInvite_forwardsGroupIdsToService() throws Exception {
UUID groupId = UUID.randomUUID();
AppUser admin = AppUser.builder().id(UUID.randomUUID()).email("admin@test.com").build();
when(userService.findByEmail("admin@test.com")).thenReturn(admin);
InviteToken savedToken = InviteToken.builder()
.id(UUID.randomUUID()).code("ABCDE12345").useCount(0).build();
when(inviteService.createInvite(any(), eq(admin))).thenReturn(savedToken);
when(inviteService.toListItemDTO(any(), anyString()))
.thenReturn(makeInviteDTO(savedToken.getId(), "ABCDE12345"));
String body = "{\"groupIds\":[\"" + groupId + "\"]}";
mockMvc.perform(post("/api/invites")
.contentType(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
.content(body))
.andExpect(status().isCreated());
ArgumentCaptor<CreateInviteRequest> captor = ArgumentCaptor.forClass(CreateInviteRequest.class);
verify(inviteService).createInvite(captor.capture(), eq(admin));
assertThat(captor.getValue().getGroupIds()).containsExactly(groupId);
}
// ─── DELETE /api/invites/{id} ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test

View File

@@ -156,35 +156,6 @@ class InviteServiceTest {
assertThat(result.getGroupIds()).contains(g.getId());
}
@Test
void createInvite_throwsGroupNotFound_whenSubmittedGroupIdDoesNotExist() {
UUID unknownGroupId = UUID.randomUUID();
when(userService.findGroupsByIds(anyList())).thenReturn(List.of());
CreateInviteRequest req = new CreateInviteRequest();
req.setGroupIds(List.of(unknownGroupId));
assertThatThrownBy(() -> inviteService.createInvite(req, admin))
.isInstanceOf(DomainException.class)
.extracting(e -> ((DomainException) e).getCode())
.isEqualTo(ErrorCode.GROUP_NOT_FOUND);
}
@Test
void createInvite_doesNotThrowGroupNotFound_whenDuplicateGroupIdsSubmitted() {
UUID groupId = UUID.randomUUID();
UserGroup group = UserGroup.builder().id(groupId).name("Familie").build();
when(inviteTokenRepository.findByCode(anyString())).thenReturn(Optional.empty());
when(userService.findGroupsByIds(anyList())).thenReturn(List.of(group));
when(inviteTokenRepository.save(any())).thenAnswer(inv -> inv.getArgument(0));
CreateInviteRequest req = new CreateInviteRequest();
req.setGroupIds(List.of(groupId, groupId)); // same UUID submitted twice
// before deduplication: size(groups)==1 != size(submitted)==2 → false GROUP_NOT_FOUND
assertThatCode(() -> inviteService.createInvite(req, admin)).doesNotThrowAnyException();
}
// ─── redeemInvite ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.PostgresContainerConfig;
import org.raddatz.familienarchiv.config.FlywayConfig;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.boot.jdbc.test.autoconfigure.AutoConfigureTestDatabase;
import org.springframework.boot.data.jpa.test.autoconfigure.DataJpaTest;
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Import;
import java.time.LocalDateTime;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.UUID;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
@DataJpaTest
@AutoConfigureTestDatabase(replace = AutoConfigureTestDatabase.Replace.NONE)
@Import({PostgresContainerConfig.class, FlywayConfig.class})
class InviteTokenRepositoryIntegrationTest {
@Autowired InviteTokenRepository inviteTokenRepository;
@Autowired UserGroupRepository userGroupRepository;
@Autowired AppUserRepository appUserRepository;
private UserGroup group;
private AppUser admin;
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
inviteTokenRepository.deleteAll();
userGroupRepository.deleteAll();
appUserRepository.deleteAll();
admin = appUserRepository.save(AppUser.builder().email("admin@test.com").password("pw").build());
group = userGroupRepository.save(UserGroup.builder().name("Familie").build());
}
// ─── existsActiveWithGroupId ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void existsActiveWithGroupId_returnsTrueForActiveInviteLinkedToGroup() {
inviteTokenRepository.save(token(t -> t));
assertThat(inviteTokenRepository.existsActiveWithGroupId(group.getId())).isTrue();
}
@Test
void existsActiveWithGroupId_returnsFalseWhenInviteIsRevoked() {
inviteTokenRepository.save(token(t -> t.revoked(true)));
assertThat(inviteTokenRepository.existsActiveWithGroupId(group.getId())).isFalse();
}
@Test
void existsActiveWithGroupId_returnsFalseWhenInviteIsExpired() {
inviteTokenRepository.save(token(t -> t.expiresAt(LocalDateTime.now().minusDays(1))));
assertThat(inviteTokenRepository.existsActiveWithGroupId(group.getId())).isFalse();
}
@Test
void existsActiveWithGroupId_returnsFalseWhenInviteIsExhausted() {
inviteTokenRepository.save(token(t -> t.maxUses(1).useCount(1)));
assertThat(inviteTokenRepository.existsActiveWithGroupId(group.getId())).isFalse();
}
// ─── helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private InviteToken token(java.util.function.UnaryOperator<InviteToken.InviteTokenBuilder> customizer) {
InviteToken.InviteTokenBuilder builder = InviteToken.builder()
.code(UUID.randomUUID().toString().replace("-", "").substring(0, 10))
.groupIds(new java.util.HashSet<>(Set.of(group.getId())))
.createdBy(admin);
return customizer.apply(builder).build();
}
}

View File

@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ class UserServiceTest {
@Mock AppUserRepository userRepository;
@Mock UserGroupRepository groupRepository;
@Mock InviteTokenRepository inviteTokenRepository;
@Mock PasswordEncoder passwordEncoder;
@Mock AuditService auditService;
@InjectMocks UserService userService;
@@ -903,41 +902,4 @@ class UserServiceTest {
assertThat(result.getName()).isEqualTo("Familie");
assertThat(result.getPermissions()).containsExactlyInAnyOrder("READ_ALL", "WRITE_ALL");
}
// ─── deleteGroup ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void deleteGroup_throwsConflict_whenActiveInviteReferencesGroup() {
UUID groupId = UUID.randomUUID();
when(inviteTokenRepository.existsActiveWithGroupId(groupId)).thenReturn(true);
assertThatThrownBy(() -> userService.deleteGroup(groupId))
.isInstanceOf(DomainException.class)
.extracting(e -> ((DomainException) e).getCode())
.isEqualTo(ErrorCode.GROUP_HAS_ACTIVE_INVITES);
}
@Test
void deleteGroup_deletesGroup_whenNoActiveInviteReferencesGroup() {
UUID groupId = UUID.randomUUID();
when(inviteTokenRepository.existsActiveWithGroupId(groupId)).thenReturn(false);
userService.deleteGroup(groupId);
verify(groupRepository).deleteById(groupId);
}
@Test
void createGroup_withNullPermissions_savesGroupWithEmptyPermissionSet() {
org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.GroupDTO dto = new org.raddatz.familienarchiv.user.GroupDTO();
dto.setName("Leser");
dto.setPermissions(null);
UserGroup saved = UserGroup.builder().id(UUID.randomUUID()).name("Leser").build();
when(groupRepository.save(any())).thenReturn(saved);
userService.createGroup(dto);
verify(groupRepository).save(argThat(g -> g.getPermissions() != null && g.getPermissions().isEmpty()));
}
}

View File

@@ -13,18 +13,3 @@ spring:
password: test
mail:
host: localhost
# Disable OTel SDK entirely in tests — prevents auto-configuration from loading resource providers
# (e.g. AzureAppServiceResourceProvider) that fail against the semconv version used here.
otel:
sdk:
disabled: true
# Disable trace export in tests — prevents OTLP connection attempts when no Tempo is running.
# Sampling probability 0.0 means no spans are created, so no export is attempted.
management:
server:
port: 0 # random port per context — prevents TIME_WAIT conflicts when @DirtiesContext restarts the context
tracing:
sampling:
probability: 0.0

View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
logging.level.root=WARN
logging.level.org.raddatz=INFO

View File

@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
# Observability stack — Grafana LGTM + GlitchTip
#
# Requires the main stack to be running first:
# docker compose up -d # creates archiv-net
# docker compose -f docker-compose.observability.yml up -d
#
# To validate without starting:
# docker compose -f docker-compose.observability.yml config
services:
# --- Metrics: Prometheus ---
prometheus:
image: prom/prometheus:v3.4.0
container_name: obs-prometheus
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- ./infra/observability/prometheus/prometheus.yml:/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml:ro
- prometheus_data:/prometheus
command:
- '--config.file=/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml'
- '--storage.tsdb.path=/prometheus'
- '--storage.tsdb.retention.time=30d'
- '--web.enable-lifecycle'
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:${PORT_PROMETHEUS:-9090}:9090"
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:9090/-/healthy"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
networks:
- archiv-net
- obs-net
node-exporter:
image: prom/node-exporter:v1.9.0
container_name: obs-node-exporter
restart: unless-stopped
# pid: host — required for process-level CPU/memory metrics; cgroup isolation applies
pid: host
volumes:
- /proc:/host/proc:ro
- /sys:/host/sys:ro
- /:/rootfs:ro
command:
- '--path.procfs=/host/proc'
- '--path.sysfs=/host/sys'
# $$ is YAML Compose escaping for a literal $ in the regex alternation
- '--collector.filesystem.ignored-mount-points=^/(sys|proc|dev|host|etc)($$|/)'
expose:
- "9100"
networks:
- obs-net
cadvisor:
image: gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.52.1
container_name: obs-cadvisor
restart: unless-stopped
# privileged: true — required for cgroup and namespace metrics, see cAdvisor docs.
# Accepted risk: cAdvisor is pinned, on Renovate, and not exposed outside obs-net.
privileged: true
volumes:
- /:/rootfs:ro
# /var/run/docker.sock mounted read-only — sufficient for container metadata discovery
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
- /sys:/sys:ro
- /var/lib/docker:/var/lib/docker:ro
expose:
- "8080"
networks:
- obs-net
# --- Logs: Loki + Promtail ---
loki:
image: grafana/loki:3.4.2
container_name: obs-loki
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- ./infra/observability/loki/loki-config.yml:/etc/loki/loki-config.yml:ro
- loki_data:/loki
command: -config.file=/etc/loki/loki-config.yml
expose:
- "3100"
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:3100/ready | grep -q ready || exit 1"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 30s
networks:
- obs-net
promtail:
image: grafana/promtail:3.4.2
container_name: obs-promtail
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- ./infra/observability/promtail/promtail-config.yml:/etc/promtail/promtail-config.yml:ro
- /var/lib/docker/containers:/var/lib/docker/containers:ro
# :ro restricts file-system access but NOT Docker API permissions — a compromised Promtail has full daemon access. Accepted risk on single-operator self-hosted archive.
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
- promtail_positions:/tmp # persists positions.yaml across restarts — avoids duplicate log ingestion
command: -config.file=/etc/promtail/promtail-config.yml
networks:
- archiv-net # label discovery from application containers via Docker socket
- obs-net # log shipping to Loki
depends_on:
loki:
condition: service_healthy
# --- Traces: Tempo ---
tempo:
image: grafana/tempo:2.7.2
container_name: obs-tempo
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- ./infra/observability/tempo/tempo.yml:/etc/tempo.yml:ro
- tempo_data:/var/tempo
command: -config.file=/etc/tempo.yml
expose:
- "3200" # Grafana queries Tempo on this port (obs-net only)
- "4317" # OTLP gRPC — backend sends traces here (archiv-net)
- "4318" # OTLP HTTP — alternative transport (archiv-net)
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:3200/ready | grep -q ready || exit 1"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 15s
networks:
- archiv-net # backend (archive-backend) reaches tempo:4317 over this network
- obs-net # Grafana reaches tempo:3200 over this network
# --- Dashboards: Grafana ---
obs-grafana:
image: grafana/grafana-oss:11.6.1
container_name: obs-grafana
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:${PORT_GRAFANA:-3003}:3000"
environment:
GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-changeme}
GF_USERS_ALLOW_SIGN_UP: "false"
GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL: ${GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL:-http://localhost:3003}
volumes:
- grafana_data:/var/lib/grafana
- ./infra/observability/grafana/provisioning:/etc/grafana/provisioning:ro
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:3000/api/health | grep -q ok || exit 1"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 30s
depends_on:
prometheus:
condition: service_healthy
loki:
condition: service_healthy
tempo:
condition: service_healthy
networks:
- obs-net
# --- Error Tracking: GlitchTip ---
obs-redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
container_name: obs-redis
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- glitchtip_data:/data
expose:
- "6379"
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
networks:
- obs-net
obs-glitchtip:
image: glitchtip/glitchtip:6.1.6
container_name: obs-glitchtip
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
obs-redis:
condition: service_healthy
obs-glitchtip-db-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
environment:
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@${POSTGRES_HOST:-archive-db}:5432/glitchtip
REDIS_URL: redis://obs-redis:6379/0
SECRET_KEY: ${GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY}
GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN: ${GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN:-http://localhost:3002}
DEFAULT_FROM_EMAIL: ${APP_MAIL_FROM:-noreply@familienarchiv.local}
EMAIL_URL: smtp://mailpit:1025
GLITCHTIP_MAX_EVENT_LIFE_DAYS: 90
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:${PORT_GLITCHTIP:-3002}:8000"
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "bash", "-c", "echo > /dev/tcp/localhost/8000"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 10s
retries: 5
start_period: 60s
networks:
- archiv-net
- obs-net
obs-glitchtip-worker:
image: glitchtip/glitchtip:6.1.6
container_name: obs-glitchtip-worker
restart: unless-stopped
command: ./bin/run-celery-with-beat.sh
depends_on:
obs-redis:
condition: service_healthy
environment:
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@${POSTGRES_HOST:-archive-db}:5432/glitchtip
REDIS_URL: redis://obs-redis:6379/0
SECRET_KEY: ${GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY}
networks:
- archiv-net
- obs-net
obs-glitchtip-db-init:
image: postgres:16-alpine
container_name: obs-glitchtip-db-init
restart: "no"
environment:
PGPASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
command: >
sh -c "psql -h ${POSTGRES_HOST:-archive-db} -U ${POSTGRES_USER} -tc
\"SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname = 'glitchtip'\" |
grep -q 1 ||
psql -h ${POSTGRES_HOST:-archive-db} -U ${POSTGRES_USER} -c \"CREATE DATABASE glitchtip;\""
networks:
- archiv-net
networks:
# Shared network created by the main docker-compose.yml.
# The observability stack joins as a peer so Prometheus can scrape
# archive-backend by container name. The observability stack must NOT
# attempt to create this network — it will fail with a clear error if
# the main stack is not running yet.
archiv-net:
external: true
# Internal network for observability-service-to-service traffic
# (e.g. Grafana → Prometheus, Grafana → Loki, Grafana → Tempo).
obs-net:
driver: bridge
volumes:
prometheus_data:
loki_data:
promtail_positions:
tempo_data:
grafana_data:
glitchtip_data:

