Addresses Sara's review request on #515.
Without this gate, a future regression that turns prerender.crawl
back on (or adds a new prerender entry whose nav links into
protected routes) would silently bake /, /documents, /persons etc.
to "redirect-to-login" HTML and re-introduce #514.
Verified the script catches the current broken build state:
$ find build/prerendered ... -not -path 'hilfe/*' ...
build/prerendered/{index,documents,persons,geschichten,stammbaum}.html
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#514.
The build was prerendering protected routes via crawl from
/hilfe/transkription. Their load functions throw redirect('/login')
during the build (no auth cookie), so SvelteKit captured the redirect
as static HTML and shipped /app/build/prerendered/{index,documents,
persons,geschichten,stammbaum}.html with a `location.href=/login`
script. In production these files are served BEFORE hooks.server.ts
runs, so an authenticated user with a valid cookie is still served
the baked bounce-back page.
Setting `crawl: false` keeps the explicit /hilfe/transkription entry
prerendered (needed for the public help page) without dragging the
nav targets along with it.
Verified locally: build now emits only `hilfe/transkription.html`
under build/prerendered/, no index.html or documents.html etc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#510.
`docker compose up -d --wait` exits 1 even when every service is
healthy because the one-shot `create-buckets` exits 0 and --wait
expects "running". The whole stack came up fine on staging, but the
workflow gate failed before the smoke step could run.
Two changes:
1. create-buckets: `restart: "no"` declares one-shot intent.
2. backend.depends_on: add `create-buckets: service_completed_successfully`.
With both, compose v2.20+ understands create-buckets is a one-shot
that must complete successfully, and --wait treats exited(0) as the
target state. Backend startup now also correctly gates on bucket
bootstrap (closes a latent race where backend could start before
the archiv-app policy was bound).
Verified `docker compose config --quiet` parses and the resolved
config shows the right dependency graph.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#508.
Our gitea-runner advertises labels ubuntu-latest / ubuntu-24.04 /
ubuntu-22.04. `runs-on: self-hosted` never matches → dispatched
deploy jobs sit in the queue forever. The runner is still
genuinely self-hosted (DooD socket, joined to gitea_gitea net,
single-tenant per ADR-011) — the `self-hosted` token was just an
unconfirmed assumption about the label name.
Unblocks #497 / #499 first deploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#506.
Under Docker-out-of-Docker (the production Gitea Actions runner), the
host daemon resolves the relative bind-mount path against the host
filesystem — not the runner container's /workspace. The script is not
there, so Docker creates an empty directory at /bootstrap.sh and the
entrypoint fails with `/bootstrap.sh: Is a directory`.
Bake the script into a tiny derived image (infra/minio/Dockerfile) so
there is no runtime path resolution. Works in DooD, regular Docker,
and CI.
Unblocks the staging / production deploy pipelines from #497 / #499
and turns the Compose Bucket Idempotency CI job green.
Verified locally:
- `docker compose ... config --quiet` parses
- `docker compose ... build create-buckets` builds the image
- bootstrap.sh exists as a +x file at /bootstrap.sh inside the image
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#503.
Debian's fail2ban package ships defaults-debian.conf with
`[DEFAULT] backend = systemd`. Without an explicit override, our
familienarchiv-auth jail inherits the systemd backend at runtime,
reads from journald, and never inspects /var/log/caddy/access.log.
A live login brute-force would not be banned.
Add `backend = polling` to the jail and a CI step that links the jail
into /etc/fail2ban/ and asserts `fail2ban-client -d` resolves it to
the polling backend, not the inherited systemd backend.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`archiv-app` is the bucket-scoped MinIO service account introduced
in PR #499 alongside the production deploy pipeline. Until now the
term only appeared in `infra/minio/bootstrap.sh` and the prod compose
file; a reader encountering `S3_ACCESS_KEY: archiv-app` had no
single-page reference distinguishing it from the MinIO root account.
Adds a new "Infrastructure Terms" section to docs/GLOSSARY.md so the
distinction (root account vs. application service account) and the
attached `archiv-app-policy` scope live in the canonical glossary
location. Cross-links to ADR-010 for the MinIO-stays-self-hosted
rationale. Addresses @elicit's round-2 recommendation on PR #499.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The docker network was the only `archive-*` identifier in either
compose file; everything else (user, db, bucket, service account,
project name) uses the `archiv-*` spelling. Reviewers' eyes stuttered
on it on the prod compose review (round 2 of PR #499 — Markus and
Tobi). Renamed in both prod and dev compose for consistency and
updated the single doc reference to the dev-project-prefixed
network name.
