fix(auth): sequential rate-limit check with ipEmail token refund on IP failure

Addresses Felix (blocker 1): the old implementation consumed from both buckets
before checking either result, silently eroding the per-email quota when only the
per-IP limit was blocking. The fix checks ipEmail first, then IP; on IP failure it
refunds the ipEmail token so legitimate users behind a shared IP are not penalised.

Also adds two new test cases:
- different_email_from_same_ip_not_blocked_by_sibling_email_exhaustion (Sara)
- ip_exhaustion_does_not_consume_ipEmail_tokens_for_blocked_attempts (red → green)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Marcel
2026-05-18 13:29:36 +02:00
parent d7eca25eb7
commit c32607e133
2 changed files with 55 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -36,10 +36,18 @@ public class LoginRateLimiter {
.build(key -> newBucket(maxPerIp, windowMinutes));
}
// NOTE: This cache is node-local (in-memory). In a multi-replica deployment,
// effective limits would be multiplied by replica count.
// For the current single-VPS setup this is the correct, simplest implementation.
public void checkAndConsume(String ip, String email) {
boolean ipEmailOk = byIpEmail.get(ip + ":" + email).tryConsume(1);
boolean ipOk = byIp.get(ip).tryConsume(1);
if (!ipEmailOk || !ipOk) {
if (!byIpEmail.get(ip + ":" + email).tryConsume(1)) {
throw DomainException.tooManyRequests(ErrorCode.TOO_MANY_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS,
"Too many login attempts from " + ip);
}
if (!byIp.get(ip).tryConsume(1)) {
// Refund the ipEmail token so IP-level blocking does not erode the per-email quota.
byIpEmail.get(ip + ":" + email).addTokens(1);
throw DomainException.tooManyRequests(ErrorCode.TOO_MANY_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS,
"Too many login attempts from " + ip);
}

View File

@@ -64,4 +64,48 @@ class LoginRateLimiterTest {
.satisfies(ex -> org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat(((DomainException) ex).getCode())
.isEqualTo(ErrorCode.TOO_MANY_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS));
}
@Test
void different_email_from_same_ip_not_blocked_by_sibling_email_exhaustion() {
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
rateLimiter.checkAndConsume("1.2.3.4", "user@example.com");
}
assertThatThrownBy(() -> rateLimiter.checkAndConsume("1.2.3.4", "user@example.com"))
.isInstanceOf(DomainException.class);
assertThatNoException().isThrownBy(
() -> rateLimiter.checkAndConsume("1.2.3.4", "other@example.com"));
}
@Test
void ip_exhaustion_does_not_consume_ipEmail_tokens_for_blocked_attempts() {
// Use a tighter limiter so the phantom-consumption effect is observable.
// ipEmail=3, IP=3: exhausting IP via one email burns the other email's quota with the old code.
RateLimitProperties props = new RateLimitProperties();
props.setMaxAttemptsPerIpEmail(3);
props.setMaxAttemptsPerIp(3);
props.setWindowMinutes(15);
LoginRateLimiter tightLimiter = new LoginRateLimiter(props);
// Exhaust the per-IP bucket using "user@"
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
tightLimiter.checkAndConsume("1.2.3.4", "user@example.com");
}
// Three blocked attempts for "target@" while IP is exhausted
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
assertThatThrownBy(() -> tightLimiter.checkAndConsume("1.2.3.4", "target@example.com"))
.isInstanceOf(DomainException.class);
}
// A successful login for "user@" resets the IP bucket but NOT target@'s ipEmail bucket
tightLimiter.invalidateOnSuccess("1.2.3.4", "user@example.com");
// After IP reset: "target@" must NOT be blocked by an exhausted ipEmail bucket.
// With the old code, 3 blocked attempts burned all 3 ipEmail tokens → blocked here.
// With the fix, tokens are refunded on each blocked attempt → still has capacity.
assertThatNoException().isThrownBy(
() -> tightLimiter.checkAndConsume("1.2.3.4", "target@example.com"));
}
}