View File

@@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
# Production / staging Docker Compose for Familienarchiv.
#
# This is a self-contained file (not an overlay over docker-compose.yml).
# All services for the prod stack live here. Environment isolation is
# achieved via the docker compose project name:
#
# production: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-production ...
# staging: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-staging --profile staging ...
#
# Volumes, networks and containers are namespaced by the project name,
# so the two environments cohabit cleanly on the same host.
#
# Required env vars (provided by .env.production / .env.staging in CI):
# TAG image tag (release tag or "nightly")
# PORT_BACKEND, PORT_FRONTEND host-side ports (bound to 127.0.0.1 only)
# APP_DOMAIN e.g. archiv.raddatz.cloud / staging.raddatz.cloud
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD Postgres password
# MINIO_PASSWORD MinIO root password (admin operations only)
# MINIO_APP_PASSWORD MinIO application service-account password
# (least-privilege scope: archive bucket only)
# OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN token guarding ocr-service /train endpoint
# APP_ADMIN_USERNAME seeded admin email (e.g. admin@archiv.raddatz.cloud)
# APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD seeded admin password — CRITICAL: locked in on
# first deploy because UserDataInitializer only
# creates the account if the email does not exist
# MAIL_HOST, MAIL_PORT, SMTP relay (production only; staging uses mailpit)
# MAIL_USERNAME, MAIL_PASSWORD
# APP_MAIL_FROM sender address (e.g. noreply@raddatz.cloud)
# IMPORT_HOST_DIR absolute host path holding ONLY the ODS
# spreadsheet and PDFs for /admin/system mass
# import — mounted read-only at /import inside
# the backend. Compose refuses to start when
# this var is unset, so staging and prod cannot
# accidentally share an import source. Must be
# readable by the backend container's UID
# (currently root via the OpenJDK image — any
# world-readable directory works).
networks:
archiv-net:
driver: bridge
name: ${COMPOSE_NETWORK_NAME:-archiv-net}
volumes:
postgres-data:
minio-data:
ocr-models:
ocr-cache:
services:
db:
image: postgres:16-alpine
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: archiv
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
POSTGRES_DB: archiv
volumes:
- postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
networks:
- archiv-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U archiv -d archiv"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
minio:
# Pinned MinIO release for reproducible deploys. Bumped manually until
# Renovate is bootstrapped for these production images (see follow-up issue).
image: minio/minio:RELEASE.2025-02-28T09-55-16Z
restart: unless-stopped
command: server /data --console-address ":9001"
environment:
MINIO_ROOT_USER: archiv
MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MINIO_PASSWORD}
volumes:
- minio-data:/data
networks:
- archiv-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 20s
retries: 3
# Idempotent bucket bootstrap + service-account creation.
# Runs once per `docker compose up` and exits 0. The entrypoint is
# extracted to infra/minio/bootstrap.sh so the (non-trivial) idempotent
# logic is readable, reviewable, and unit-testable as a script rather
# than YAML-escaped shell.
create-buckets:
# Custom image bakes bootstrap.sh in at build time. A bind-mount fails on
# the Docker-out-of-Docker production runner because the host daemon
# resolves the relative path against the host filesystem, not the
# runner container's CWD. See #506 + infra/minio/Dockerfile.
build:
context: ./infra/minio
# Declare one-shot intent so `docker compose up -d --wait` treats
# exited(0) as success rather than "not running, fail". Pair with
# backend's `service_completed_successfully` dependency below. See #510.
restart: "no"
depends_on:
minio:
condition: service_healthy
networks:
- archiv-net
environment:
MINIO_PASSWORD: ${MINIO_PASSWORD}
MINIO_APP_PASSWORD: ${MINIO_APP_PASSWORD}
# Dev-only mail catcher; gated behind the staging profile so production
# never starts it. Staging workflow runs with `--profile staging`.
mailpit:
# Pinned for reproducibility; bumped manually until Renovate is bootstrapped.
image: axllent/mailpit:v1.29.7
restart: unless-stopped
profiles: ["staging"]
networks:
- archiv-net
healthcheck:
# TCP-port open check via BusyBox `nc`. The previous wget-based probe
# introduced a non-obvious binary dependency on the mailpit image; a
# future tag that ships without wget would silently disable the
# healthcheck. `nc` is part of BusyBox in the upstream image.
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "nc -z localhost 8025 || exit 1"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
# --- OCR: Volume bootstrap ---
# Ensures correct ownership and directory structure on ocr-cache / ocr-models
# before ocr-service starts. Handles pre-existing volumes (including those
# created before the non-root ocr user was introduced in commit 1aca4c4a)
# and guarantees /app/cache/.tmp exists for TMPDIR staging. See ADR-021.
ocr-volume-init:
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- "chown -R 1000:1000 /app/cache /app/models && mkdir -p /app/cache/.tmp && chown 1000:1000 /app/cache/.tmp"
volumes:
- ocr-models:/app/models
- ocr-cache:/app/cache
networks: []
restart: "no"
ocr-service:
build:
context: ./ocr-service
restart: unless-stopped
expose:
- "8000"
# Surya OCR loads ~5GB of transformer models at startup; first request
# triggers a further ~1GB Kraken model download into ocr-cache.
# CX42+ (16 GB RAM) honours the default. On a CX32 (8 GB) override with
# OCR_MEM_LIMIT=6g (slower first-request, fits the host).
mem_limit: ${OCR_MEM_LIMIT:-12g}
memswap_limit: ${OCR_MEM_LIMIT:-12g}
volumes:
- ocr-models:/app/models
- ocr-cache:/app/cache # HuggingFace / ketos cache — prevents re-downloads on recreate (HF_HOME)
environment:
HF_HOME: /app/cache
XDG_CACHE_HOME: /app/cache
TORCH_HOME: /app/models/torch
TMPDIR: /app/cache/.tmp # Stage GB-scale Surya model downloads on SSD, not the 512 MB RAM tmpfs.
# /tmp keeps its small DoS cap; training ZIPs still unpack under /tmp
# but ZIP Slip protection (_validate_zip_entry) is unchanged. See ADR-021.
KRAKEN_MODEL_PATH: /app/models/german_kurrent.mlmodel
TRAINING_TOKEN: ${OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN}
OCR_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD: "0.3"
OCR_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD_KURRENT: "0.5"
# SSRF allowlist pinned explicitly to the internal MinIO hostname.
# In prod the OCR service only fetches PDFs from MinIO over the
# docker network; localhost/127.0.0.1 are dev-only sources and
# must NOT be reachable here. Do not widen to `*`.
ALLOWED_PDF_HOSTS: "minio"
networks:
- archiv-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:8000/health"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 12
start_period: 120s
depends_on:
ocr-volume-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
read_only: true
tmpfs:
- /tmp:size=512m # training-ZIP unzip + transient PDF buffers only (small, RAM-friendly).
# GB-scale model downloads go to TMPDIR=/app/cache/.tmp instead. See ADR-021.
cap_drop:
- ALL
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
backend:
image: familienarchiv/backend:${TAG:-nightly}
build:
context: ./backend
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy
minio:
condition: service_healthy
ocr-service:
condition: service_healthy
# Gate startup on the bucket bootstrap. Without this, backend
# starts in parallel with create-buckets and may race the policy
# bind. Also tells compose's `up -d --wait` that create-buckets
# is a one-shot that must complete successfully. See #510.
create-buckets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
# Bound to localhost only — Caddy fronts external traffic.
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:${PORT_BACKEND}:8080"
# Host path holding the ODS spreadsheet + PDFs for the mass-import endpoint.
# Read-only; MassImportService only reads (Files.list / Files.walk on /import).
# Required — no default — so staging and prod cannot accidentally share an
# import source. CI workflows pin this per-env (see .gitea/workflows/).
volumes:
- ${IMPORT_HOST_DIR:?Set IMPORT_HOST_DIR to a host path holding the mass-import payload (ODS + PDFs). See docs/DEPLOYMENT.md.}:/import:ro
environment:
SPRING_DATASOURCE_URL: jdbc:postgresql://db:5432/archiv
SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME: archiv
SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
# Application uses the bucket-scoped service account, not MinIO root.
S3_ENDPOINT: http://minio:9000
S3_ACCESS_KEY: archiv-app
S3_SECRET_KEY: ${MINIO_APP_PASSWORD}
S3_BUCKET_NAME: familienarchiv
S3_REGION: us-east-1
# No SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE — base application.yaml is production-ready
# (Swagger disabled, show-sql off, open-in-view false).
APP_BASE_URL: https://${APP_DOMAIN}
APP_ADMIN_USERNAME: ${APP_ADMIN_USERNAME}
APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD}
APP_OCR_BASE_URL: http://ocr-service:8000
APP_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN: ${OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN}
MAIL_HOST: ${MAIL_HOST}
MAIL_PORT: ${MAIL_PORT:-587}
MAIL_USERNAME: ${MAIL_USERNAME:-}
MAIL_PASSWORD: ${MAIL_PASSWORD:-}
APP_MAIL_FROM: ${APP_MAIL_FROM:-noreply@raddatz.cloud}
SPRING_MAIL_PROPERTIES_MAIL_SMTP_AUTH: ${MAIL_SMTP_AUTH:-true}
SPRING_MAIL_PROPERTIES_MAIL_SMTP_STARTTLS_ENABLE: ${MAIL_STARTTLS_ENABLE:-true}
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: http://tempo:4318
OTEL_LOGS_EXPORTER: none
OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER: none
MANAGEMENT_METRICS_TAGS_APPLICATION: Familienarchiv
MANAGEMENT_TRACING_SAMPLING_PROBABILITY: ${MANAGEMENT_TRACING_SAMPLING_PROBABILITY:-0.1}
networks:
- archiv-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8081/actuator/health | grep -q UP || exit 1"]
interval: 15s
timeout: 5s
retries: 10
start_period: 30s
frontend:
image: familienarchiv/frontend:${TAG:-nightly}
build:
context: ./frontend
target: production
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
backend:
condition: service_healthy
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:${PORT_FRONTEND}:3000"
environment:
# SSR fetches go inside the docker network; clients hit https://${APP_DOMAIN}
API_INTERNAL_URL: http://backend:8080
ORIGIN: https://${APP_DOMAIN}
networks:
- archiv-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://127.0.0.1:3000/login >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1"]
interval: 15s
timeout: 5s
retries: 10
start_period: 20s

View File

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "${PORT_DB}:5432"
networks:
- archiv-net
- archive-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${POSTGRES_USER} -d ${POSTGRES_DB}"]
interval: 5s
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ services:
- "${PORT_MINIO_API}:9000" # API Port
- "${PORT_MINIO_CONSOLE}:9001" # Web-Oberfläche
networks:
- archiv-net
- archive-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live"]
interval: 30s
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ services:
exit 0;
"
networks:
- archiv-net
- archive-net
# --- Mail catcher: Mailpit (dev only) ---
# Catches all outgoing emails and displays them in a web UI.
@@ -69,24 +69,7 @@ services:
- "${PORT_MAILPIT_UI:-8025}:8025" # Web UI
- "${PORT_MAILPIT_SMTP:-1025}:1025" # SMTP
networks:
- archiv-net
# --- OCR: Volume bootstrap ---
# Ensures correct ownership and directory structure on ocr_cache / ocr_models
# before ocr-service starts. Handles pre-existing volumes (including those
# created before the non-root ocr user was introduced in commit 1aca4c4a)
# and guarantees /app/cache/.tmp exists for TMPDIR staging. See ADR-021.
ocr-volume-init:
image: alpine:3.21
command:
- sh
- -c
- "chown -R 1000:1000 /app/cache /app/models && mkdir -p /app/cache/.tmp && chown 1000:1000 /app/cache/.tmp"
volumes:
- ocr_models:/app/models
- ocr_cache:/app/cache
networks: []
restart: "no"
- archive-net
# --- OCR: Python microservice (Surya + Kraken) ---
# Single-node only: OCR training reloads the model in-process after each run.
@@ -104,14 +87,8 @@ services:
memswap_limit: 12g
volumes:
- ocr_models:/app/models
- ocr_cache:/app/cache # HuggingFace / ketos cache — prevents re-downloads on recreate (HF_HOME)
- ocr_cache:/root/.cache # Hugging Face / ketos model download cache — prevents re-downloads on container recreate
environment:
HF_HOME: /app/cache
XDG_CACHE_HOME: /app/cache
TORCH_HOME: /app/models/torch
TMPDIR: /app/cache/.tmp # Stage GB-scale Surya model downloads on SSD, not the 512 MB RAM tmpfs.
# /tmp keeps its small DoS cap; training ZIPs still unpack under /tmp
# but ZIP Slip protection (_validate_zip_entry) is unchanged. See ADR-021.
KRAKEN_MODEL_PATH: /app/models/german_kurrent.mlmodel
TRAINING_TOKEN: "${OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN:-}"
OCR_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD: "0.3"
@@ -122,24 +99,13 @@ services:
OCR_CLAHE_TILE_SIZE: "8" # CLAHE tile grid size (NxN tiles per page)
OCR_MAX_CACHED_MODELS: "2" # LRU cache; each model ~500 MB, so 2 = ~1 GB resident
networks:
- archiv-net
- archive-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:8000/health"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 12
start_period: 120s
depends_on:
ocr-volume-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
read_only: true
tmpfs:
- /tmp:size=512m # training-ZIP unzip + transient PDF buffers only (small, RAM-friendly).
# GB-scale model downloads go to TMPDIR=/app/cache/.tmp instead. See ADR-021.
cap_drop:
- ALL
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
# --- Backend: Spring Boot ---
backend:
@@ -181,22 +147,10 @@ services:
SPRING_MAIL_PROPERTIES_MAIL_SMTP_STARTTLS_ENABLE: ${MAIL_STARTTLS_ENABLE:-false}
APP_OCR_BASE_URL: http://ocr-service:8000
APP_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN: "${OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN:-}"
SENTRY_DSN: ${SENTRY_DSN:-}
SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE: ${SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE:-1.0}
# Observability: send traces to Tempo inside archiv-net (OTLP gRPC port 4317)
# Tempo is defined in docker-compose.observability.yml (future issue).
# OTLP failures are non-fatal — backend starts cleanly without the observability stack.
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: http://tempo:4317
# 10% sampling in this compose (dev + staging) — override locally to 1.0 if needed
MANAGEMENT_TRACING_SAMPLING_PROBABILITY: "0.1"
ports:
- "${PORT_BACKEND}:8080"
# Management port — Prometheus scrapes /actuator/prometheus from inside archiv-net.
# Not exposed to the host; Docker service-name DNS (backend:8081) is sufficient.
expose:
- "8081"
networks:
- archiv-net
- archive-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/actuator/health | grep -q UP || exit 1"]
interval: 15s
@@ -209,7 +163,6 @@ services:
build:
context: ./frontend
dockerfile: Dockerfile
target: development # Dockerfile is multi-stage; default would be the production stage
container_name: archive-frontend
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
@@ -231,10 +184,10 @@ services:
ports:
- "${PORT_FRONTEND}:5173"
networks:
- archiv-net
- archive-net
networks:
archiv-net:
archive-net:
driver: bridge
volumes:

View File

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Members of the cross-cutting layer have no entity of their own, no user-facing C
| `audit` | Append-only event store (`audit_log`) for all domain mutations. Feeds the activity feed and Family Pulse dashboard. | Consumed by 5+ domains; no user-facing CRUD of its own |
| `config` | Infrastructure bean definitions: `MinioConfig`, `AsyncConfig`, `WebConfig` | Framework infra; no business logic |
| `dashboard` | Stats aggregation for the admin dashboard and Family Pulse widget | Aggregates from 3+ domains; no owned entities |
| `exception` | `DomainException`, `ErrorCode` enum, `GlobalExceptionHandler` | Framework infra; consumed by every controller and service. Adding a new `ErrorCode` requires matching updates in `frontend/src/lib/shared/errors.ts` and all three `messages/*.json` locale files. |
| `exception` | `DomainException`, `ErrorCode` enum, `GlobalExceptionHandler` | Framework infra; consumed by every controller and service |
| `filestorage` | `FileService` — MinIO/S3 upload, download, presigned-URL generation | Generic service; consumed by `document` and `ocr` |
| `importing` | `MassImportService` — async ODS/Excel batch import | Orchestrates across `person`, `tag`, `document` |
| `security` | `SecurityConfig`, `Permission` enum, `@RequirePermission` annotation, `PermissionAspect` (AOP) | Framework infra; enforced globally across all controllers |