Operational note: applying this change to a running stack will
recreate the network on the next `docker compose up`; containers
restart, named volumes are unaffected.
`docker compose config --quiet` passes for both compose files and
for the staging profile. Sweep confirms zero `archive-net`
references remain in the tree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The `if: always()` conditional on the env-file cleanup step in both
deploy workflows is what makes the ADR-011 single-tenant runner trust
model safe: secrets land on disk before each deploy and are wiped
unconditionally afterwards. A future workflow refactor that drops
`if: always()` would silently leave plaintext secrets on the runner
on any failed deploy.
The ADR documents this; the workflow file did not. Adds a prominent
inline comment so the next reader of the YAML sees the constraint
without having to cross-reference ADR-011. No behaviour change — both
workflows still parse. Addresses @nora's round-2 suggestion on PR
#499 — "linchpin of the ADR-011 trust model".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mailpit service healthcheck previously assumed `wget` ships in
the axllent/mailpit image. That's true for v1.29.7 but is not part
of the image's contract — a future Alpine slim-down could drop wget
and silently disable the healthcheck. Switched to BusyBox `nc -z
localhost 8025`, which is a TCP-port open check with no dependency
beyond BusyBox itself.
Verified inside axllent/mailpit:v1.29.7 that `nc` is present
(/usr/bin/nc, BusyBox v1.37.0) and that the proposed command
returns 0 against an open port and non-zero against a closed one.
Compose still parses with `--profile staging`. Addresses @tobi's
round-2 suggestion on PR #499.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Production never sources PDFs from localhost or 127.0.0.1 — the OCR
service only reads from MinIO over the internal docker network. The
Python default (`minio,localhost,127.0.0.1`) was permissive on
purpose for local dev, but in production a future change to that
default — or a host-env override — would silently broaden the SSRF
surface. Pinning the env var explicitly here freezes the allowlist
to the one hostname production actually needs.
`docker compose config --quiet` and `--profile staging config
--quiet` both still pass. Verified the resolved config emits
`ALLOWED_PDF_HOSTS: minio`. Addresses @nora's round-2 suggestion on
PR #499 — "five characters of YAML, lifetime guarantee".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()` to
the shared (security_headers) snippet, so both archiv vhosts and the
git vhost deny browser APIs the app does not use. Reduces blast radius
of an XSS landing in a privileged origin.
The deploy smoke steps in nightly.yml and release.yml gain a matching
assertion against the canonical header value, so a future Caddyfile
edit that drops or loosens the header (e.g. `camera=(self)`) fails the
deploy instead of regressing silently.
`caddy validate` against caddy:2 passes; both workflow YAMLs parse.
Addresses @nora's round-2 suggestion on PR #499 — "lower-impact than
CSP but nearly free".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the presence-only `grep -qi strict-transport-security` smoke
assertion in both nightly.yml and release.yml with a value-pinning
regex that requires `max-age=31536000`, `includeSubDomains`, and
`preload`. A future Caddyfile edit that drops any of those three
parts now fails the deploy smoke step instead of passing silently.
Verified locally that the new pattern matches the preload-eligible
value and rejects three degraded forms (short max-age, missing
includeSubDomains, missing preload). Addresses @sara's round-2 note
on PR #499 — "presence check, not value check".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The top-level deployment diagram lagged the C4 L2 diagram, which
correctly notes that SSE notifications are fronted by Caddy. The
mermaid showed Browser → Backend direct, which would only be true
if the backend port were exposed publicly (it is not — all docker
ports bind to 127.0.0.1).
Fixes the inconsistency Markus flagged on PR #499: the public
surface is Caddy and Caddy only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the Caddy hop to seq-auth-flow.puml and surfaces the two
production-relevant header behaviours:
- Caddy terminates TLS and forwards X-Forwarded-Proto: https
- Spring Boot trusts this header (server.forward-headers-strategy:
native, ForwardedRequestCustomizer at the Jetty layer), so
request.getScheme() returns "https"
- The Set-Cookie response carries the Secure flag because the
observed scheme is https — without forward-headers-strategy this
would silently drop to plain http and the cookie would lose Secure
Closes the doc-currency gap flagged in the Markus review on PR #499:
"Auth flow change → docs/architecture/c4/seq-auth-flow.puml".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records the operational assumption that nightly.yml and release.yml
bake in: the self-hosted runner is single-tenant, so writing secrets
to .env.staging / .env.production on disk and removing them via an
`if: always()` cleanup step is acceptable for v1.
