c160ab3223
The Gitea issue body is the single source of truth for a spec; the only per-feature artifact in git is the RTM row (REQ-ID -> issue # -> test). Drops per-feature spec.md/tasks.md/checklist files from the workflow (the _example stays as a template/reference). Updates the guide, ADR-041, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, templates, the RTM (adds an Issue column), the implement/review-pr skills, and replaces the file-spec CI jobs with an rtm-check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2.9 KiB
Threat Model —
Feature spec: Gitea issue # Date: Author:
Data Flow Diagram (text)
Actors
- <e.g. Anonymous visitor, Authenticated reader, Authenticated transcriber, Admin, OCR sidecar>
Trust boundaries
- TB-1: Browser ⇄ Caddy (public internet ⇄ DMZ)
- TB-2: Caddy ⇄ Backend (
:8080) (DMZ ⇄ app) - TB-3: Backend ⇄ PostgreSQL / MinIO / sidecars (app ⇄ data plane)
Data flows (source → [boundary] → sink : data)
- F-1: Browser → [TB-1,TB-2] → Backend :
- F-2: Backend → [TB-3] → MinIO :
- <…>
STRIDE
| Threat Category | Asset / Flow | Threat Description | Mitigation | Likelihood × Impact | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | <e.g. unauthenticated caller forges a request> | <session auth + @RequirePermission> | Low × High | <Open/Mitigated/Accepted> | |
| Tampering | <e.g. mass-assignment of createdBy> | <server-set audit fields, no body binding> | Med × High | ||
| Repudiation | <e.g. no record of who changed what> | <NOT NULL createdBy/updatedBy audit trail> | Low × Med | ||
| Information disclosure | <e.g. entity leaks email/hash; raw 500 leaks Hibernate internals> | <view not entity; DomainException.conflict> | Med × High | ||
| Denial of service | <e.g. oversized upload / unbounded list> | <size limit, batch cap, pagination> | Med × Med | ||
| Elevation of privilege | <e.g. reader reaches a write endpoint / IDOR> | <least-privilege Permission, ownership check> | Low × High |
ASTRIDE (only if the feature invokes an AI agent / tool — OCR, NLP, LLM)
| Threat | Asset / Flow | Threat Description | Mitigation | Likelihood × Impact | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prompt Injection | <treat model output as untrusted; no auto-exec> | ||||
| Context Poisoning | <retrieved/shared context> | <scope/provenance of context; validation> | |||
| Unsafe Tool Invocation | <allow-list tools; human-in-loop on mutations> | ||||
| Reasoning Subversion | <crafted input flips a classification/decision> | <confidence threshold; deterministic guardrail> |
Residual Risk
<Threats marked Accepted, who accepted them, and why the residual risk is tolerable.>