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ This doc is the Day-1 checklist and operational reference. It links to the canon
5. [Backup + recovery](#5-backup--recovery)
6. [Common operational tasks](#6-common-operational-tasks)
7. [Known limitations](#7-known-limitations)
8. [Upgrade notes](#8-upgrade-notes)
---
@@ -28,23 +27,20 @@ This doc is the Day-1 checklist and operational reference. It links to the canon
```mermaid
graph TD
Browser -->|HTTPS| Caddy["Caddy (TLS termination)"]
Caddy -->|HTTP :3000| Frontend["Web Frontend\nSvelteKit Node adapter"]
Caddy -->|HTTP :5173| Frontend["Web Frontend\nSvelteKit / Node.js"]
Caddy -->|HTTP :8080| Backend["API Backend\nSpring Boot / Jetty :8080"]
Backend -->|JDBC :5432| DB[(PostgreSQL 16)]
Backend -->|S3 API :9000| MinIO[(MinIO)]
Backend -->|S3 API :9000| MinIO[(MinIO / Hetzner OBS)]
Backend -->|HTTP :8000 internal| OCR["OCR Service\nPython FastAPI"]
OCR -->|presigned URL| MinIO
Caddy -->|SSE proxy_pass| Backend
Browser -->|SSE direct| Backend
```
**Key facts:**
- Caddy terminates TLS and reverse-proxies to frontend (`:3000`) and backend (`:8080`). The Caddyfile is committed at [`infra/caddy/Caddyfile`](../infra/caddy/Caddyfile) and is installed on the host as `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` (symlink).
- The host binds all docker-published ports to `127.0.0.1` only; Caddy is the sole external entry point.
- The OCR service has **no published port** — reachable only on the internal Docker network from the backend.
- SSE notifications transit Caddy (browser → Caddy → backend); the backend is never reachable directly from the public internet. The SvelteKit SSR layer is bypassed for SSE, but Caddy is not.
- The Caddyfile responds `404` on `/actuator/*` (defense in depth). Internal monitoring scrapes the backend on the docker network, not through Caddy.
- Production and staging cohabit on the same host via docker compose project names: `archiv-production` (ports 8080/3000) and `archiv-staging` (ports 8081/3001).
- An optional observability stack (Prometheus, Node Exporter, cAdvisor, Loki, Tempo, Grafana, GlitchTip) runs as a separate compose file. Configuration lives under `infra/observability/`. In production and CI, the stack is managed from `/opt/familienarchiv/` (CI copies it there on every nightly run) so bind mounts survive workspace wipes — see §4 for the ops procedure.
- Caddy terminates TLS and reverse-proxies to frontend and backend. See the Caddyfile in [`docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md`](infrastructure/production-compose.md).
- The OCR service has **no external port** — reachable only on the internal Docker network from the backend.
- SSE notifications go directly backend → browser (not via the SvelteKit SSR layer).
- Management port 8081 (Spring Actuator / Prometheus scrape) is internal only — the Caddy config blocks `/actuator/*` externally.
### OCR memory requirements
@@ -56,23 +52,19 @@ The OCR service requires significant RAM for model loading. The dev compose sets
| Hetzner CX32 | 8 GB | 6 GB | Accept reduced batch sizes and slower throughput |
| Hetzner CX22 | 4 GB | — | Disable the OCR service (`profiles: [ocr]`); run OCR on demand only |
A CX32 cannot honour the default `mem_limit: 12g` — set the `OCR_MEM_LIMIT=6g` env var (in `.env.production` / `.env.staging`, or as a Gitea secret consumed by the workflow) before deploying on a CX32. The prod compose interpolates this var with a 12g default.
A CX32 cannot honour a `mem_limit: 12g` — set it to `6g` in the prod overlay or use CX42.
### Dev vs production differences
| Concern | Dev (`docker-compose.yml`) | Prod (`docker-compose.prod.yml`) |
| Concern | Dev compose | Prod overlay |
|---|---|---|
| MinIO image tag | `minio/minio:latest` | Pinned `minio/minio:RELEASE.…` |
| Data persistence | Bind mounts `./data/postgres`, `./data/minio` | Named Docker volumes (`postgres-data`, `minio-data`) |
| MinIO credentials for backend | Root user/password | Service account `archiv-app` with bucket-scoped rights |
| Bucket creation | `create-buckets` helper | Same helper, plus service-account bootstrap on every up |
| Spring profile | `dev,e2e` (Swagger + e2e overrides) | unset — base `application.yaml` is production-ready |
| Mail | Mailpit (local catcher) | Real SMTP (production) / Mailpit via `profiles: [staging]` (staging) |
| Frontend image | Dev server, `target: development`, port 5173 | Node adapter, `target: production`, port 3000 |
| Host port binding | All published | Bound to `127.0.0.1` only; Caddy is the front door |
| Deploy method | `docker compose up -d` (manual) | Gitea Actions: `nightly.yml` (staging, cron) and `release.yml` (production, on `v*` tag) — both use `up -d --wait` |
| MinIO image tag | `minio/minio:latest` (unpinned) | Pinned in prod overlay |
| Data persistence | Bind mounts `./data/postgres`, `./data/minio` | Named Docker volumes |
| Bucket creation | `create-buckets` helper container | Pre-created in Hetzner console |
| Spring profile | `dev,e2e` (enables OpenAPI + Swagger UI) | `prod` |
| Mail | Mailpit (local catcher) | Real SMTP |
Full prod compose: [`docker-compose.prod.yml`](../docker-compose.prod.yml). Workflow files: [`.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml`](../.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml), [`.gitea/workflows/release.yml`](../.gitea/workflows/release.yml).
Full prod overlay: [`docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md`](infrastructure/production-compose.md).
---
@@ -99,7 +91,6 @@ All vars are set in `.env` at the repo root (copy from `.env.example`). The back
| `APP_BASE_URL` | Public-facing URL for email links | `http://localhost:3000` | YES (prod) | — |
| `APP_OCR_BASE_URL` | Internal URL of the OCR service | — | YES | — |
| `APP_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN` | Secret token for OCR training endpoints | — | YES (prod) | YES |
| `IMPORT_HOST_DIR` | Absolute host path holding the ODS spreadsheet + PDFs for the `/admin/system` mass-import card. Mounted read-only at `/import` inside the backend (compose-only — backend reads via `app.import.dir`). Compose refuses to start when unset, so staging and prod cannot accidentally share the source. Convention: `/srv/familienarchiv-staging/import` and `/srv/familienarchiv-production/import` | — | YES (prod compose) | — |
| `MAIL_HOST` | SMTP host | `mailpit` (dev) | YES (prod) | — |
| `MAIL_PORT` | SMTP port | `1025` (dev) | YES (prod) | — |
| `MAIL_USERNAME` | SMTP username | — | YES (prod) | YES |
@@ -108,12 +99,6 @@ All vars are set in `.env` at the repo root (copy from `.env.example`). The back
| `MAIL_SMTP_AUTH` | SMTP auth enabled | `false` (dev) | YES (prod) | — |
| `MAIL_STARTTLS_ENABLE` | STARTTLS enabled | `false` (dev) | YES (prod) | — |
| `SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE` | Spring profile | `dev,e2e` (compose) | YES | — |
| `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` | OTLP HTTP endpoint for distributed traces (Tempo). Port 4318 = HTTP transport; port 4317 is gRPC-only and causes "Connection reset" with Spring Boot's HttpExporter. | `http://localhost:4318` | — | — |
| `OTEL_LOGS_EXPORTER` | Disable OTLP log export — Promtail captures Docker logs via the logging driver; Tempo does not accept logs. | `none` | — | — |
| `OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER` | Disable OTLP metric export — Prometheus scrapes `/actuator/prometheus` via pull model; Tempo does not accept metrics. | `none` | — | — |
| `MANAGEMENT_METRICS_TAGS_APPLICATION` | Common tag added to every Micrometer metric. Required by Grafana's Spring Boot Observability dashboard (ID 17175) `label_values(application)` template variable. | `Familienarchiv` | — | — |
| `MANAGEMENT_TRACING_SAMPLING_PROBABILITY` | Micrometer tracing sample rate; overridden to `0.0` in test profile. | `0.1` (compose) / `1.0` (dev) | — | — |
| `SENTRY_DSN` | GlitchTip / Sentry DSN for backend error reporting. Leave empty to disable the SDK. Set after GlitchTip first-run (§4). | — | — | YES |
### PostgreSQL container
@@ -127,10 +112,9 @@ All vars are set in `.env` at the repo root (copy from `.env.example`). The back
| Variable | Purpose | Default | Required? | Sensitive? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `MINIO_ROOT_USER` | MinIO root username (dev compose only — prod compose hardcodes `archiv`) | `minio_admin` | YES (dev) | — |
| `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD` / `MINIO_PASSWORD` | MinIO root password. **Used only by the `mc admin` bootstrap in prod, never by the backend.** | `change-me` | YES | YES |
| `MINIO_APP_PASSWORD` | Password for the `archiv-app` service account that the backend uses. Bucket-scoped via `readwrite` policy on `familienarchiv`. Bootstrapped by `create-buckets`. | — | YES (prod) | YES |
| `MINIO_DEFAULT_BUCKETS` | Bucket name (dev compose only — prod compose hardcodes `familienarchiv`) | `archive-documents` | YES (dev) | — |
| `MINIO_ROOT_USER` | MinIO root username | `minio_admin` | YES | — |
| `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD` | MinIO root password | `change-me` | YES | YES |
| `MINIO_DEFAULT_BUCKETS` | Bucket name | `archive-documents` | YES | — |
### OCR service
@@ -140,155 +124,58 @@ All vars are set in `.env` at the repo root (copy from `.env.example`). The back
| `ALLOWED_PDF_HOSTS` | SSRF protection — comma-separated list of allowed PDF source hosts. **Do not widen to `*`** | `minio,localhost,127.0.0.1` | YES | — |
| `KRAKEN_MODEL_PATH` | Directory containing Kraken HTR models (populated by `download-kraken-models.sh`) | `/app/models/` | — | — |
| `BLLA_MODEL_PATH` | Kraken baseline layout analysis model path | `/app/models/blla.mlmodel` | — | — |
| `OCR_MEM_LIMIT` | Container memory cap for ocr-service in `docker-compose.prod.yml`. Set to `6g` on CX32 hosts; leave unset on CX42+ to use the 12g default | `12g` (prod compose default) | — | — |
| `XDG_CACHE_HOME` | XDG cache base dir — redirects Matplotlib and other XDG-aware libraries away from the read-only `HOME` (`/home/ocr`) to the writable cache volume | `/app/cache` | — | — |
| `TORCH_HOME` | PyTorch model cache — redirects `~/.cache/torch` to the writable models volume | `/app/models/torch` | — | — |
### Observability stack (`docker-compose.observability.yml`)
| Variable | Purpose | Default | Required? | Sensitive? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `PORT_PROMETHEUS` | Host port for the Prometheus UI (bound to `127.0.0.1` only) | `9090` | — | — |
| `PORT_GRAFANA` | Host port for the Grafana UI (bound to `127.0.0.1` only) | `3003` | — | — |
| `POSTGRES_HOST` | PostgreSQL hostname for GlitchTip's db-init job and workers. Override when only the staging stack is running and `archive-db` is not resolvable by that name. | `archive-db` | — | — |
| `GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Grafana `admin` user password | `changeme` | YES (prod) | YES |
| `PORT_GLITCHTIP` | Host port for the GlitchTip UI (bound to `127.0.0.1` only) | `3002` | — | — |
| `GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN` | Public-facing base URL for GlitchTip (used in email links and CORS) | `http://localhost:3002` | YES (prod) | — |
| `GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY` | Django secret key for GlitchTip — generate with `python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"` | — | YES | YES |
| `VITE_SENTRY_DSN` | GlitchTip/Sentry DSN for the frontend (SvelteKit) — injected at build time via Vite. Leave empty to disable. Set after GlitchTip first-run (§4). | — | — | YES |
---
## 3. Bootstrap from scratch
Production and staging deploy via Gitea Actions (`release.yml` on `v*` tag, `nightly.yml` on cron). The server itself only needs to host Caddy, Docker, and the runner — the workflows handle the rest.
> Full VPS provisioning steps are in [`docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md`](infrastructure/production-compose.md). This section covers the sequence and the security-critical steps.
### 3.1 Server one-time setup
### Security checklist — complete before first boot
> ⚠️ **These defaults ship in `.env.example` and `application.yaml`. Change them or you will have an insecure installation.**
- [ ] Set `APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` (default: `admin123` — change before starting the backend)
- [ ] Set `APP_ADMIN_USERNAME` if you want a non-default admin login name (add to `.env` — not in `.env.example`)
- [ ] Rotate `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` from `change-me`
- [ ] Rotate `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD` from `change-me`
- [ ] Set a strong `APP_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN` (backend) and the matching `TRAINING_TOKEN` (OCR service) — both must be the same value (`python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"`)
- [ ] Confirm `ALLOWED_PDF_HOSTS` is locked to your MinIO/S3 hostname — widening to `*` opens SSRF
- [ ] Set `SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE=prod` in the prod overlay (not `dev,e2e` — that exposes Swagger UI and `/v3/api-docs`)
- [ ] Use a dedicated MinIO service account for `S3_ACCESS_KEY` / `S3_SECRET_KEY`, not the root credentials
### Bootstrap sequence
```bash
# Base hardening
ufw default deny incoming && ufw allow 22/tcp && ufw allow 80/tcp && ufw allow 443/tcp && ufw enable
# /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PasswordAuthentication no, PermitRootLogin no
# 1. Copy and fill the env file
cp .env.example .env
# edit .env — complete the security checklist above first
# Install Caddy 2 (https://caddyserver.com/docs/install#debian-ubuntu-raspbian)
apt install caddy
# 2. (Production only) Create the MinIO / Hetzner OBS bucket in the console
# The dev compose has a create-buckets helper; production does not.
# Create the bucket named $MINIO_DEFAULT_BUCKETS with private access.
# Use the Caddyfile from the repo (replace path with the runner's clone target)
# CI DEPENDENCY: the nightly and release workflows run `systemctl reload caddy` to
# pick up committed Caddyfile changes. They find the file via this symlink — if it
# is absent or points elsewhere, the reload succeeds but serves stale config.
ln -sf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/caddy/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
systemctl reload caddy
# 3. Start the stack (prod overlay — see docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md)
# docker-compose.prod.yml is NOT committed — create it from the guide above
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
# fail2ban — protect /api/auth/login from credential stuffing.
# Jail watches the Caddy JSON access log for 401 responses on
# /api/auth/login. The jail (maxretry=10 / findtime=10m / bantime=30m)
# and filter are committed under infra/fail2ban/ — symlink them in:
apt install fail2ban
ln -sf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf \
/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf
ln -sf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf \
/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf
systemctl reload fail2ban
# Verify after first deploy with:
# fail2ban-client status familienarchiv-auth
# fail2ban-regex /var/log/caddy/access.log familienarchiv-auth
# 4. Flyway migrations run automatically on backend start.
# Watch the backend log to confirm:
docker compose logs --follow --tail=100 backend
# Tailscale — used by the backup pipeline to reach heim-nas (follow-up issue)
curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh && tailscale up
# 5. Verify the stack is healthy
curl http://localhost:8080/actuator/health
# Expected: {"status":"UP"}
# Self-hosted Gitea runner — register against the repo with a runner token.
# This runner is assumed single-tenant: the deploy workflows write .env.*
# files to disk during execution (cleaned up unconditionally on completion).
# A multi-tenant runner would need to switch to stdin-piped env files.
# (See https://docs.gitea.com/usage/actions/quickstart for the register step.)
# Runner workspace directory — required for DooD bind-mount resolution (ADR-015).
# act_runner stores job workspaces here so that docker compose bind mounts resolve
# to real host paths. The path must be identical on the host and inside job containers.
mkdir -p /srv/gitea-workspace
# Observability config permanent directory — the nightly CI job copies
# docker-compose.observability.yml and infra/observability/ here on every run.
# The obs stack is always started from this path, not from the workspace.
# See ADR-016 for why this directory is used instead of a server-pull approach.
mkdir -p /opt/familienarchiv/infra
# Both paths must also appear in the runner service volumes in ~/docker/gitea/compose.yaml:
# volumes:
# - /srv/gitea-workspace:/srv/gitea-workspace
# /opt/familienarchiv does NOT need to be in the runner container's volumes — job
# containers are spawned by the host daemon directly (DooD), so the host path is
# accessible to them as long as runner-config.yaml lists it in valid_volumes + options.
# See runner-config.yaml (workdir_parent + valid_volumes + options) and ADR-015/016.
# ⚠ IMPORTANT: after any change to runner-config.yaml (valid_volumes, options, workdir_parent),
# restart the Gitea Act runner for the new config to take effect:
# docker restart gitea-runner
# Until restarted, job containers are spawned with the old config and any new bind mounts
# (e.g. /opt/familienarchiv) will not be available inside job steps.
# 6. Open the app and log in with the admin credentials from .env
```
### 3.2 DNS records
```
archiv.raddatz.cloud A <server IP>
staging.raddatz.cloud A <server IP>
git.raddatz.cloud A <server IP>
```
### 3.3 Gitea secrets (Repo → Settings → Actions → Secrets)
| Secret | Used by | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `PROD_POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | release.yml | strong unique password |
| `PROD_MINIO_PASSWORD` | release.yml | MinIO root password; used only at bootstrap |
| `PROD_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD` | release.yml | application service-account password |
| `PROD_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN` | release.yml | `python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"` |
| `PROD_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME` | release.yml | e.g. `admin@archiv.raddatz.cloud` |
| `PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | release.yml | **⚠ locked permanently on first deploy** — see §3.5 |
| `STAGING_POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | nightly.yml | different from prod |
| `STAGING_MINIO_PASSWORD` | nightly.yml | different from prod |
| `STAGING_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD` | nightly.yml | different from prod |
| `STAGING_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN` | nightly.yml | different from prod |
| `STAGING_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME` | nightly.yml | e.g. `admin@staging.raddatz.cloud` |
| `STAGING_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | nightly.yml | locked on first staging deploy |
| `MAIL_HOST` | release.yml | SMTP relay hostname (prod only) |
| `MAIL_PORT` | release.yml | typically `587` |
| `MAIL_USERNAME` | release.yml | SMTP user |
| `MAIL_PASSWORD` | release.yml | SMTP password |
| `GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | both | Grafana `admin` login — generate a strong password |
| `GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY` | both | Django secret key — `openssl rand -hex 32` |
| `SENTRY_DSN` | both | GlitchTip project DSN — set after first-run (§4); leave empty to keep Sentry disabled |
| `VITE_SENTRY_DSN` | both | GlitchTip frontend project DSN — set after first-run (§4); leave empty to keep Sentry disabled |
### 3.4 First deploy
```bash
# 1. Trigger nightly.yml manually (Repo → Actions → nightly → "Run workflow")
# Expected: docker compose up -d --wait succeeds for archiv-staging, then
# the workflow's "Smoke test deployed environment" step asserts:
# - https://staging.raddatz.cloud/login returns 200
# - HSTS header is present
# - /actuator/health returns 404 (defense-in-depth check)
# 2. (Optional) Re-verify manually
curl -I https://staging.raddatz.cloud/
# Expected: 200 (login page) with HSTS + X-Content-Type-Options headers
# 3. When staging looks healthy, push a v* tag to trigger release.yml
git tag v1.0.0 && git push origin v1.0.0
```
### 3.5 ⚠ Admin password is locked on first deploy
`UserDataInitializer` creates the admin user **only if the email does not exist**. The first successful deploy persists the admin password to the database. Changing `PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` in Gitea secrets after that point has **no effect** — the secret is only consulted when the row is missing.
Before the first deploy: rotate `PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` to a strong value. After the first deploy: change the admin password via the in-app account settings, not via the Gitea secret.
> **Do not use `docker-compose.ci.yml` locally** — it disables bind mounts that the dev workflow depends on.
---
## 4. Logs + observability
> **Developer guide (where to look for what, LogQL queries, trace exploration) → [docs/OBSERVABILITY.md](./OBSERVABILITY.md).**
> This section covers the ops side: starting the stack, env vars, and CI wiring.
### First-response commands
```bash
@@ -309,156 +196,9 @@ docker compose logs --tail=200 <service>
- **Spring Actuator health**: `http://localhost:8080/actuator/health` (internal only in prod — port 8081 for Prometheus scraping)
- **Prometheus scraping**: management port 8081, path `/actuator/prometheus`. Internal only; Caddy blocks `/actuator/*` externally.
### Observability stack
### Future observability
An observability stack is available via `docker-compose.observability.yml`. Configuration lives under `infra/observability/`.
#### Dev — start from the workspace
```bash
docker compose up -d # creates archiv-net
docker compose -f docker-compose.observability.yml up -d
```
#### Why the obs stack is managed differently from the main app stack
The main app stack (`docker-compose.prod.yml`) has no config-file bind mounts — its containers read config from env vars and image defaults. The workspace is wiped after each CI run but that does not affect running containers, because they hold no references to workspace paths.
The obs stack is different: `prometheus.yml`, `tempo.yml`, Loki config, Grafana provisioning files, and Promtail config are all bind-mounted from the host filesystem into their containers. If those source paths disappear (workspace wipe), the containers can restart fine until a `docker compose up` is run again — at that point Docker tries to re-resolve the bind-mount source and fails because the workspace path no longer exists.