Documents the three migration triggers (second repo on the runner,
untrusted PR execution, move to shared infrastructure) and the
one-step migration path (--env-file <(printf '%s' "$SECRET_BLOB"))
so the next operator does not silently break the trust assumption.
The in-comment notes at the top of both workflow files already point
at this ADR's content; this commit records the decision in the durable
location the doc-currency table demands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records the reversal of the earlier "migrate to Hetzner Object Storage"
direction in docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md. Documents the
cost/benefit (current 13 GB fits trivially on the VPS; OBS billing is
dominated by base fee at this size; migration is a three-env-var swap
plus `mc mirror`, no application rewrite cost).
Captures the four triggers that should re-open the decision (50 GB
threshold, healthcheck latency, VPS upgrade cost, backup runtime) so
the deferral does not become an indefinite punt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records the decision to make docker-compose.prod.yml a fully self-contained
file rather than an overlay over docker-compose.yml. Captures the cost
(env-var duplication across dev and prod files) and the benefit (single
file the reviewer can hold in their head, no Compose merge-rule
surprises, automatic project-name namespacing for cohabiting staging +
production on one host).
Surfaces the retirement of the earlier overlay narrative in
docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md so a future maintainer does
not reverse the choice out of ignorance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The repo's renovate.json only configures TipTap grouping; Renovate is
not currently active against MinIO / mc / mailpit / Postgres / Node /
Caddy. The "Renovate keeps it current" comments were aspirational —
those tags will rot until Renovate is bootstrapped (tracked in a
follow-up issue).
The "Pinned mc release; Renovate keeps it current" comment is gone
already since the create-buckets entrypoint was extracted to a script
in the preceding MinIO-policy commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The smoke step previously curled the public hostname unconditionally,
which routes the runner's request via DNS → router → back into the same
host. Many SOHO routers do not implement hairpin NAT (or do so only after
a firmware update), so the deploy may pass on day one and silently fail
on day 90.
--resolve "<host>:443:127.0.0.1" pins the hostname to the runner's
loopback while keeping SNI on the public name (so the cert validates
correctly and the Caddy vhost block matches). The smoke test now
verifies that the Caddy-on-the-same-host is serving the right
hostname end-to-end, with no router dependency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without --pull, the host's Docker layer cache wins: if a CVE drops in
node:20.19.0-alpine3.21 / postgres:16-alpine and the vendor re-publishes
the same tag, the runner keeps serving the cached layer until the cache
is manually cleared — a silent supply-chain blind spot.
Adding --pull to both `compose build` invocations costs a single
re-pull per run and lifts the base-image patch lag from "next host
prune" to "next nightly".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The filter only watched /api/auth/login 401 — leaving the forgot-password
endpoint open to:
- email enumeration (slow brute-force probing which addresses exist)
- password-reset brute-force against accounts whose addresses leak
Widens the failregex to /api/auth/(login|forgot-password) and adds 429 to
the status alternation so a future in-app rate-limiter response is also
caught by the jail (defense in depth).
CI assertions extended to cover both new dimensions plus a negative case
on an unrelated 401 endpoint (/api/documents) — pins that the widening
did not over-match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The create-buckets service in docker-compose.prod.yml runs on every
`docker compose up` (one-shot, restart=no). A re-deploy that fails
because the user/bucket/policy already exists would block the whole
nightly/release pipeline — and the only way to find out today is to
run a second deploy.
This job runs the bootstrap twice against a throwaway minio stack and
asserts both invocations exit 0. Caught at PR time, not at the third
nightly deploy at 02:00.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces MinIO's built-in `readwrite` policy (which grants s3:* on
arn:aws:s3:::* — every bucket present and future) with a bucket-scoped
custom policy `archiv-app-policy`:
- s3:GetObject / s3:PutObject / s3:DeleteObject on familienarchiv/*
- s3:ListBucket / s3:GetBucketLocation on familienarchiv
The previous configuration silently regressed the least-privilege guarantee
that the service-account separation was supposed to provide: a future
second bucket (logs, backups, mc-mirror staging) would have been
read/write/delete-accessible to a compromised backend.