The fix is to keep the obs compose file and config tree at a **permanent path** that CI copies to on every run but which survives between runs: `/opt/familienarchiv/` (see ADR-016).
#### Production — managed from `/opt/familienarchiv/`
Every CI run (nightly + release) copies `docker-compose.observability.yml` and `infra/observability/` to `/opt/familienarchiv/` before starting the stack. Bind mounts then resolve to `/opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/…` — a stable path that outlasts any workspace wipe.
**Environment variables** follow the same two-source model as the main stack:
| Source | What it contains | Managed by |
|---|---|---|
| `infra/observability/obs.env` | All non-secret config (ports, URLs, hostnames) | Git — reviewed in PRs |
| `/opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env` | Passwords and secret keys only | CI — written fresh from Gitea secrets on every deploy |
Both files are passed explicitly via `--env-file` to the compose command, so there is no implicit auto-read `.env` and no operator-managed file to keep in sync.
**Non-secret config** (`infra/observability/obs.env`):
| Key | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `PORT_GRAFANA` | `3003` | Avoids collision with staging frontend on port 3001 |
| `PORT_GLITCHTIP` | `3002` | |
| `PORT_PROMETHEUS` | `9090` | |
| `GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL` | `https://grafana.archiv.raddatz.cloud` | Required for alert email links and OAuth redirects |
| `GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN` | `https://glitchtip.archiv.raddatz.cloud` | Must match the Caddy vhost |
| `POSTGRES_HOST` | `archive-db` | Override if only the staging stack is running |
**Secret keys** (set in Gitea secrets, injected by CI into `obs-secrets.env`):
| Gitea secret | Notes |
|---|---|
| `GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Strong unique password; shared by nightly and release |
| `GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY` | `openssl rand -hex 32`; shared by nightly and release |
| `STAGING_POSTGRES_PASSWORD` / `PROD_POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | Must match the running PostgreSQL container |
To start or restart the obs stack manually on the server (after CI has run at least once):
```bash
docker compose \
-f /opt/familienarchiv/docker-compose.observability.yml \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/obs.env \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env \
up -d --wait --remove-orphans
```
> **Note (manual ops only):** CI clears the destination with `rm -rf` before copying, so deleted files are removed automatically on the next run. If you copy manually with `cp -r` without first removing the directory, stale files from deleted configs will persist until cleaned up:
> ```bash
> rm /opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/<path-to-removed-file>
> ```
Current services:
| Service | Image | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `obs-prometheus` | `prom/prometheus:v3.4.0` | Scrapes metrics from backend management port 8081 (`/actuator/prometheus`), node-exporter, and cAdvisor |
| `obs-node-exporter` | `prom/node-exporter:v1.9.0` | Host-level CPU / memory / disk / network metrics |
| `obs-cadvisor` | `gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.52.1` | Per-container resource metrics |
| `obs-loki` | `grafana/loki:3.4.2` | Log aggregation — receives log streams from Promtail. Port 3100 is `expose`-only (not host-bound). |
| `obs-promtail` | `grafana/promtail:3.4.2` | Log shipping agent — reads all Docker container logs via the Docker socket and forwards them to Loki with `container_name`, `compose_service`, `compose_project`, and `job` labels. The `job` label is mapped from the Docker Compose service name (`com.docker.compose.service`) so that Grafana Loki dashboard queries (`{job="backend"}`, `{job="frontend"}`) work out of the box and the "App" variable dropdown is populated. |
| `obs-tempo` | `grafana/tempo:2.7.2` | Distributed trace storage — OTLP HTTP receiver on port 4318 (`archiv-net`-internal; backend sends traces here). Grafana queries traces on port 3200 (`obs-net`-internal). All ports are `expose`-only (not host-bound). |
| `obs-grafana` | `grafana/grafana-oss:11.6.1` | Unified observability UI — metrics dashboards, log exploration, trace viewer. Bound to `127.0.0.1:${PORT_GRAFANA:-3003}` on the host. |
| `obs-glitchtip` | `glitchtip/glitchtip:6.1.6` | Sentry-compatible error tracker. Receives frontend + backend error events, groups by fingerprint, provides issue UI with stack traces. Bound to `127.0.0.1:${PORT_GLITCHTIP:-3002}`. |
| `obs-glitchtip-worker` | `glitchtip/glitchtip:6.1.6` | Celery + beat worker — processes async GlitchTip tasks (event ingestion, notifications, cleanup). |
| `obs-redis` | `redis:7-alpine` | Celery task broker for GlitchTip. Internal to `obs-net`; no host port exposed. |
| `obs-glitchtip-db-init` | `postgres:16-alpine` | One-shot init container. Creates the `glitchtip` database on the existing `archive-db` PostgreSQL instance if it does not already exist. Runs at stack startup; exits cleanly once done. |
#### Grafana
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| URL | `http://localhost:3003` (or `http://localhost:$PORT_GRAFANA`) |
| Username | `admin` |
| Password | `$GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` (default: `changeme`**change before exposing to a network**) |
Datasources are auto-provisioned on first start (Prometheus, Loki, Tempo — no manual setup required). Three dashboards are pre-loaded:
| Dashboard | Grafana ID | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Node Exporter Full | 1860 | Host CPU, memory, disk, network |
| Spring Boot Observability | 17175 | JVM metrics, HTTP latency, error rate |
| Loki Logs | 13639 | Log exploration and filtering |
Tempo traces are accessible via Grafana Explore → Tempo datasource, and linked from Loki logs via the `traceId` derived field.
**Loki quick checks** (after ~60 s, run from inside the `obs-loki` container):
```bash
# Loki health
docker exec obs-loki wget -qO- http://localhost:3100/ready
# List labels
docker exec obs-loki wget -qO- 'http://localhost:3100/loki/api/v1/labels'
# Query logs by service (stable across dev and prod environments)
docker exec obs-loki wget -qO- \
'http://localhost:3100/loki/api/v1/query_range?query=%7Bcompose_service%3D%22backend%22%7D&limit=5'
```
**Prefer `compose_service` over `container_name` in LogQL queries**`container_name` differs between dev (`archive-backend`) and prod (`archiv-production-backend-1`), while `compose_service` is stable (`backend`, `db`, `minio`, etc.).
Prometheus port `9090` and Grafana port `3003` (default; configurable via `PORT_GRAFANA`) are bound to `127.0.0.1` on the host. No other observability ports are host-bound.
#### GlitchTip
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| URL | `http://localhost:3002` (or `http://localhost:$PORT_GLITCHTIP`) |
**Required env vars** — set in `.env` before first start:
```bash
GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY=$(python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))")
GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN=http://localhost:3002 # change to your public URL in prod
PORT_GLITCHTIP=3002 # optional, defaults to 3002
```
**Database:** GlitchTip shares the existing `archive-db` PostgreSQL instance. The `obs-glitchtip-db-init` one-shot container creates a dedicated `glitchtip` database on first stack start — no manual step required.
**First-run steps** (one-time, after `docker compose -f docker-compose.observability.yml up -d`):
```bash
# 1. Create the Django superuser (interactive)
docker exec -it obs-glitchtip ./manage.py createsuperuser
# 2. Open the GlitchTip UI and log in
open http://localhost:3002
# 3. Create an organisation (e.g. "Familienarchiv")
# 4. Create two projects:
# - "familienarchiv-frontend" (platform: JavaScript / SvelteKit)
# - "familienarchiv-backend" (platform: Java / Spring Boot)
# 5. Copy each project's DSN from Settings → Projects → <project> → Client Keys
# 6. Wire the DSNs into the backend and frontend via env vars (separate issue)
```
Phase 7 of the Production v1 milestone adds Prometheus + Loki + Grafana. No monitoring infrastructure is in place yet.
---
@@ -484,23 +224,7 @@ docker exec -i archive-db psql -U ${POSTGRES_USER} ${POSTGRES_DB} < backup-YYYYM
### Planned — phase 5 of Production v1 milestone
Automated backup (nightly `pg_dump` + MinIO `mc mirror` over Tailscale to `heim-nas`) is a follow-up issue. Until that ships: **manual backups are the only recovery option.**
### Rollback
Each release tag corresponds to a docker image tag on the host daemon (built via DooD; no registry). Rolling back to a previous tag is one command:
```bash
TAG=v1.0.0 docker compose \
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
-p archiv-production \
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/.env.production \
up -d --wait --remove-orphans
```
If the rollback target image is no longer present on the host (host disk pruned, etc.), re-trigger `release.yml` for that tag from Gitea Actions UI — it rebuilds and redeploys.
**Flyway migrations are not auto-rolled-back.** If a release contained a destructive migration (drop column, rename table), a tag rollback brings the schema back to a previous app version but the data shape has already changed. For breaking schema changes, prefer a forward-only fix.
Automated backup (PostgreSQL WAL archiving + MinIO bucket replication) is planned in the Production v1 milestone phase 5. Until that ships: **manual backups are the only recovery option.**
---
@@ -533,18 +257,9 @@ bash scripts/download-kraken-models.sh
### Trigger a mass import (Excel/ODS)
**Dev:** drop the ODS spreadsheet + PDFs into `./import/` at the repo root — the dev compose bind-mounts it to `/import` automatically.
**Staging/production:**
1. Pre-stage the payload on the host. Convention: `/srv/familienarchiv-staging/import/` or `/srv/familienarchiv-production/import/`.
```bash
rsync -avh --progress ./import/ user@host:/srv/familienarchiv-staging/import/
```
2. Make sure `IMPORT_HOST_DIR=<host-path>` is set in `.env.staging` / `.env.production` (the nightly/release workflows already write this — see §3). Compose refuses to start without it.
3. Redeploy the stack so the bind mount picks up — or, if the mount is already in place, skip to step 4.
4. Call `POST /api/admin/trigger-import` (requires `ADMIN` permission), or click the "Import starten" button on `/admin/system`.
5. The import runs asynchronously — poll `GET /api/admin/import-status`, watch `/admin/system`, or tail the backend logs.
1. Place the import file in the `import/` bind mount on the backend container.
2. Call `POST /api/admin/trigger-import` (requires `ADMIN` permission).
3. The import runs asynchronously — poll `GET /api/admin/import-status` or watch backend logs.
---
@@ -557,44 +272,3 @@ bash scripts/download-kraken-models.sh
| **No multi-region** | Single PostgreSQL + MinIO instance; no replication or failover | Deliberate scope decision |
| **Max upload size** | 50 MB per file (500 MB per request for multi-file) | Configurable in `application.yaml` (`spring.servlet.multipart`) |
| **No automated backup** | Phase 5 of Production v1 milestone is not yet implemented | See §5 above |
---
## 8. Upgrade notes
Version-specific one-time steps that must be run before or after upgrading to a given release. Each subsection is safe to skip on a fresh install.
### Upgrading to PR #615 — TMPDIR redirect + ocr-volume-init
`ocr-volume-init` is a new one-shot service in both compose files that runs before `ocr-service` on every `docker compose up`. It:
1. `chown -R 1000:1000 /app/cache /app/models` — corrects volume ownership so the non-root `ocr` user (uid 1000) can write to volumes that may have been created as root (including volumes from before PR #611).
2. `mkdir -p /app/cache/.tmp` — creates the TMPDIR staging directory that Surya uses for GB-scale model downloads. Without this directory, the first model download falls back to the 512 MB `/tmp` tmpfs and fails with ENOSPC. See ADR-021.
**Verify it succeeded:**
```bash
docker logs archiv-ocr-volume-init # dev
docker logs archiv-production-ocr-volume-init-1 # prod
```
Expected output: no error lines; exit code 0.
**Failure mode:** if `chown` is denied (e.g. the volume is mounted read-only), the container exits non-zero and `ocr-service` will not start (`depends_on: condition: service_completed_successfully`). Check `docker logs` for the `chown` error and verify the volume is writable.
### Upgrading to PR #611 — non-root OCR container
The OCR cache volume path changed from `/root/.cache` to `/app/cache` (PR #611 — CIS Docker §4.1 hardening). The existing volume was written as root and is inaccessible to the new non-root `ocr` user, causing a `PermissionError` on startup.
**Before starting the updated container stack**, drop the old root-owned volume. The volume name depends on the compose project name:
```bash
# Dev (docker-compose.yml — project name: familienarchiv)
docker volume rm familienarchiv_ocr_cache
# Production (docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-production)
docker volume rm archiv-production_ocr-cache
# Staging (docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-staging)
docker volume rm archiv-staging_ocr-cache
```
The volume is recreated automatically on `docker compose up`. The OCR service will re-download its model cache on first startup (approximately 12 GB, one-time cost).

View File

@@ -107,13 +107,6 @@ _See also [Briefwechsel](#briefwechsel-user-facing)._
---
## Infrastructure Terms
**archiv-app** — the bucket-scoped MinIO service account the backend uses to read and write the `familienarchiv` bucket. Distinct from the MinIO root account (`archiv`, used only by the bootstrap container for admin operations). Defined and provisioned in [`infra/minio/bootstrap.sh`](../infra/minio/bootstrap.sh) and consumed by the backend as `S3_ACCESS_KEY` in [`docker-compose.prod.yml`](../docker-compose.prod.yml). The attached `archiv-app-policy` grants `s3:GetObject/PutObject/DeleteObject` on `familienarchiv/*` and `s3:ListBucket/GetBucketLocation` on the bucket only — not the built-in `readwrite` policy which would grant `s3:*` on all buckets.
_See also [ADR-010 — MinIO stays self-hosted, not Hetzner OBS](./adr/010-minio-self-hosted-not-hetzner-obs.md)._
---
## Pending Terms
_Terms flagged as potentially ambiguous that have not yet been formally defined here. Add an entry above and remove it from this list when resolved._

View File

@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
# Observability Guide
> **Ops reference (starting the stack, env vars, CI wiring) → [DEPLOYMENT.md §4](./DEPLOYMENT.md#4-logs--observability).**
> This file is for developers: what signal lives where, how to reach it, and what to look for.
## Where to look for what
| I want to… | Go to |
|---|---|
| See the last N log lines from the backend | `docker compose logs --tail=100 backend` |
| Search logs by keyword across time | Grafana → Explore → Loki |
| Understand why an HTTP request failed | Grafana → Explore → Loki → filter by `traceId` → follow link to Tempo |
| See a full distributed trace (DB queries, HTTP calls) | Grafana → Explore → Tempo → search by service or trace ID |
| Check JVM heap / GC / thread count | Grafana → Dashboards → Spring Boot Observability |
| Check HTTP error rate or p95 latency | Grafana → Dashboards → Spring Boot Observability |
| Check host CPU / memory / disk | Grafana → Dashboards → Node Exporter Full |
| See grouped application errors with stack traces | GlitchTip |
| Check if the backend is healthy | `curl http://localhost:8081/actuator/health` (on the server) |
| Check what Prometheus is scraping | `curl http://localhost:9090/api/v1/targets` (on the server) |
## Access
| Tool | External URL | Who it's for |
|---|---|---|
| Grafana | `https://grafana.archiv.raddatz.cloud` | Logs, metrics, traces — the primary observability UI |
| GlitchTip | `https://glitchtip.archiv.raddatz.cloud` | Grouped errors with stack traces and release tracking |
Loki, Tempo, and Prometheus have no external URL. They are internal services, accessible only through Grafana (or via SSH tunnel — see below).
## Logs (Loki)
Logs reach Loki via Promtail, which reads all Docker container logs from the Docker socket and ships them with labels derived from Docker Compose metadata.
### Labels available in every log line
| Label | What it contains | Example |
|---|---|---|
| `job` | Compose service name | `backend`, `frontend`, `db` |
| `compose_service` | Same as `job` | `backend` |
| `compose_project` | Compose project name | `archiv-staging`, `archiv-production` |
| `container_name` | Docker container name | `archiv-staging-backend-1` |
| `filename` | Docker log source | `/var/lib/docker/containers/…` |
**Use `job` in LogQL queries** — it is stable across dev, staging, and production. `container_name` changes between environments.
### Common LogQL queries in Grafana Explore
```logql
# All backend logs
{job="backend"}
# Backend ERROR and WARN lines only
{job="backend"} |= "ERROR" or {job="backend"} |= "WARN"
# All logs for a specific request (paste a traceId from a log line)
{job="backend"} |= "3fa85f64-5717-4562-b3fc-2c963f66afa6"
# Log lines containing a specific exception class
{job="backend"} |~ "DomainException|NullPointerException"
# Frontend logs
{job="frontend"}
# Database (slow query log, if enabled)
{job="db"}
```
### Log → Trace correlation
Spring Boot writes the active `traceId` into every log line when a request is being processed:
```
2026-05-16 ... INFO [Familienarchiv,3fa85f64...,1b2c3d4e] o.r.f.document.DocumentService : ...
```
In Grafana Explore → Loki, log lines with a `traceId` field show a **Tempo** link. Clicking it opens the full trace in Explore → Tempo without copying and pasting IDs.
This linking is configured in the Loki datasource provisioning via the `traceId` derived field regex. No manual setup required.
## Traces (Tempo)
The backend sends traces to Tempo via OTLP HTTP (port 4318). Every inbound HTTP request and every JPA query produces a span. Spans are linked into traces by the propagated `traceId` header.
### Finding a trace in Grafana
**Option A — from a log line:**
1. Grafana → Explore → select *Loki* datasource
2. Query `{job="backend"}` and find the failing request
3. Click the **Tempo** link in the log line (appears when `traceId` is present)
**Option B — by service:**
1. Grafana → Explore → select *Tempo* datasource
2. Query type: **Search**
3. Service name: `familienarchiv-backend`
4. Filter by HTTP status, duration, or operation name as needed
**Option C — by trace ID:**
1. Grafana → Explore → select *Tempo* datasource
2. Query type: **TraceQL** or **Trace ID**
3. Paste the trace ID
### What each span type tells you
| Root span name pattern | What it covers |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/documents`, `POST /api/documents` | Full HTTP request lifecycle |
| `SELECT archiv.*` | A single JPA/JDBC query inside that request |
| `HikariPool.getConnection` | Connection pool wait time |
A slow `SELECT` span inside an otherwise fast HTTP span pinpoints a missing index. A slow `HikariPool.getConnection` span indicates connection pool exhaustion.
### Sampling rate
- **Dev**: 100% of requests are traced (`management.tracing.sampling.probability: 1.0` in `application.yaml`)
- **Staging / Production**: 10% (`MANAGEMENT_TRACING_SAMPLING_PROBABILITY=0.1` in `docker-compose.prod.yml`)
To find a trace for a specific request in staging/production, either increase the sampling rate temporarily or trigger the request multiple times.
## Metrics (Prometheus → Grafana)
Prometheus scrapes the backend management endpoint every 15 s:
```
Target: backend:8081/actuator/prometheus
Labels: job="spring-boot", application="Familienarchiv"
```
All Spring Boot metrics carry the `application="Familienarchiv"` tag, which is how the Grafana Spring Boot Observability dashboard (ID 17175) filters to this service.
### Useful Prometheus queries (run on the server or via Grafana Explore → Prometheus)
```promql
# HTTP error rate (5xx) as a fraction of all requests
sum(rate(http_server_requests_seconds_count{status=~"5.."}[5m]))
/ sum(rate(http_server_requests_seconds_count[5m]))
# p95 response time
histogram_quantile(0.95, sum by (le) (
rate(http_server_requests_seconds_bucket[5m])
))
# JVM heap used
jvm_memory_used_bytes{area="heap", application="Familienarchiv"}
# Active DB connections
hikaricp_connections_active
```
## Errors (GlitchTip)
GlitchTip receives errors from both the backend (via Sentry Java SDK) and the frontend (via Sentry JavaScript SDK). It groups events by fingerprint, tracks first/last seen times, and links to the release that introduced the error.
GlitchTip complements Loki: use GlitchTip when you need **grouped, de-duplicated errors with stack traces and release attribution**; use Loki when you need **raw log lines with full context** or want to search across all log levels.
## Direct API access (debugging only)
Loki and Tempo bind no host ports. To reach them directly from your laptop, use an SSH tunnel through the server:
```bash
# Loki API on localhost:3100 (then query via curl or logcli)
ssh -L 3100:172.20.0.x:3100 root@raddatz.cloud
# Replace 172.20.0.x with the obs-loki container IP:
# docker inspect obs-loki --format '{{.NetworkSettings.Networks.archiv-obs-net.IPAddress}}'
# Tempo API on localhost:3200 (then query via curl or tempo-cli)
ssh -L 3200:172.20.0.x:3200 root@raddatz.cloud
```
In practice, Grafana Explore covers all common debugging workflows without needing direct API access.
## Signal summary
| Signal | Source | Transport | Storage | UI |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Application logs | Spring Boot stdout → Docker log driver | Promtail → Loki push API | Loki | Grafana Explore → Loki |
| Distributed traces | Spring Boot OTel agent | OTLP HTTP → Tempo:4318 | Tempo | Grafana Explore → Tempo |
| JVM + HTTP metrics | Spring Actuator `/actuator/prometheus` | Prometheus pull (15 s) | Prometheus | Grafana dashboards |
| Host metrics | node-exporter | Prometheus pull | Prometheus | Grafana → Node Exporter Full |
| Container metrics | cAdvisor | Prometheus pull | Prometheus | Grafana (via Prometheus datasource) |
| Application errors | Sentry SDK | HTTP POST → GlitchTip ingest | GlitchTip DB | GlitchTip UI |

View File

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
# ADR-008: SQL-level pagination for full-text search via window-function CTE
## Status
Accepted
## Context
`DocumentRepository.findAllMatchingIdsByFts` (formerly `findRankedIdsByFts`) returns all matching document IDs for a FTS query. `DocumentService.searchDocuments` then paginates in memory on the RELEVANCE sort path.
A pre-production audit against 1,520 documents measured:
```
rows_per_call: 911 / call (query: "walter")
```
At current scale this is acceptable — 911 UUIDs ≈ 14 KB, ms-level DB time. At 100 K+ documents two failure modes emerge:
1. **Memory**: a broad query returns ~60 K UUIDs ≈ 1 MB per request, multiplied by concurrent users.
2. **Latency**: the `LATERAL` join does work proportional to match-set size; at 60 K matches the FTS step alone exceeds 100 ms per query.
Tracked as finding **F-31 (High)** in the pre-production architectural review.
## Decision
Push pagination and rank ordering into SQL for the RELEVANCE sort path when no non-text filters are active (pure full-text search):
```sql
WITH q AS (
SELECT CASE WHEN websearch_to_tsquery('german', :query)::text <> ''
THEN to_tsquery('simple', regexp_replace(
websearch_to_tsquery('german', :query)::text,
'''([^'']+)''', '''\\1'':*', 'g'))
END AS pq
), matches AS (
SELECT d.id, ts_rank(d.search_vector, q.pq) AS rank
FROM documents d, q
WHERE d.search_vector @@ q.pq
)
SELECT id, rank, COUNT(*) OVER () AS total
FROM matches
ORDER BY rank DESC, id
OFFSET :offset LIMIT :limit
```
`COUNT(*) OVER ()` returns the full match count alongside each page row in a single round-trip — no separate count query needed.
`rows_per_call` for the FTS query drops from match-set size (911) to page size (≤ 50).
When non-text filters (date range, sender, receiver, tags, status) are also active, the existing path is preserved: `findAllMatchingIdsByFts` returns all ranked IDs, which are passed as an `IN` clause to the JPA Specification, and `totalElements` comes from the JPA `Page.getTotalElements()`. This keeps the count accurate across the combined filter set.
## Alternatives Considered
**1. Two-query approach (separate COUNT + paged SELECT)**
Correct, but doubles round-trips. The window function achieves the same result in one query.
**2. Capped result set with a user-visible warning**
Return at most N results (e.g. 500) and show "showing top 500 of many results". Simpler, but degrades UX for broad queries and doesn't reduce latency proportionally (still scans N rows).
**3. Full SQL rewrite combining FTS + JPA Specification filters**
Possible via a native query that embeds all filter predicates. Eliminates the in-memory SENDER/RECEIVER sort paths and the two-phase approach. High complexity, tight coupling to schema details, loses type-safe JPA Specification composition. Deferred to a future refactor if scale demands it.
## Consequences
- **`rows_per_call` for pure-text FTS searches drops to ≤ page size** — the primary metric.
- **SENDER and RECEIVER sort paths stay in-memory** for combined text+filter queries. For pure-text queries with SENDER/RECEIVER sort, the current approach (fetch all matched IDs, build spec, load all matched entities, sort in-memory) still runs. This is acceptable while the archive stays under ~10 K documents.
- **RELEVANCE sort with text+filters still loads the full filtered entity set in-memory.** The filtered set is typically much smaller than the raw FTS match set, so the cost is bounded by filter selectivity, not total match count.
- **`findAllMatchingIdsByFts` is retained** for: (a) the bulk-edit "select all" fast path (`findIdsForFilter`), (b) the document density chart (`getDensity`), and (c) the SENDER/RECEIVER in-memory sort paths.

View File

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
# ADR-009: Standalone `docker-compose.prod.yml`, not an overlay
## Status
Accepted
## Context
The repository's `docker-compose.yml` is a development stack: every service is built locally, ports are exposed on `0.0.0.0` for dev tooling, the frontend runs `npm run dev` with hot-reload, the backend is `spring-boot:run` with the dev profile, and there is no Caddy, no `archiv-app` service account, no admin-credential lock-in, no healthcheck-gated startup sequence. The dev stack reflects "single developer on a laptop", not "production on a single VPS".
The pre-merge design (issue #497, comment #8331) sketched two ways to add a production stack:
1. **Overlay** — keep `docker-compose.yml` as the base, add `docker-compose.prod.yml` as a `-f` overlay (`docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up`). Compose merges the two files at runtime.
2. **Standalone** — make `docker-compose.prod.yml` a fully self-contained file that does not reference or merge with `docker-compose.yml` at all. Project-name namespacing (`-p archiv-production`, `-p archiv-staging`) keeps multi-environment deploys clean on a single host.
The earlier `docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md` notes assumed overlay because the original plan was to **remove** MinIO in production (replace with Hetzner Object Storage), so the prod file would only need to remove one service and add a few. With MinIO retained (see ADR-010), the prod stack diverges from dev in essentially every service: build vs pre-built image, target stage, port binding, env vars, healthcheck, restart policy, mem_limit, profile gating, service account, depends_on chain. Overlay would mostly be `override:` blocks that nullify the dev defaults — a fragile inversion.
## Decision
`docker-compose.prod.yml` is standalone. Production and staging both run it directly:
```
production: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-production --env-file .env.production ...
staging: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-staging --env-file .env.staging --profile staging ...
```
Environment isolation is achieved via the Docker Compose project name (`-p`). Volumes, networks, and containers are namespaced by the project name, so production and staging cohabit cleanly on the same host without interfering.
The dev `docker-compose.yml` is unchanged — `docker compose up` still works for developers, and its `frontend` service now specifies `target: development` explicitly so the new multi-stage Dockerfile builds the right stage.
## Alternatives Considered
| Alternative | Why rejected |
|---|---|
| Overlay (`-f base.yml -f prod.yml`) | With MinIO retained and most services differing across nearly every field, the overlay would consist mostly of `override:` blocks that null out dev defaults. Compose's merge semantics for nested keys (env, ports, healthcheck) are sharp — silent merges of port mappings, env-var entries, and depends_on edges cost reviewer hours. Standalone is one file the reader can hold in their head. |
| Two fully separate files (dev + prod) but with shared YAML anchors via `extends:` | `extends:` works across files but is a niche feature and is increasingly discouraged in compose v2. Reviewer load is higher than reading two flat files. |
| Generate prod compose from a template at deploy time (e.g. ytt, kustomize) | Adds a build-time step and a new tool to the operator toolchain. Justified for a fleet of 10+ environments; overkill for production + staging on one host. |
| Single compose file with environment-specific profiles | Compose profiles select which *services* run, not which *configuration* a service runs with. Using profiles to swap "build locally" vs "pull image" would smear dev and prod across one file. |
## Consequences
- The prod file can be read top-to-bottom without cross-referencing `docker-compose.yml`. Onboarding and review cost drops.
- Volume namespacing is automatic (`archiv-production_postgres-data`, `archiv-staging_postgres-data`) — no manual `volumes:` aliasing.
- Dev compose churn (e.g. swapping a dev port) cannot accidentally affect production. The two files are independent.
- The cost is duplication: identical environment variables (e.g. `POSTGRES_DB: archiv`) appear in both files. This duplication is bounded — there is no incentive to add more services that exist in both — and the alternative (overlay) carries its own duplication via `override:` boilerplate.
- The retired `docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md` narrative is trimmed to a pointer at the live files. The cost/sizing rationale is preserved there.
## Future Direction
If the deployment fleet ever grows beyond two environments on one host (e.g. add a `demo` environment, or shard staging across two VPS for load testing), revisit the templating decision. At three+ environments the duplication starts to bite and a template engine (kustomize or ytt) becomes attractive.

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# ADR-010: MinIO stays self-hosted on the production VPS
## Status
Accepted
## Context
`docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md` (pre-this-PR) sketched a production topology in which the application bucket migrates from in-cluster MinIO to Hetzner Object Storage (OBS, S3-compatible). The motivation was operational: one less service to back up, no MinIO RAM/disk pressure on the VPS, hand off durability to the hyperscaler.
Two facts revisited at pre-merge review (issue #497, comment #8331) changed the answer:
1. **Current data size is small.** The archive is ~13 GB of file uploads (Kurrent letters, scanned ODS files, attachment PDFs). Hetzner OBS billing on this size is dominated by the per-month base fee (~5 EUR/mo for the smallest unit), not capacity or egress. The break-even point against the VPS's existing disk is far above the current footprint.
2. **MinIO is already production-grade.** The dev stack uses MinIO; the backend already drives it via the AWS SDK v2 with a generic `S3_ENDPOINT`. Switching providers is a runtime env-var change (`S3_ENDPOINT`, `S3_ACCESS_KEY`, `S3_SECRET_KEY`) plus an `mc mirror` to copy objects. There is no application-level rewrite cost waiting.
If Hetzner OBS were a one-way-door (provider-specific SDK, complex IAM integration, multi-month migration), the decision would deserve a serious weighing. As reversible as the migration is, deferring it costs nothing.
## Decision
MinIO stays on the production VPS for the first launch. The application bucket is created and managed inside the docker-compose stack (`infra/minio/bootstrap.sh`). The backend uses a least-privilege service account (`archiv-app`) with a bucket-scoped IAM policy, not the MinIO root credentials.
Hetzner Object Storage is **explicitly deferred**, not rejected. The migration path is documented as a runbook in `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` (when the trigger fires): provision an OBS bucket, run `mc mirror local-minio:/familienarchiv obs:/familienarchiv`, rotate the three env vars, restart the backend, decommission the MinIO service from `docker-compose.prod.yml`.
## Triggers to re-evaluate
Revisit the decision when **any** of the following holds:
- The `minio-data` volume exceeds 50 GB and is growing > 5 GB/month.
- MinIO healthcheck latency exceeds 200 ms p95 (signal of disk pressure on the host).
- The VPS upgrade required to keep MinIO healthy costs more per month than the equivalent OBS bucket + traffic.
- Backup of the MinIO volume to `heim-nas` over Tailscale (deferred follow-up) is implemented and consistently runs > 30 min nightly. At that point durability-as-a-service starts paying for itself.
The migration runbook in `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` is the script for executing the swap when one of the triggers fires.
## Alternatives Considered
| Alternative | Why rejected (for now) |
|---|---|
| Migrate to Hetzner Object Storage in this PR | Premature. Adds an external dependency, locks the operator into the Hetzner ecosystem before the data has demonstrated it needs hyperscaler durability, blocks the PR on a migration that buys ~5 GB of headroom. |
| Migrate to S3 (AWS) for HA across regions | Way over-spec for a family archive. Egress cost would dwarf any benefit; durability concerns at this size are addressed by nightly off-site backup, not by multi-region replication. |
| Drop S3 abstraction entirely; store files directly on the VPS disk | Possible, but loses the bucket-policy IAM surface (least-privilege service account), loses presigned-URL flow (OCR service downloads files via short-lived URLs, not via shared filesystem), loses the migration path to OBS. The S3 indirection is cheap insurance. |
| Self-hosted on-VPS plus periodic `mc mirror` to Hetzner OBS for off-site backup | This is the **target** for the backup pipeline follow-up. Treated as backup, not primary — primary stays MinIO. |
## Consequences
- The production VPS sizing (Hetzner CX42, 16 GB RAM, 80 GB disk) must accommodate MinIO's working set. Current footprint leaves ample headroom.
- Backup of MinIO data is the operator's responsibility until the off-site `mc mirror` pipeline is implemented (deferred follow-up). The DEPLOYMENT.md rollback procedure explicitly flags this — manual backup is the only recovery option until the pipeline ships.
- The backend never sees the MinIO root password; it uses the `archiv-app` service account with a bucket-scoped IAM policy (see `infra/minio/bootstrap.sh`). A backend RCE/SSRF cannot escalate beyond the `familienarchiv` bucket.
- The migration to Hetzner OBS remains a small, well-understood runbook step rather than a major refactor. No application code, no SDK swap.
## Future Direction
When one of the triggers above fires, the migration is: provision OBS bucket → `mc mirror` → rotate three env vars → restart backend → remove MinIO service from compose. The bucket-scoped policy translates 1:1 to an OBS user policy (S3-compatible).

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# ADR-011: Single-tenant Gitea runner with secrets-on-disk env-files
## Status
Accepted
## Context
The deploy workflows (`.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml`, `release.yml`) execute on a self-hosted Gitea Actions runner. The runner has Docker-out-of-Docker access (the host's Docker socket is mounted into the runner), so `docker compose build` produces images on the host daemon and `docker compose up` consumes them directly — no registry hop.
Two workflow steps shape the security model:
1. **"Write env file"** — the workflow writes every required secret to `.env.staging` or `.env.production` on the runner's filesystem so that `docker compose --env-file` can consume them. The file lives on disk for the duration of the workflow.
2. **"Cleanup env file"** — the matching `if: always()` step deletes the env file after the workflow ends, regardless of success.
This shape only works under one operational assumption: **the runner is single-tenant**. The runner is owned by the same operator who owns the secrets, no other repositories run jobs on the same runner, and no untrusted code is executed (no public fork PRs trigger workflows). If any of those held, the env-file-on-disk approach would be a credential exposure path — a sibling job could read `.env.production`, or a malicious PR could exfiltrate the secrets via a step.
The alternative — `docker compose --env-file <(printf "..." )` (bash process substitution) — is technically supported and would keep secrets out of the on-disk filesystem. It is more secure under a multi-tenant runner but requires bash 4+ and is brittle inside YAML (the `printf` step would need to escape every secret value containing newlines, equals signs, or quotes).
## Decision
The runner is treated as single-tenant for the lifetime of the v1 deployment. The workflows write env-files to disk under that assumption and rely on the `if: always()` cleanup step to remove them. The operational assumption is documented in-comment at the top of both workflow files (`nightly.yml`, `release.yml`) so the next operator who considers adding a second repo or accepting public PRs has the trigger surfaced in front of them.
Concretely:
- The Gitea runner only runs jobs for `marcel/familienarchiv`.
- No public fork PRs trigger the workflows (Gitea defaults to requiring an explicit approval on first-time contributor PRs for the actions to run).
- Secrets are stored in Gitea repository secrets and injected via `${{ secrets.* }}`. They land in the env-file at workflow start and are removed at workflow end.
## Migration trigger
Switch to the multi-tenant-safe pattern when **any** of the following becomes true:
- A second repository starts using the same runner.
- A workflow accepts contributions that can run untrusted code (public PRs without manual approval).
- The runner is moved off the operator's controlled host onto shared infrastructure.
The migration path is one-step per workflow: replace the "Write env file" step with `--env-file <(printf '%s' "${{ secrets.STAGING_ENV_BLOB }}")` and store the full env-file as a single Gitea secret. The cleanup step is then unnecessary because the env-file never touches disk.
## Alternatives Considered
| Alternative | Why rejected (for now) |
|---|---|
| `--env-file <(printf "...")` via bash process substitution | More secure under multi-tenant. Brittle for multi-line / quoted secret values; harder to debug ("env file not found" with no diff to inspect). Justified once the trigger above fires. |
| Docker secrets (`docker secret create` + `compose secrets:`) | Designed for Swarm; outside of Swarm, compose secrets read from files anyway, so the on-disk surface is the same. Adds complexity without changing the threat model. |
| External secret manager (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) | Adds a third-party dependency to the deploy path. For a family-archive deployment with one operator and one VPS, the cost outweighs the benefit at this scale. |
| GitHub-hosted ephemeral runners | Would require uploading the prod-deploy artifacts to a registry first, then a deploy step on the VPS connecting back. Inverts the current Docker-out-of-Docker simplicity for marginal security gain. The single-tenant self-hosted runner *is* ephemeral in practice — the secrets are written to a directory the runner controls, then deleted. |
## Consequences
- The runner host's filesystem is in the secret-trust boundary. The host is hardened per `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` (ufw, fail2ban, Tailscale-only SSH).
- An operator who later adds a second repo to the runner without revisiting the workflows would silently break the trust assumption. The in-file comments at the top of `nightly.yml` and `release.yml` are the breadcrumb that surfaces the assumption at change time.
- The `if: always()` cleanup step is load-bearing: removing it (e.g. during a future workflow refactor) leaves credentials on disk between runs. Treat it as a permanent invariant.
- Workflow debuggability stays high: an operator who needs to know what env-file the deploy ran with can SSH onto the host while a workflow is in flight and `cat .env.staging` — useful for first-deploy diagnostics.
## Future Direction
When the trigger fires, migrate both workflows in a single PR: replace the "Write env file" step with a single `--env-file <(printf '%s' …)` invocation, drop the cleanup step, and consolidate the per-secret Gitea entries into a single multi-line `STAGING_ENV_BLOB` / `PROD_ENV_BLOB` secret. Single commit, both workflows, no application change.

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# ADR 012 — Browser-Mode Test Mocking Strategy
**Status:** Accepted
**Date:** 2026-05-11 (revised 2026-05-12)
**Issues:** [#535 — original incident](https://git.raddatz.cloud/marcel/familienarchiv/issues/535) · [#553 — revision](https://git.raddatz.cloud/marcel/familienarchiv/issues/553)
---
## Context
Vitest browser-mode tests (the `client` project, run with `@vitest/browser-playwright` / Chromium) use a different module resolution path than Node-environment tests. When a spec calls `vi.mock('some-module', factory)`, vitest registers a `ManualMockedModule`. At runtime, every time Chromium requests that module, a playwright route handler intercepts the request and calls the Node worker over **birpc** (`resolveManualMock`) to evaluate the factory and return the module body.
This is safe for modules that are imported **statically** at spec module-eval time (e.g. `$app/navigation`, `$env/static/public`): those requests resolve before the first test runs and well before any teardown occurs.
It is **unsafe** for modules that are imported **dynamically** (e.g. inside an `async onMount`, inside a lazy-loaded chunk): Chromium may fetch the module after the worker's birpc channel has already closed, producing:
```
Error: [birpc] rpc is closed, cannot call "resolveManualMock"
ManualMockedModule.factory node_modules/@vitest/browser/dist/index.js:3221:34
```
This raises an unhandled rejection that exits the vitest process with code 1, even though every test in the run reported green.
`pdfjs-dist` and `pdfjs-dist/build/pdf.worker.min.mjs?url` are loaded via `await Promise.all([import('pdfjs-dist'), import('pdfjs-dist/build/pdf.worker.min.mjs?url')])` inside `usePdfRenderer.svelte.ts::init()`, which is called from `onMount`. These dynamic imports triggered the race.
---
## Decision
**Prefer prop injection over `vi.mock(module, factory)` for any module that is loaded dynamically in browser-mode specs.**
### The libLoader pattern (for external rendering libraries)
When a component depends on a large external library loaded via dynamic import, extract the import into an injectable loader function with a production default:
```typescript
// usePdfRenderer.svelte.ts
type LibLoader = () => Promise<readonly [typeof import('pdfjs-dist'), { default: string }]>;
const defaultLibLoader: LibLoader = () =>
Promise.all([import('pdfjs-dist'), import('pdfjs-dist/build/pdf.worker.min.mjs?url')]);
export function createPdfRenderer(libLoader: LibLoader = defaultLibLoader) { ... }
```
The component threads the loader as an optional prop:
```svelte
<!-- PdfViewer.svelte -->
let { url, ..., libLoader = undefined } = $props();
const renderer = untrack(() => createPdfRenderer(libLoader));
```
Tests supply a synchronous fake — no `vi.mock` needed:
```typescript
const fakePdfjs = { GlobalWorkerOptions: ..., getDocument: vi.fn(), TextLayer: class {} };
const fakeLoader = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([fakePdfjs, { default: '' }] as const);
render(PdfViewer, { url: '...', libLoader: fakeLoader });
```
### The test-host pattern (for component behaviour)
For components that fetch data or call services, the `*.test-host.svelte` pattern threads the dependency as a prop rather than mocking the module. See `PersonMentionEditor.test-host.svelte` for the canonical example.
---
## Binding invariant: factory bodies must be synchronous (#553)
The original revision of this ADR allowed `vi.mock(virtualModule, factory)` for SvelteKit/Vite virtual modules on the argument that their consumer imports were resolved at static-import time. **That reasoning is wrong.** What matters is what the **factory body** does, not where the mocked module is consumed.
`EnrichmentBlock.svelte.spec.ts` (issue #553) was statically imported and still produced the race: its `vi.mock('$app/stores', async () => { const mod = await import(...); return mod; })` factory performed a dynamic import in its body, and that body was invoked asynchronously when Chromium fetched the manually-mocked module — sometimes after the worker's birpc channel had already closed.
**Therefore: under `**/*.svelte.{test,spec}.ts`, every `vi.mock` factory body must be synchronous. No `await`, no `import(...)`.**
If a factory needs to share state with the spec (a mutable ref, a `vi.fn`, a writable store), use `vi.hoisted()` to lift the reference above `vi.mock`'s implicit hoist:
```ts
const { mockNavigating } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
mockNavigating: { type: null as string | null }
}));
vi.mock('$app/state', () => ({
get navigating() {
return mockNavigating;
}
}));
```
The getter defers the read until consumption time; `vi.hoisted` guarantees the reference is initialised before the (also hoisted) `vi.mock` factory runs. See `DropZone.svelte.spec.ts:9`, `NotificationBell.svelte.spec.ts:6-10`, and `EnrichmentBlock.svelte.spec.ts` for canonical examples.
### Architectural follow-on: prefer `$app/state` over `$app/stores`
`$app/stores` is the deprecated subscription-based store API; `$app/state` is the modern reactive proxy. New components should import from `$app/state`. As part of #553 we migrated `EnrichmentBlock.svelte` from `$app/stores.navigating` to `$app/state.navigating` with `!!navigating.type` — matching the pattern already established in `routes/aktivitaeten/+page.svelte:117` and `routes/documents/+page.svelte:261`. Migration eliminated the *need* to mock a store at all in that spec.
**Pattern note:** When an overlay or dropdown triggers a navigation action, use `<button type="button">` with an `onclick` handler that calls `goto(path)` — do **not** use `<a href="…">` with `e.preventDefault()`. SvelteKit registers its link interceptor as a capture-phase `document` listener, so it fires before the component's bubble-phase `onclick`. By the time `e.preventDefault()` runs the router has already initiated navigation, which tears down the vitest-browser Playwright orchestrator iframe. A `<button>` carries no `href`, so the capture-phase interceptor never fires. See `NotificationDropdown.svelte` for the canonical example.
**Pattern note (#553):** Browser-mode tests run with `data-sveltekit-preload-data="off"` (set in `src/test-setup.ts` via the client project's `setupFiles`). Hover-prefetch otherwise fires real fetch requests for route loader chunks; those requests go through the same Playwright route handler that serves mocked modules. An in-flight prefetch landing after iframe teardown can hit the handler with a closed birpc channel, raising an unhandled rejection.
---
## Binding invariant: one canonical ID per mocked module (#553 — duplicate-id hazard)
The sync-factory invariant above closes one named trigger of the `[birpc] rpc is closed` race. Investigation of a follow-up flake revealed a second, independent trigger: **the same resolved module URL mocked under two distinct ID strings** across or within spec files.
`@vitest/browser-playwright` registers a Playwright `page.context().route(...)` handler per `vi.mock` call. The predicate matches on the module's resolved URL. When two `vi.mock` calls reference the same module under different IDs — for example `'$lib/foo.svelte'` and `'$lib/foo.svelte.js'` (both resolve to the same Svelte rune-module URL) — the registry stores both predicates but the cleanup map only tracks the latest. The orphan route survives session teardown. When the next session loads the same module, the orphan fires, calls `await module.resolve()` against a closed birpc channel, and crashes the run.
This is fixed upstream in [vitest PR #10267](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10267) (issue [#9957](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/issues/9957)). Until that fix reaches a published `@vitest/browser-playwright` release, we close the gap from two sides:
**The rule.** Every mocked module must be referenced under exactly one ID string across the entire client test suite. Pick the spelling production code uses. For Svelte 5 rune modules (`*.svelte.ts`), the canonical form is the no-extension import (`'$lib/foo.svelte'`) — matches the source file basename and matches Svelte 5 convention. Never mix `.svelte.js` and `.svelte` for the same module across specs.
**Enforcement layers** (added in #553's second cycle, extending the four-layer chain above):
5. **In-suite meta-test** at `frontend/src/__meta__/no-duplicate-mock-ids.test.ts` globs `src/**/*.svelte.{test,spec}.ts`, extracts every `vi.mock` first-arg string, canonicalises by stripping a trailing `.js`/`.ts` after `.svelte`, and fails if any canonical ID is referenced under two or more distinct spellings. Same shape as `no-async-mock-factories.test.ts`.
6. **`patch-package` backport** of PR #10267 at `frontend/patches/@vitest+browser-playwright+4.1.0.patch`. Applied automatically by the `postinstall` hook. Closes the race at the route-handler level — even if a contributor reintroduces a duplicate-ID, the patched `register` handler unroutes the existing predicate before installing the new one.
**When to remove the patch.** Once `@vitest/browser-playwright` ships a release containing PR #10267, delete `patches/@vitest+browser-playwright+4.1.0.patch`. Bump the dependency to the version containing the fix. The in-suite meta-test stays — it's a cheap permanent guard against the contributor-facing pattern, independent of upstream library version.
---
## Consequences
- New browser-mode specs that need to stub an external library **must not** use `vi.mock(externalLib, factory)`. Add a loader/factory parameter to the underlying hook or service instead.
- The CI `unit-tests` job includes a permanent grep guard that fails the build if `rpc is closed` appears in any coverage run log. This catches regressions before they reach the acceptance criterion.
- Acceptance criterion for #535: 60 consecutive green `workflow_dispatch` CI runs against `main` after the fix is merged, with zero `rpc is closed` lines in any log.
- **Enforcement (six layers, defence in depth):**
1. **ESLint `no-restricted-syntax`** in `eslint.config.js` (scoped to `**/*.{spec,test}.ts`) flags two patterns: (a) the literal `vi.mock('pdfjs-dist', ...)` — enforces the libLoader pattern — and (b) any `vi.mock(..., async () => { ... await import(...) ... })` — enforces the synchronous-factory invariant. Both messages point at this ADR. Failure surfaces at save time.
2. **CI grep guard** in `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` runs before the test suite launches. Mirrors the ESLint patterns with `grep -Pzn`. ~10s round-trip.
3. **In-suite meta-test** at `frontend/src/__meta__/no-async-mock-factories.test.ts` globs `src/**/*.svelte.{test,spec}.ts` and asserts none match the banned pattern. Catches at every vitest invocation — the layer hardest to disable.
4. **CI birpc assert** runs after the coverage step and fails the build if `[birpc] rpc is closed` appears in any log line. Catches the symptom even if all the upstream layers were bypassed.
5. **In-suite duplicate-ID meta-test** at `frontend/src/__meta__/no-duplicate-mock-ids.test.ts` enforces the one-canonical-ID-per-module rule from the duplicate-id-hazard section above.
6. **`patch-package` backport** at `frontend/patches/@vitest+browser-playwright+4.1.0.patch` closes the upstream race itself, applied via `postinstall`. To be removed when `@vitest/browser-playwright` releases [vitest PR #10267](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10267).
- **Acceptance verification:** `coverage-flake-probe.yml` is a `workflow_dispatch`-triggered matrix workflow that runs the coverage suite 20× in parallel against a single SHA and asserts zero birpc lines. One fire, parallel cost, deterministic signal — replaces accumulating 20 sequential push events.
- **When to revisit the LibLoader home:** If three or more components adopt this pattern, consider extracting a shared `$lib/types/lib-loader.ts` or a generic `DynamicImportLoader<T>` type to avoid parallel type definitions across modules.

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# ADR-012: nsenter via privileged sibling container for host service management in CI
## Status
Accepted
## Context
The deploy workflows (`.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml`, `release.yml`) run job steps inside Docker containers under a Docker-out-of-Docker (DooD) setup: the Gitea runner container mounts the host Docker socket, and act_runner spawns a sibling container for each job. That job container also gets the Docker socket mounted (via `valid_volumes` in `runner-config.yaml`).
This architecture has one significant limitation: **job containers cannot manage host services**. Specifically:
- Job containers are not in the host's PID, mount, UTS, network, or IPC namespaces.
- There is no systemd PID 1 inside a job container — `systemctl` has nothing to talk to.
- `sudo` is not present in standard container images; even if it were, it would not help.
- Caddy runs as a **host systemd service** (not a Docker container), managing TLS certificates via Let's Encrypt. It must be running on the host to serve port 443.
The deploy workflows need to tell Caddy to reload its config after each deploy so that committed Caddyfile changes are applied before the smoke test validates the public surface. Without a reload step, Caddy silently serves the previous config and the smoke test may pass against stale configuration.
## Decision
Use the host Docker socket (already mounted in every job container via `runner-config.yaml`) to spin up a **privileged sibling container** in the host PID namespace, then use `nsenter` to enter all host namespaces and call `systemctl reload caddy`:
```yaml
- name: Reload Caddy
run: |
docker run --rm --privileged --pid=host \
alpine:3.21@sha256:48b0309ca019d89d40f670aa1bc06e426dc0931948452e8491e3d65087abc07d \
sh -c 'apk add --no-cache util-linux -q && nsenter -t 1 -m -u -n -p -i -- /bin/systemctl reload caddy'
```
`nsenter -t 1 -m -u -n -p -i` enters the init process's mount, UTS, IPC, network, PID, and cgroup namespaces, giving `systemctl` a view of the real host systemd daemon.
**Alpine is used** instead of Ubuntu: ~5 MB vs ~70 MB pull size, no unnecessary tooling. `util-linux` (which ships `nsenter`) is installed at run time; apk add takes ~1 s on the warm VPS cache. The image digest is pinned so any upstream change requires an explicit Renovate bump PR.
**`reload` not `restart`**: reload sends SIGHUP so Caddy re-reads its config in-process without dropping TLS connections or in-flight requests.
**No sudoers entry is required**: the Docker socket already grants root-equivalent host access. This pattern makes existing implicit privileges explicit rather than introducing new ones.
This decision applies the same pattern to both `nightly.yml` and `release.yml` since both deploy the app stack and must apply Caddyfile changes before smoke-testing the public surface.
## Alternatives Considered
| Alternative | Why rejected |
|---|---|
| `sudo systemctl reload caddy` in the job container | No systemd PID 1 inside the container — `systemctl` has nothing to connect to. `sudo` is not present in container images and would not help even if it were. |
| Caddy admin API (`curl localhost:2019/load`) | Job containers do not share the host network namespace; `localhost:2019` on the host is unreachable. Exposing `:2019` on a host-bound port would add a network attack surface with no benefit over the current approach. |
| SSH from the job container to the VPS host | Requires storing an SSH private key as a CI secret, managing authorized_keys on the host, and opening an inbound SSH path from the container. Adds key management overhead for a pattern that the Docker socket already enables more directly. |
| Running Caddy as a Docker container (instead of host service) | Caddy manages TLS certificates via Let's Encrypt; running it in Docker complicates certificate persistence and renewal. As a host service, cert storage is straightforward and restarts do not risk rate-limit issues. This would be a larger infrastructure change unrelated to the CI gap. |
## Consequences
- The runner host's Docker socket access is now a capability relied upon for host service management, not just for running `docker compose` commands. This is stated explicitly in the YAML comment so future reviewers understand the trust boundary.
- The Caddyfile symlink on the VPS (`/etc/caddy/Caddyfile → /opt/familienarchiv/infra/caddy/Caddyfile`) is a required contract for CI to succeed. It is documented in `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §3.1` and `docs/infrastructure/ci-gitea.md`. If the symlink is absent or mis-pointed, `systemctl reload caddy` succeeds but Caddy serves stale config.
- Renovate will create bump PRs when a new Alpine 3.21 digest is published. Because the container runs `--privileged --pid=host`, these bump PRs must be reviewed manually and must not be auto-merged. A `packageRule` in `renovate.json` enforces this.
- The step is duplicated between `nightly.yml` and `release.yml` (tracked in issue #539 for extraction into a composite action).
- If Caddy is not running when the step executes, `systemctl reload` exits non-zero and the workflow aborts before the smoke test — preventing a misleading "port 443 refused" curl error.
## References
- `docs/infrastructure/ci-gitea.md` §"Running host-level commands from CI (nsenter pattern)" — full operational context, troubleshooting guide
- `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` §3.1 — Caddyfile symlink bootstrap step
- ADR-011 — single-tenant runner trust model (Docker socket access scope)

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# ADR 013 — Client-Project Branch Coverage Threshold
**Status:** Accepted
**Date:** 2026-05-14
**Issues:** [#556 — threshold drop](https://git.raddatz.cloud/marcel/familienarchiv/issues/556) · [#496 — long-tail-grind tracking](https://git.raddatz.cloud/marcel/familienarchiv/issues/496)
---
## Context
The browser-mode component test suite (`vitest.client-coverage.config.ts`) enforces Istanbul coverage thresholds across `lines`, `functions`, `branches`, and `statements`. The `branches` metric was set to 80%, but the codebase sits at **75%** — below the gate — causing every CI run of `unit-tests` and `coverage-flake-probe` to fail on this check alone, even when all tests are green.
**Measured baseline (2026-05-14, branch `feat/issue-553-birpc-async-mock-factory`, head `2e6cc346`):**
```
branches: 75% (below the 80% gate — reason for this ADR)
lines: ≥ 80%
functions: ≥ 80%
statements: ≥ 80%
```
Reproducer:
```bash
cd frontend && npm ci && npx vitest run -c vitest.client-coverage.config.ts --coverage
```
### The long-tail-grind problem
In Istanbul's branch accounting, when a child component gains test coverage its branches are added to the parent's denominator. A child moving from 40% → 80% coverage can drag a parent from 78% → 72% because more branches in the call graph become reachable and must be covered. This is not a bug — it is how branch accounting works — but it means that on a large SvelteKit application the denominator grows with every coverage improvement, making an arbitrary 80% ceiling a constant grind. Per #496, the expected cost to reach 80% branches from 75% is 30100+ commits with no guarantee of stability.
### Why this layer is different
The 80% branch floor used for backend unit/integration tests is appropriate for Java service code and permission logic. Browser-mode component coverage measures Svelte template branches: conditional class bindings, `{#if}` blocks, empty/loaded/error state guards. These branches have a fundamentally different accounting model and a higher inherent denominator. This ADR **only** lowers the browser-mode component gate; the backend test coverage gates are unaffected.
### Security-relevant uncovered components
The following auth/permission-boundary components currently have low or zero branch coverage. When ratchet-up work begins (see below), these are the highest-priority targets:
- `src/routes/login/+page.svelte`
- `src/routes/forgot-password/+page.svelte`
- `src/routes/reset-password/+page.svelte`
- `src/routes/register/+page.svelte`
Note: the 75% figure already reflects the absence of coverage on these files. Lowering the gate does not create this gap — it makes the existing state legible.
---
## Decision
Drop the `branches` threshold from `80``75` in `frontend/vitest.client-coverage.config.ts`. Leave `lines`, `functions`, and `statements` at `80`.
The 75% figure matches the measured current state, allowing CI to pass while deliberate coverage improvement work (tracked in #496) continues without blocking other PRs. The asymmetry in the thresholds block is intentional and documented with an inline comment pointing here.
---
## Ratchet Rule
The branches threshold ratchets **up by 3 percentage points** when the rolling 3-PR-average client-project branches figure on `main` stays at or above `threshold + 3pp` for ≥ 30 consecutive days. Direction is **up-only** — never lower the floor below 75 without a new ADR superseding this one. Manual today (verify before any `vitest.client-coverage.config.ts` edit); a future automation issue may codify the check.
Concretely:
- When `main` sustains ≥ 78% branches across 3 consecutive PRs for 30 days → raise gate to 78%
- When `main` sustains ≥ 81% branches across 3 consecutive PRs for 30 days → raise gate back to 80%
---
## Non-goals
- **Not** raising actual branch coverage — that is #496's job, tracked separately.
- **Not** touching the server-project coverage configuration (`vitest.config.ts`) — only the client project hits the long-tail-grind pattern.
- **Not** removing or relaxing any existing test files, `skipIf` guards, or axe-playwright accessibility runs.
---
## Consequences
**Easier:**
- CI unblocked — `unit-tests` and `coverage-flake-probe` jobs pass when all tests are green
- The ratchet rule creates a concrete, observable path back to 80%
**Harder:**
- The gate now has near-zero headroom — any branch regression that drops below 75% will fail CI immediately
- The 75% floor must not be treated as a permanent ceiling; the ratchet discipline requires active attention
---
## References
- [#496 — Branch coverage long-tail grind](https://git.raddatz.cloud/marcel/familienarchiv/issues/496)
- [#556 — This threshold drop](https://git.raddatz.cloud/marcel/familienarchiv/issues/556)
- [ADR 012 — Browser-Mode Test Mocking Strategy](./012-browser-test-mocking-strategy.md)
- `frontend/vitest.client-coverage.config.ts` — thresholds block (lines 4451)

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@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
# ADR 014 — Pin actions/upload-artifact to v3 (Gitea act_runner v4 protocol incompatibility)
**Status:** Accepted
**Date:** 2026-05-14
**Issues:** [#557 — re-regression](https://git.raddatz.cloud/marcel/familienarchiv/issues/557) · [#14 — original incident](https://git.raddatz.cloud/marcel/familienarchiv/issues/14)
---
## Context
`actions/upload-artifact` is available in two incompatible major versions. The v4 client
uploads via a GitHub-specific artifact API that is **not implemented** in Gitea's
`act_runner` (the self-hosted CI substrate established by ADR-011). When a workflow step
uses `actions/upload-artifact@v4` on this runner, `act_runner` returns a non-zero exit
code from the v4 client even when all tests pass, producing:
> green test suite — red job status — no artifact uploaded
The failure lands in the upload step, _after_ the test output, making it hard to diagnose
from the build log.
### Incident history
| Date | Commit | Event |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-19 | `9f3f022e` | Original downgrade: `upload-artifact@v4 → v3` |
| 2026-03-19 | `4142c7cd` | Rationale committed; closes #14 |
| 2026-05-05 | `410b91e2` | Re-regression: upgraded back to v4 without referencing #14 |
| 2026-05-14 | this PR | Second downgrade + ADR + grep guard |
The root cause of the re-regression was institutional-memory failure: the original
rationale was captured only in a commit body, invisible at the point of change (the
`uses:` line). This ADR, the inline comments, and the grep guard are the three
defence layers that replace that missing breadcrumb.
---
## Decision
**Pin all `actions/upload-artifact` and `actions/download-artifact` call sites to `@v3`.**
Both action families share the same v4 protocol incompatibility with `act_runner`.
Pinning to the major tag (`@v3`) keeps us on the latest v3 patch without Renovate noise.
Three call sites are pinned:
- `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` — "Upload coverage reports" step
- `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` — "Upload screenshots" step
- `.gitea/workflows/coverage-flake-probe.yml` — "Upload coverage log on failure" step
Each pinned `uses:` line carries a load-bearing inline comment:
```yaml
# Gitea Actions (act_runner) does not implement upload-artifact v4 protocol — pinned per ADR-014. Do NOT upgrade. See #557.
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
```
A CI grep guard enforces the constraint automatically (see below).
---
## Consequences
### Enforcement layers (defence in depth)
1. **Inline comments** on every `uses:` line — visible at the point of change.
2. **CI grep guard** in `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` ("Assert no (upload|download)-artifact
past v3") — fails the build if a future commit re-introduces `@v4` or higher on any
workflow file. Anchored to YAML `uses:` lines to avoid false positives on embedded
shell strings. Includes a self-test that proves the regex catches v4+ before scanning
the repo.
3. **This ADR** — canonical rationale; cross-referenced by comments and guard message.
### How to spot the symptom
- Test suite output shows green (vitest, surefire, pytest all exit 0)
- CI job status shows red
- Artifacts section of the run is empty
- Build log shows a non-zero exit from the `Upload …` step immediately after green tests
### `@v3` maintenance-mode status
GitHub placed `actions/upload-artifact@v3` in maintenance mode (no new features) but it
has not been removed and carries no known unpatched CVE as of this writing. If GitHub
publishes a v3-specific security advisory, that is an additional trigger to re-evaluate
(see upgrade conditions below).
### When to remove this pin
Re-evaluate pinning **when either condition is met:**
1. `gitea/act_runner` ships a release with v4 artifact protocol support. Track upstream:
<https://gitea.com/gitea/act_runner>
2. `actions/upload-artifact@v3` acquires an unpatched CVE that cannot be mitigated
at the runner level.
When upgrading: remove the grep guard step, update all three `uses:` lines, remove the
inline comments, and update this ADR's status to Superseded.
---
## Alternatives
### SHA pinning (`uses: actions/upload-artifact@<sha>`)
More secure against action repository compromise, but adds Renovate update friction
and is disproportionate for a self-hosted, single-tenant Gitea instance with one
trusted contributor (ADR-011). Rejected.
### Minor/patch pinning (`@v3.4.0`)
Avoids Renovate PRs but freezes us on a specific patch. The v3 major track is in
maintenance mode — minor pinning has no benefit and would require manual updates
for any v3 security patches. Rejected.
### Renovate `packageRules` bypass
Would prevent automated PRs from proposing v4. Not needed while Renovate is not
configured for this repository. Revisit if Renovate is introduced.
### Migrating the runner to a v4-compatible Gitea release
Out of scope for this issue. A separate decision; tracked in #557's non-goals.

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@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
# ADR-015: DooD workspace bind mount for Compose file bind-mount resolution
## Status
Accepted
## Context
The deploy workflows (`.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml`, `release.yml`) run job steps inside Docker containers via Docker-out-of-Docker (DooD): the Gitea runner mounts the host Docker socket, and act_runner spawns sibling containers for each job.
When a job step calls `docker compose -f docker-compose.observability.yml up`, Docker Compose resolves relative bind-mount sources against `$(pwd)` inside the job container and passes the resulting absolute paths to the **host** daemon. For example, `./infra/observability/prometheus/prometheus.yml` becomes `/some/path/infra/observability/prometheus/prometheus.yml`, and the host daemon tries to bind-mount that path from the **host filesystem**.
In the default DooD setup (`runner-config.yaml` with only `valid_volumes: ["/var/run/docker.sock"]`), job container workspaces live in the act_runner overlay2 layer. The host has no corresponding directory at the job container's `$(pwd)` path, so the daemon auto-creates an empty directory in its place. The container then fails to start because the mount target was expected to be a file, not a directory:
```
error mounting "…/prometheus/prometheus.yml" to rootfs at "/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml": not a directory
```
This affected all five config file bind mounts in `docker-compose.observability.yml`.
## Decision
Configure act_runner to store job workspaces on a real host path (`/srv/gitea-workspace`) and mount that path into both the runner container and every job container at the **same absolute path**. The identity of the host path and container path is the key constraint: Compose resolves to an absolute path and hands it to the host daemon, which looks for that exact path on the host filesystem.
**runner-config.yaml changes:**
```yaml
container:
workdir_parent: /srv/gitea-workspace
valid_volumes:
- "/var/run/docker.sock"
- "/srv/gitea-workspace"
options: "-v /srv/gitea-workspace:/srv/gitea-workspace"
```
**Runner compose.yaml change** (host side — not in this repo):
```yaml
runner:
volumes:
- /srv/gitea-workspace:/srv/gitea-workspace
```
With this in place, `$(pwd)` inside a job container resolves to `/srv/gitea-workspace/<owner>/<repo>/`, which is a real directory on the host. Compose-managed bind mounts from that directory work without any additional steps.
## Alternatives Considered
| Alternative | Why rejected |
|---|---|
| **overlay2 `MergedDir` sync via privileged nsenter** (the previous approach, see PR #599 v1) | Required `--privileged --pid=host` (effective root on the host) plus fragile overlay2 driver assumption. Introduced stale-file risk on the host and a second stable path (`/srv/familienarchiv-*/obs-configs`) to maintain separately from the source tree. Replaced by this ADR. |
| **Build configs into a dedicated Docker image** (pattern used for MinIO bootstrap, see `infra/minio/Dockerfile`) | Viable for static files that change infrequently. Requires a build step and an image rebuild every time a config changes. Appropriate for bootstrap scripts; too heavy for frequently-tuned observability configs. |
| **Add workspace directory to runner-config `valid_volumes` only** (without `workdir_parent`) | `valid_volumes` whitelists paths that workflow steps may reference, but does not change where act_runner stores workspaces. Without `workdir_parent`, the workspace would still be in overlay2 and the bind-mount resolution problem would remain. |
| **Map workspace under a different host path than container path** (e.g. host `/srv/workspace`, container `/workspace`) | Compose resolves to the container-internal path (e.g. `/workspace/…`) and passes that to the host daemon. The host daemon interprets the source as a host path. If host `/workspace` does not exist, the daemon creates an empty directory — the original bug. The paths must be identical. |
## Consequences
- `/srv/gitea-workspace` must exist on the VPS before the runner starts. The directory was created as part of this change; it is not created automatically.
- The runner container's `compose.yaml` (maintained outside this repo at `~/docker/gitea/compose.yaml` on the VPS) must include the `- /srv/gitea-workspace:/srv/gitea-workspace` volume line. This is an out-of-band operational dependency; the prerequisite is documented in `runner-config.yaml`.
- `workdir_parent` applies to all jobs on this runner. Any future workflow that calls `docker compose` with relative bind mounts benefits automatically without further configuration.
- Job workspaces persist across runs under `/srv/gitea-workspace`. act_runner manages per-run subdirectory cleanup. Orphaned directories from interrupted runs should be cleaned up manually if disk space becomes a concern.
- Workflows that previously relied on `OBS_CONFIG_DIR` env var or the `obs-configs` stable path on the host no longer need those. Both were removed in this PR.
- This pattern does **not** apply to the `nsenter`-based Caddy reload step (ADR-012), which manages a host systemd service — a different problem class with no bind-mount equivalent.
## References
- ADR-011 — single-tenant runner trust model
- ADR-012 — nsenter via privileged container for host service management
- Issue #598 — original observability stack bind-mount failure
- `runner-config.yaml``workdir_parent`, `valid_volumes`, `options`

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@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
# ADR-016: Observability stack co-location at `/opt/familienarchiv/` with CI-push config sync
## Status
Accepted
## Context
Issue #601 established that the observability stack must survive Gitea CI workspace wipes between nightly runs. When the nightly job completes, act_runner deletes the job workspace. Any Docker container that bind-mounts a config file from a workspace path (`/srv/gitea-workspace/…/infra/observability/prometheus/prometheus.yml`) then references a path that no longer exists on the host. On the next nightly run, Docker Compose either auto-creates an empty directory in its place (causing the container to fail to start because a file mount receives a directory) or finds a stale file from a previous run if the workspace happened to land at the same path.
ADR-015 solved the workspace bind-mount resolution problem: job workspaces are stored at `/srv/gitea-workspace` so `$(pwd)` inside the job container maps to a real host path. But it did not address persistence: the workspace is still wiped after the job, so bind mounts from workspace-relative paths remain fragile across runs.
### Decision drivers
1. Bind-mount sources must point to a host path that persists indefinitely, not to a path that disappears after each CI run.
2. Config files must reflect the committed state of the repo after every nightly run (no manual sync steps).
3. Secrets must not be written to the workspace or to any path managed by CI; they must survive independently of deployments.
4. The solution must not introduce new infrastructure dependencies (no SSH access from CI, no external registry, no additional server-side daemon).
### Alternatives considered
**A: Server-pull model** — a systemd timer or cron job on the server does `git pull` from the repo into `/opt/familienarchiv/` and then runs `docker compose up`. Rejected because: (1) requires git credentials on the server and a registered deploy key, (2) adds a second deployment mechanism that diverges from the CI-push model used for the main app stack, (3) timing coupling — the server pull must complete before CI's health checks run, requiring polling or a webhook.
**B: Separate directory (e.g. `/opt/obs/`)** — keeps obs configs isolated from the app stack. Rejected because: (1) the main app compose files are already in `/opt/familienarchiv/` (managed the same way), and (2) GlitchTip shares the `archive-db` PostgreSQL instance and `archiv-net` Docker network — it is architecturally part of the same deployment unit, not a separate one. Co-location reflects the actual coupling.
**C: Named Docker configs (Swarm)** — Docker Swarm supports first-class config objects that persist in the cluster. Rejected because the project does not use Swarm and introducing it solely for config persistence is a disproportionate dependency.
## Decision
The observability stack is co-located with the main application deployment at `/opt/familienarchiv/`:
- `docker-compose.observability.yml``/opt/familienarchiv/docker-compose.observability.yml`
- `infra/observability/``/opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/`
Both the nightly CI job (`nightly.yml`) and the release job (`release.yml`) copy these files from the workspace checkout to `/opt/familienarchiv/` using `cp -r` on every run (CI-push model). Containers always read config from the permanent location; a workspace wipe has no effect on running containers.
Environment variables follow a two-source model:
- `infra/observability/obs.env` (git-tracked, non-secret): all non-sensitive config — host ports, public URLs (`GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN`, `GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL`), and the default `POSTGRES_HOST`. Changes go through PR review. No credentials.
- `/opt/familienarchiv/obs-secrets.env` (CI-written, per-deploy): passwords and secret keys only (`GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD`, `GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY`, `POSTGRES_USER`, `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `POSTGRES_HOST`), injected fresh from Gitea secrets on every nightly and release deploy. Gitea is the single source of truth for secrets — rotating a secret takes effect on the next deploy without manual server action.
Both files are passed explicitly via `--env-file` to every obs compose command (config dry-run and `up`). There is no implicit auto-read `.env`. The required key inventory is documented in `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §4`.
The CI runner mounts `/opt/familienarchiv` as a bind mount into job containers (see `runner-config.yaml`). This requires a one-time `mkdir -p /opt/familienarchiv/infra` on the server and a runner restart after updating `runner-config.yaml` (see ADR-015 and `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §3.1`).
## Consequences
**Positive:**
- Bind-mount sources survive workspace wipes by definition — they are on a persistent host path.
- Config is always in sync with the repo after each nightly run.
- No new infrastructure dependencies; the CI-push model mirrors how the main app stack is deployed.
- Secret rotation requires no manual server action — Gitea secrets are the authoritative store; `obs-secrets.env` is rewritten from scratch on every deploy so a secret change takes effect on the next nightly or release run.
**Negative:**
- `cp -r` does not remove deleted files; a config file removed from the repo persists in `/opt/familienarchiv/infra/observability/` until manually deleted. Acceptable for this project's change frequency. A `rsync -a --delete` would give a clean mirror if this becomes a problem.
- Mounting `/opt/familienarchiv/` into CI job containers expands the blast radius of a compromised workflow step — a malicious step could overwrite app compose files and Caddy config. Acceptable because the runner is single-tenant (trusted code only). See `runner-config.yaml` security comment.
- Runner must be restarted (`systemctl restart gitea-runner`) after any change to `runner-config.yaml` for the new mount to take effect.

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# ADR-017: Spring Boot 4.0 management port shares the main security filter chain
## Status
Accepted
## Context
The Familienarchiv backend runs Spring Boot Actuator on a dedicated management port (8081) so that Caddy never proxies `/actuator/*` requests and Prometheus can reach the scrape endpoint directly inside `archiv-net`.
In earlier Spring Boot versions (< 4.0), the management server ran in an isolated child application context whose security was governed independently by `ManagementWebSecurityAutoConfiguration`. The main app's `SecurityConfig` filter chain (port 8080) never intercepted requests arriving on port 8081.
In Spring Boot 4.0 with Jetty, this isolation was removed. The management server now traverses the **same** Spring Security `FilterChainProxy` as the main application. Concretely:
- Any `SecurityFilterChain` bean in the application context is evaluated for requests arriving on the management port.
- There is no longer a separate "management security" child context.
This was discovered when Prometheus began receiving HTTP 401 responses from `/actuator/prometheus` despite the endpoint being exposed and the `micrometer-registry-prometheus` dependency being present. Prometheus rejected these responses with `received unsupported Content-Type "text/html"` because the main filter chain's form-login `DelegatingAuthenticationEntryPoint` was redirecting unauthenticated requests to `/login` (302 → HTML).
A secondary issue: Spring Boot 4.0 no longer auto-enables Prometheus metrics export — `management.prometheus.metrics.export.enabled` must be set explicitly, and the Prometheus scrape endpoint requires `spring-boot-starter-micrometer-metrics` (a new starter that was split out in Spring Boot 4.0).
## Decision
1. **Dedicated management `SecurityFilterChain`** scoped to `/actuator/**` at `@Order(1)` (highest precedence). This chain:
- `permitAll()` for `/actuator/health` and `/actuator/prometheus` — required for Docker health checks and unauthenticated Prometheus scraping.
- `authenticated()` for all other actuator endpoints — blocks `/actuator/metrics`, `/actuator/info`, etc. without credentials.
- Uses an explicit `401` entry point (not form-login redirect) so that API clients — including Prometheus — receive a machine-readable status code rather than an HTML redirect.
- No CSRF, no form login.
2. **Belt-and-suspenders `permitAll()` in the main `SecurityFilterChain`** for `/actuator/health` and `/actuator/prometheus`, in case a future configuration change causes these paths to escape the management chain's `securityMatcher`.
3. **Network isolation as the outer defense boundary.** Port 8081 is not published in `docker-compose.yml` and is not routed through Caddy. Only services inside `archiv-net` (primarily Prometheus and the Docker health checker) can reach the management port.
## Alternatives rejected
- **Exclude `ManagementWebSecurityAutoConfiguration`:** This auto-configuration no longer exists in Spring Boot 4.0. Exclusion is not applicable.
- **Keep `SecurityConfig` as the sole filter chain without `@Order(1)` management chain:** The main chain's form-login `DelegatingAuthenticationEntryPoint` redirects browser-like clients to `/login` (302). Prometheus and automated health check clients cannot follow this redirect, so the endpoint would be unreachable without a dedicated chain that returns plain 401 or 200.
- **Per-endpoint `@Order(1)` filter chain using `EndpointRequest.toAnyEndpoint()`:** The `spring-boot-security` artifact that provides `EndpointRequest` is not a transitive dependency of `spring-boot-starter-actuator` in Spring Boot 4.0. Using a path-based `securityMatcher("/actuator/**")` achieves the same scoping without an extra dependency.
## Consequences
- All actuator endpoints on port 8081 that are not explicitly `permitAll()`-ed require HTTP Basic credentials. Without valid credentials, the response is 401 (not a redirect).
- Adding a new actuator endpoint to `management.endpoints.web.exposure.include` implicitly protects it via `anyRequest().authenticated()` in the management chain — no additional `permitAll()` needed unless intentional.
- A regression test (`ActuatorPrometheusIT`) verifies:
- `/actuator/prometheus` returns 200 without credentials.
- `/actuator/metrics` returns 401 without credentials.
- Prometheus metric names are present in the response body.
- If port 8081 is ever accidentally published in `docker-compose.yml`, actuator endpoints other than health and prometheus are still protected by HTTP Basic. This reduces (but does not eliminate) the risk of inadvertent exposure.

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@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
# ADR-018: GlitchTip frontend error tracking via @sentry/sveltekit
**Date:** 2026-05-17
**Status:** Accepted
**Deciders:** Marcel Raddatz
---
## Context
The Familienarchiv had no client-side error reporting. When a user encountered a crash
or unhandled error in the SvelteKit frontend, there was no way for the operator to
observe it — errors were invisible until a user manually reported them. A GlitchTip
instance (self-hosted, Sentry-compatible) was already running as part of the
observability stack (`docker-compose.observability.yml`). The backend already reported
server-side errors to it.
We needed a way to:
1. Capture frontend errors automatically and route them to GlitchTip.
2. Give users a visible error identifier they can include in a support message.
3. Do this without leaking personally identifiable information (PII) from the family
archive — documents contain personal histories, names, and relationships.
---
## Decision
Use `@sentry/sveltekit` (the official Sentry SDK for SvelteKit) to:
- Initialise with `sendDefaultPii: false` on both `hooks.server.ts` and `hooks.client.ts`.
- Pass a callback to `Sentry.handleErrorWithSentry()` that returns
`{ message, errorId }` where `errorId` is `Sentry.lastEventId()` when Sentry
captured the event, or a fresh `crypto.randomUUID()` as fallback.
- Display the `errorId` on the `+error.svelte` page so users can include it in a
report to the operator.
The SDK is initialised with `enabled: !!import.meta.env.VITE_SENTRY_DSN` so that
development and CI builds without a DSN configured do not send any events.
`VITE_SENTRY_DSN` is a write-only ingest key — it can POST events to GlitchTip but
cannot read them. It is safe to include in the client bundle per the Sentry security
model; it does not require rotation like a password.
---
## Alternatives considered
**Sentry SaaS** — rejected. The archive contains private family documents and personal
history. Sending error events with stack traces to a US-hosted third party is
inconsistent with the project's data-minimisation posture. Self-hosted GlitchTip on
the same Hetzner VPS keeps all data on infrastructure the operator controls.
**Custom error logging endpoint** — rejected. The @sentry/sveltekit SDK handles
SvelteKit's hook lifecycle, source-map upload, and event grouping automatically.
Reimplementing this would cost significant engineering time for no benefit.
**Log-only (no user-visible errorId)** — rejected. Without a visible error ID, users
can only describe what happened in natural language, making it hard to correlate a
report with a specific GlitchTip event. The `errorId` closes this gap at negligible UI
cost.
---
## Consequences
**Positive:**
- Frontend errors are now observable without requiring user reports.
- Users can provide an `errorId` that maps directly to a GlitchTip event.
- `sendDefaultPii: false` ensures names, IPs, and cookie values are not included in
captured events.
- `tracesSampleRate: 0.1` limits trace volume to 10% of transactions, keeping
GlitchTip load low on the shared VPS.
**Negative / trade-offs:**
- The `@sentry/sveltekit` SDK is now a production dependency. SDK updates must be
reviewed for changes to the default PII scrubbing behaviour.
- The `handleError` callback in both hooks returns a hardcoded English message
(`'An unexpected error occurred'`). This bypasses Paraglide i18n — the error page
will always show English text when the hooks are active, regardless of the user's
locale. This is acceptable because: (a) the error page is a last-resort fallback
not part of normal UX, (b) the `errorId` is the actionable information, not the
message text. A future ADR may address this if internationalised error messages
become a requirement.
- `Sentry.lastEventId()` returns `undefined` when Sentry did not capture the event
(e.g. DSN not configured). The `crypto.randomUUID()` fallback guarantees an `errorId`
is always present, but that UUID will not appear in GlitchTip.

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@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
# ADR-019 — Container hardening baseline: non-root user + read-only filesystem
**Status:** Accepted
**Date:** 2026-05-17
**PR:** #611
---
## Context
The OCR service ran as `root` inside its container by default. This violated CIS Docker Benchmark §4.1 and CIS §4.6, and meant that any exploit in the OCR pipeline (untrusted PDF content, model deserialization, ZIP handling) could write to or execute anything inside the container without restriction.
The following risks were present before this baseline:
- A path-traversal in the ZIP-based training endpoint could overwrite arbitrary paths on the container filesystem (including Python source files and model files).
- A compromised dependency running at startup could persist itself to the image layers or model volumes.
- Misconfigured model downloads could overwrite `/etc/passwd` or similar via path-traversal — possible because root can write everywhere.
---
## Decision
All containers in this project that have no operational need for elevated privileges **must** apply the following hardening baseline:
### 1. Non-root user
Create a dedicated user with a fixed UID and no login shell:
```dockerfile
RUN useradd --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin --uid 1000 <service>
```
Set `HOME` explicitly to a path owned by this user. Do not rely on `~` expansion for any path resolution in application code.
### 2. Read-only container filesystem
```yaml
read_only: true
```
All paths the application writes to at runtime must be explicitly declared as either a named volume or a `tmpfs` mount. This turns any unexpected write attempt into an immediate, visible `PermissionError` rather than a silent success.
### 3. Per-path write carve-outs
Declare only the paths that are actually written at runtime:
```yaml
volumes:
- <service>_models:/app/models # persistent model storage
- <service>_cache:/app/cache # HuggingFace / ketos download cache
tmpfs:
- /tmp:size=512m # transient scratch space (ZIP extraction etc.)
```
Do not mount the home directory as a volume unless necessary — use `XDG_CACHE_HOME` and `TORCH_HOME` env vars to redirect library cache writes to the declared writable paths instead.
### 4. Dropped capabilities and privilege escalation prevention
```yaml
cap_drop: [ALL]
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
```
A Python/FastAPI service on port 8000+ requires no Linux capabilities. Dropping all and blocking privilege escalation via setuid prevents any capability regain even if a dependency contains a SUID binary.
### 5. Startup root canary
Log a warning during startup if the process is running as root. This catches misconfiguration (e.g., `USER` directive accidentally removed in a future Dockerfile edit) before it becomes a silent vulnerability:
```python
if os.getuid() == 0:
logger.warning("Running as root — CIS Docker §4.1 violation")
```
---
## Consequences
**Positive:**
- Any exploit that achieves code execution inside the container is confined: it cannot write outside the declared volumes, cannot acquire new capabilities, and cannot persist to the image filesystem.
- `PermissionError` on startup is an explicit, diagnosable failure rather than a silent privilege misuse.
- The startup canary catches accidental regressions in the non-root setup.
**Negative / operational cost:**
- Every new feature that writes to a new path (e.g., a new model cache directory, a new scratch path) must add a volume or tmpfs mount. The `read_only: true` flag makes this a hard constraint, not a suggestion.
- Library dependencies that write to `HOME` without respecting `XDG_CACHE_HOME` must be identified and redirected explicitly (see `TORCH_HOME`, `XDG_CACHE_HOME`, `HF_HOME` in `docker-compose.yml`).
- Existing named volumes written by root (pre-baseline) must be dropped and recreated before upgrading. See [DEPLOYMENT.md §8](../DEPLOYMENT.md#8-upgrade-notes).
---
## Applicability
This baseline applies to the OCR service (PR #611). It should be applied to any new container added to the project unless there is a documented, specific operational reason a capability or writable filesystem is required.

View File

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
# ADR-020 — Stateful Authentication via Spring Session JDBC
**Date:** 2026-05-17
**Status:** Accepted
**Issue:** #523
---
## Context
PR #521 (closing #520) introduced `AuthTokenCookieFilter` to unblock a production deploy.
The filter promotes an `auth_token` cookie — which contains the full HTTP Basic credential
(`Basic <base64(email:password)>`) — to an `Authorization` header so browser-direct `/api/*`
calls authenticate correctly behind Caddy.
This model has three concrete problems:
1. **Cookie = credential.** A stolen `auth_token` cookie leaks the user's password in
base64-encoded plaintext. No decode step is needed; the cookie value is directly usable
as a credential forever.
2. **No server-side revocation.** Logout deletes the local cookie but the credential
remains valid until the 24 h `Max-Age` elapses. An attacker who copied the cookie before
logout retains access.
3. **No audit signal.** There is no server-side record of login or logout events. Observability
and compliance tooling cannot reconstruct "who was logged in when".
Additionally, Nora flagged that `url.protocol === 'https:'` in `login/+page.server.ts` is
incorrect behind Caddy: SvelteKit sees `http`, so `Secure=false` was set on the credential
cookie in production, transmitting it in cleartext from Caddy to the browser on any network
path without TLS.
---
## Decision
Replace the `auth_token` / `AuthTokenCookieFilter` model with **Spring Session JDBC**:
- A `POST /api/auth/login` endpoint in a new `auth` package authenticates with `email +
password`, creates a server-side session record in PostgreSQL, and returns the `AppUser`
JSON in the response body.
- The response sets an **opaque** `fa_session` cookie (`HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`,
`Secure` in non-dev profiles, `Max-Age=28800` — 8 h idle timeout) that contains only the
session ID, never a credential.
- A `POST /api/auth/logout` endpoint invalidates the session record immediately. Subsequent
requests carrying the same cookie return 401.
- `AuthTokenCookieFilter` is deleted in the same PR. No transitional coexistence period.
- Cookie name `fa_session` (not the default `SESSION`) minimises framework fingerprinting.
Session storage uses the canonical `spring_session` / `spring_session_attributes` tables,
re-introduced via `V67__recreate_spring_session_tables.sql` (dropped by V2 when the
dependency was previously removed as unused).
**Idle timeout:** 8 h (`MaxInactiveIntervalInSeconds = 28800`). No 24 h absolute cap is
implemented in Phase 1 — the 8 h idle bound contains the risk to one workday. A weekend-long
active session is acceptable given the family-archive threat model. The absolute cap and
additional revocation paths (password-change, admin force-logout) land in Phase 2 (#524).
---
## Alternatives Considered
### Stay on Basic cookie + add a server-side revocation table
Keeps the credential-in-cookie problem. Implementing a revocation table would re-invent
Spring Session badly — we'd write bespoke session storage that already exists and is
well-tested upstream.
### JWT (stateless)
Opaque revocation is simpler than JWT revocation (token introspection or short-lived tokens
+ refresh). The cluster is single-node; session affinity is not a constraint. Stateless tokens
buy complexity without benefit here. JWKS infrastructure and refresh-token rotation are
unnecessary for a family archive with < 50 concurrent users.
### Keep `auth_token` cookie but add `AuthTokenCookieFilter` improvements
The root problem is that the cookie contains the credential. No amount of filter hardening
fixes that. Nora's P1 flag stands until the credential leaves the cookie.
---
## Consequences
- **One breaking deploy.** All existing sessions (the `auth_token` cookies) become inert
on the next request after the deploy. The SvelteKit `handleAuth` hook redirects to
`/login?reason=expired`; a banner renders. Users re-login. No data loss.
- **~2 KB per active session** in PostgreSQL (`spring_session_attributes` stores the
serialised `SecurityContext`). With < 50 family members, this is immaterial.
- **Session cleanup task** runs on the default Spring Session JDBC schedule (every 10 min).
No custom job needed.
- **Caddy / infrastructure unchanged.** `forward-headers-strategy: native` already ensures
`Secure` cookies work correctly behind the reverse proxy.
- **Dev profile:** `application-dev.yaml` sets `secure: false` on the session cookie so
local HTTP dev (port 5173 → 8080) works without TLS.

View File

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
# ADR-021 — Route Surya model-download staging to the persistent cache volume via TMPDIR
**Status:** Accepted
**Date:** 2026-05-18
**Issue:** #614
---
## Context
After the container hardening baseline (ADR-019), the OCR service runs with `read_only: true` and a 512 MB `/tmp` tmpfs. The tmpfs was sized for training-ZIP extraction (typically 2050 images, well under 100 MB).
Surya's `download_directory()` (surya ≥ 0.6, `surya/common/s3.py`) stages every model file through `tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()` before moving it to the final cache location. `TemporaryDirectory()` honours `$TMPDIR` and falls back to `/tmp`. The `text_recognition` model is 1.34 GB; future Surya models will be in the same range. This blows the 512 MB budget at ~510 MB with `OSError: [Errno 28] No space left on device`.
The host has 1.8 TB free on the disk that backs `/app/cache`. The failure is a routing problem, not a capacity problem.
---
## Decision
Set `TMPDIR=/app/cache/.tmp` in the OCR container so all `tempfile` staging goes to the persistent SSD-backed cache volume.
```yaml
# docker-compose.yml / docker-compose.prod.yml — ocr-service.environment
TMPDIR: /app/cache/.tmp
```
```dockerfile
# ocr-service/Dockerfile — default for bare docker-run usage
ENV TMPDIR=/app/cache/.tmp
```
```bash
# ocr-service/entrypoint.sh — idempotent directory bootstrap
mkdir -p "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"
find "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}" -mindepth 1 -mtime +1 -delete 2>/dev/null || true
```
A one-shot `ocr-volume-init` service in both compose files runs before `ocr-service` to `chown -R 1000:1000` the volumes and `mkdir -p /app/cache/.tmp`. This replaces the manual `docker run --rm alpine chown` step performed on 2026-05-18 and makes fresh-volume correctness a permanent infrastructure-as-code guarantee.
The `/tmp` tmpfs remains at 512 MB and continues to serve training-ZIP extraction and transient PDF buffers — its original purpose.
---
## Consequences
**Positive**
- Surya model downloads complete: 1.34 GB fits on the SSD, not in 512 MB of RAM.
- `shutil.move()` from staging → cache becomes a same-filesystem `rename(2)` — atomic and near-free.
- Volume ownership is now automated; no manual `docker run --rm alpine chown` on redeploy.
- `/tmp` retains its small 512 MB DoS cap for attacker-influenceable training endpoints (post-auth only, behind `X-Training-Token`).
- ZIP Slip protection in `_validate_zip_entry()` is unaffected — it uses `os.path.realpath()` anchored to the extraction directory regardless of where that directory lives.
**Negative / Trade-offs**
- If the container is `docker kill`ed mid-download, partial files persist in `/app/cache/.tmp` across container restarts. Mitigated by the `find -mtime +1 -delete` in `entrypoint.sh` — orphans older than one day are removed on startup.
- `TMPDIR` pointing inside a volume mount is non-obvious. Any future move of `/app/cache` to a different storage tier must revisit this setting. This ADR is the load-bearing reference.
---
## Alternatives considered
**Approach B — Enlarge `/tmp` to 4 GB**
One-line change. Discarded because: (1) 4 GB tmpfs counts against the cgroup `mem_limit`; on CX32 hosts with `OCR_MEM_LIMIT=6g` the combined Surya resident set + tmpfs would trigger OOMKill on cold start; (2) staging GB-scale model files through RAM is using the wrong storage tier; (3) any future model larger than 4 GB requires another bump.
**Approach C — Both TMPDIR redirect and enlarged /tmp**
Belt-and-suspenders: Approach A + 1 GB tmpfs. Discarded in favour of the cleaner Approach A. The defence-in-depth benefit does not outweigh the extra compose churn; the 512 MB cap on `/tmp` is intentional.

View File

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
# ADR-022 — EAGER→LAZY Fetch Strategy for Document Collections
**Date:** 2026-05-18
**Status:** Accepted
**Issue:** #467
**PR:** #622
---
## Context
A pre-production query audit of 24 HTTP requests to the document list and detail endpoints
produced **2,733 SQL statements** — primarily N+1 queries caused by `FetchType.EAGER` on
`Document.receivers`, `Document.tags`, `Document.trainingLabels`, and `Document.sender`.
With EAGER fetch, every `Document` loaded by any repository method immediately triggers
additional `SELECT` statements for each associated collection, regardless of whether the
caller needs those associations. For a list of 100 documents, this means up to 400 extra
queries for `receivers` alone.
---
## Decision
Switch all four associations to `FetchType.LAZY` and use a two-tier strategy to load exactly
what each code path needs:
**Tier 1 — Named entity graphs on `Document` + `@EntityGraph` overrides on `DocumentRepository`:**
- `Document.full` — loads `sender`, `receivers`, `tags` — used by `findById` (detail view)
- `Document.list` — loads `sender`, `tags` — used by `findAll(Spec, Pageable)`,
`findAll(Spec)`, and `findAll(Pageable)` (list/search/dashboard paths)
Each repository method that is called from a hot code path has an `@EntityGraph` override
that declares exactly which associations to JOIN-fetch, collapsing N+1 into 12 queries.
**Tier 2 — `@BatchSize(50)` fallback on all four associations:**
For any lazy access path not covered by an entity graph (e.g., a future ad-hoc query or an
in-memory sort that touches `trainingLabels`), Hibernate batches the secondary `SELECT` to
at most one statement per 50 entities instead of one per entity.
**Session lifetime for post-return lazy access:**
`getDocumentById` and `getRecentActivity` return entities to callers that may access lazy
associations after the repository call returns. Both methods are annotated
`@Transactional(readOnly = true)` to keep the Hibernate session open until the service method
returns, making those post-return accesses safe.
This is an intentional exception to the project convention that read methods are not annotated
(see `CLAUDE.md §Services`). The convention remains correct for all other read methods; this
exception applies only to methods that serve lazy-initialized associations to their callers.
---
## Alternatives Considered
### `@BatchSize`-only (no entity graphs)
`@BatchSize(50)` on all associations would eliminate the worst N+1 cases (100 documents → 2
batch queries instead of 100 individual queries) without requiring repository overrides. Simpler
to maintain — no named graph definitions, no per-method overrides.
Rejected because batch loading is best-effort: it depends on what Hibernate happens to find in
the first-level cache and produces a variable number of statements. Entity graphs produce a
deterministic, verifiable statement count that can be asserted in tests. The query-count test
suite (`DocumentRepositoryTest`) validates the exact statement bounds on every CI run.
### Single unified entity graph (`Document.full` everywhere)
Loading `receivers` on every list query is wasteful — the document list view only needs
`sender` and `tags`. `receivers` is a `@ManyToMany` collection that, when JOIN-fetched together
with `tags`, forces Hibernate to split into two queries anyway (to avoid Cartesian product).
Using a single graph on list paths would load data the UI does not display.
Rejected in favour of two graphs with distinct scopes: `Document.list` for list paths
(sender + tags), `Document.full` for detail paths (sender + receivers + tags).
### `@Transactional` on the Spring Data repository methods
Spring Data allows `@Transactional` on repository interfaces directly. This would keep the
session open for all calls to those methods without touching the service layer.
Rejected because the transaction boundary belongs at the service layer — repositories should
not own transaction lifecycle. The service methods are the natural scope for "keep the session
open long enough for the caller to use the result."
---
## Consequences
- **Query count reduced from ~2,733 to ≤10 statements per 24 HTTP requests** — verified by
`DocumentRepositoryTest` query-count assertions and `DocumentLazyLoadingTest` smoke tests.
- **Read methods that return lazily-initialized entities must carry `@Transactional(readOnly = true)`.**
Any future service method that loads a `Document` and returns it to a caller that accesses
lazy associations must follow this pattern. Removing the annotation causes
`LazyInitializationException` in production.
- **New lazy code paths need an entity graph or `@BatchSize` review.** Any new
`DocumentRepository` method added to a hot code path should be assessed for N+1 risk and
given an `@EntityGraph` override if warranted.
- **`@JsonIgnoreProperties({"hibernateLazyInitializer", "handler"})` required on serialized lazy-proxy entities.**
`Person` and `Tag` carry this annotation to prevent Jackson from attempting to serialize
Hibernate proxy internals when the association is not initialized. Any new entity that is
used as a lazy association and serialized directly (without a DTO) needs the same annotation.

View File

@@ -8,11 +8,9 @@ Person(member, "Family Member", "Access by administrator invite. Searches, brows
System(familienarchiv, "Familienarchiv", "Web application for digitising, organising, and searching family documents")
System_Ext(mail, "Email Service", "SMTP server. Delivers notification emails (mentions, replies) and password-reset links.")
System_Ext(glitchtip, "GlitchTip", "Self-hosted error tracking (Sentry-compatible). Receives frontend and backend error events with stack traces.")
Rel(admin, familienarchiv, "Manages via browser", "HTTPS")
Rel(member, familienarchiv, "Searches, reads, and transcribes via browser", "HTTPS")
Rel(familienarchiv, mail, "Sends notification and password-reset emails (optional)", "SMTP")
Rel(familienarchiv, glitchtip, "Sends error events with errorId and stack trace", "HTTPS")
@enduml

View File

@@ -6,47 +6,23 @@ title Container Diagram: Familienarchiv
Person(user, "User", "Admin or family member")
System_Ext(mail, "Email Service", "SMTP server. Delivers notification and password-reset emails.")
Container(caddy, "Reverse Proxy", "Caddy 2 (host-installed)", "TLS termination (auto Let's Encrypt). Routes /api/* to backend:8080, everything else to frontend:3000. Responds 404 on /actuator/* and adds HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy headers.")
System_Boundary(archiv, "Familienarchiv (Docker Compose)") {
Container(frontend, "Web Frontend", "SvelteKit / Node adapter / port 3000", "Server-side rendered UI. Handles auth session cookies, document search and viewer, transcription editor, annotation layer, family tree (Stammbaum), stories (Geschichten), activity feed (Chronik), enrichment workflow, and admin panel.")
Container(backend, "API Backend", "Spring Boot 4 / Java 21 / Jetty / port 8080", "REST API. Implements document management, search, user auth, file upload/download, transcription, OCR orchestration, and SSE notifications. Trusts X-Forwarded-* headers from Caddy.")
Container(frontend, "Web Frontend", "SvelteKit / Node.js", "Server-side rendered UI. Handles auth session cookies, document search and viewer, transcription editor, annotation layer, family tree (Stammbaum), stories (Geschichten), activity feed (Chronik), enrichment workflow, and admin panel.")
Container(backend, "API Backend", "Spring Boot 4 / Java 21 / Jetty", "REST API. Implements document management, search, user auth, file upload/download, transcription, OCR orchestration, and SSE notifications.")
Container(ocr, "OCR Service", "Python FastAPI / port 8000", "Handwritten text recognition (HTR) and OCR microservice. Single-node by design — see ADR-001. Reachable only on the internal Docker network; no external port exposed.")
ContainerDb(db, "Relational Database", "PostgreSQL 16", "Stores document metadata, persons, users, permission groups, tags, transcription blocks, audit log, and Spring Session data.")
ContainerDb(storage, "Object Storage", "MinIO (S3-compatible)", "Stores the actual document files (PDFs, scans). Backend uses a bucket-scoped service account (archiv-app), not MinIO root.")
Container(mc, "Bucket / Service-Account Init", "MinIO Client (mc)", "One-shot container on startup. Idempotent: creates the archive bucket, the archiv-app service account, and attaches the readwrite policy.")
ContainerDb(storage, "Object Storage", "MinIO (S3-compatible)", "Stores the actual document files (PDFs, scans). Objects keyed as documents/{UUID}_{filename}.")
Container(mc, "Bucket Init Helper", "MinIO Client (mc)", "One-shot container on startup. Creates the archive bucket with private access policy.")
}
System_Boundary(observability, "Observability Stack (/opt/familienarchiv/docker-compose.observability.yml)") {
Container(prometheus, "Prometheus", "prom/prometheus:v3.4.0", "Scrapes metrics from backend management port 8081 (/actuator/prometheus), node-exporter, and cAdvisor. Retention: 30 days.")
Container(node_exporter, "Node Exporter", "prom/node-exporter:v1.9.0", "Host-level CPU, memory, disk, and network metrics.")
Container(cadvisor, "cAdvisor", "gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.52.1", "Per-container resource metrics.")
Container(loki, "Loki", "grafana/loki:3.4.2", "Stores log streams from all containers.")
Container(promtail, "Promtail", "grafana/promtail:3.4.2", "Ships Docker container logs to Loki via Docker SD.")
Container(tempo, "Tempo", "grafana/tempo:2.7.2", "Distributed trace storage. OTLP HTTP receiver on port 4318 (archiv-net). Grafana queries traces on port 3200 (obs-net). All ports internal only.")
Container(grafana, "Grafana", "grafana/grafana-oss:11.6.1", "Unified observability UI — dashboards, logs, traces. Datasources (Prometheus, Loki, Tempo) and three dashboards are auto-provisioned.")
Container(glitchtip, "GlitchTip", "glitchtip/glitchtip:6.1.6", "Sentry-compatible error tracker — web process. Receives frontend + backend error events, groups by fingerprint, provides issue UI with stack traces.")
Container(obs_glitchtip_worker, "GlitchTip Worker", "glitchtip/glitchtip:6.1.6", "Celery + beat worker — async event ingestion, notifications, cleanup.")
Container(obs_redis, "Redis", "redis:7-alpine", "Celery task queue for GlitchTip async workers.")
}
Rel(user, caddy, "HTTPS", "TLS 1.2/1.3")
Rel(caddy, frontend, "Reverse proxies non-/api requests", "HTTP / loopback:3000")
Rel(caddy, backend, "Reverse proxies /api/*", "HTTP / loopback:8080")
Rel(user, frontend, "Uses", "HTTPS / Browser")
Rel(frontend, backend, "API requests with Basic Auth token", "HTTP / REST / JSON")
Rel(backend, user, "SSE notifications (server-sent events)", "HTTP / SSE — fronted by Caddy")
Rel(backend, user, "SSE notifications (server-sent events)", "HTTP / SSE — direct backend-to-browser")
Rel(backend, db, "Reads and writes metadata and sessions", "JDBC / SQL")
Rel(backend, storage, "Uploads and streams document files using archiv-app service account", "HTTP / S3 API (AWS SDK v2)")
Rel(backend, storage, "Uploads and streams document files", "HTTP / S3 API (AWS SDK v2)")
Rel(backend, ocr, "OCR job requests with presigned MinIO URL", "HTTP / REST / JSON")
Rel(backend, mail, "Sends notification and password-reset emails (optional)", "SMTP")
Rel(ocr, storage, "Fetches PDF via presigned URL", "HTTP / S3 presigned")
Rel(mc, storage, "Bootstraps bucket + service account on startup", "MinIO Client CLI")
Rel(promtail, loki, "Pushes log streams", "HTTP/Loki push API")
Rel(backend, tempo, "Sends distributed traces via OTLP", "HTTP / OTLP / port 4318 (archiv-net)")
Rel(grafana, prometheus, "Queries metrics", "HTTP 9090")
Rel(grafana, loki, "Queries logs", "HTTP 3100")
Rel(grafana, tempo, "Queries traces", "HTTP 3200")
Rel(glitchtip, db, "Stores error events in glitchtip DB", "PostgreSQL / archiv-net")
Rel(obs_glitchtip_worker, obs_redis, "Processes Celery tasks", "Redis / obs-net")
Rel(mc, storage, "Creates bucket on startup", "MinIO Client CLI")
@enduml

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