While at it, two follow-on fixes:
1. Extract the entrypoint to infra/minio/bootstrap.sh. The previous
inline `/bin/sh -c "..."` was already at the YAML-escaping ceiling;
adding the policy-JSON heredoc would have made it unreadable.
2. Replace the `| grep -q readwrite || exit 1` fatal-check with a
POSIX `case` substring match. The minio/mc image ships coreutils +
bash but NOT grep/awk/sed — the original check was a no-op that
ALWAYS exited 1 (verified locally). The new check passes on the
first invocation and on every subsequent re-deploy.
Idempotency verified locally: two consecutive `docker compose run --rm
create-buckets` invocations both exit 0 with the user bound to the
new policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Caddy 2.x emits JSON access logs; the failregex in
infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf depends on the
"remote_ip" → "uri" → "status" key order being stable. A future Caddy
upgrade that reorders fields would break the jail silently (regex no
longer matches → fail2ban returns 0 hits → host stops banning
brute-force, discovered only at the next incident).
This job pins the contract: a sample /api/auth/login 401 line must
match (1 hit) and a /api/auth/login 200 line must not (0 hits).
Catches a regression at PR time instead of in production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Drops @SpringBootTest + PostgresContainerConfig + @MockitoBean S3Client in
favour of Spring's Binder API against application.yaml. The new test binds
the property into the typed ServerProperties.ForwardHeadersStrategy enum,
so typos (`nativ`, `Native`, `framework `) and future enum renames fail
the build with BindException — addresses the silent-coercion concern that
the YAML-string assertion missed.
Verified the test goes red on a typo (BindException: Failed to convert
"nativ" → ForwardHeadersStrategy) and green on `native`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Updates DEPLOYMENT.md to match the infra changes in this PR:
§1 OCR memory — point operators at the new OCR_MEM_LIMIT env var instead
of telling them to edit "the prod overlay".
§2 OCR env vars — add OCR_MEM_LIMIT to the table.
§3.1 server setup — replace fail2ban prose with concrete `ln -sf`
commands referencing the committed jail/filter.
Document the single-tenant runner assumption near
the runner-registration step.
§3.4 first deploy — describe the new automated smoke test step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two deploy workflows make two non-obvious assumptions that future
maintainers should not have to rediscover by reading the diff:
1. Single-tenant self-hosted runner — the .env.* file lands on disk
during the deploy and is cleaned up unconditionally. Multi-tenant
usage would require switching to stdin-piped env input.
2. Host docker layer cache is authoritative — there is no
actions/cache directive; a host-level `docker system prune` will
cold-start the next build.
Both notes added as block comments at the top of each workflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirrors the nightly.yml smoke step against archiv.raddatz.cloud. Catches
the same three failure modes (Caddy not reloaded, DNS missing, HSTS
dropped, /actuator block bypassed) on the prod path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Healthchecks prove containers are healthy on the docker network; they
do not prove the public URL is reachable, HSTS still fires, or
/actuator is still blocked at the edge. Add a post-deploy smoke step
to nightly.yml that:
1. GETs https://staging.raddatz.cloud/login (frontend reachable)
2. asserts the response includes the Strict-Transport-Security header
3. asserts /actuator/health returns 404 (defense-in-depth verified)
Failure aborts the workflow before the env-file cleanup step. The
cleanup step still runs because it is `if: always()`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds two files mirroring the on-host install layout:
infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf
infra/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf
Filter parses the JSON access log emitted by Caddy (previous commit) and
matches 401 responses on /api/auth/login. Jail bans the offending IP for
30 min after 10 attempts in a 10-minute window.
Verified the failregex against four sample log lines via fail2ban-regex
in an alpine container:
- 2 brute-force 401 attempts → matched (ban)
- 1 successful login (POST /api/auth/login 200) → not matched
- 1 unrelated GET /login 200 → not matched
Date template "ts":{EPOCH} parses Caddy's Unix-epoch ts field.
The previous review iteration described this jail in DEPLOYMENT.md prose
only; committing it makes the security posture reproducible from a
fresh server build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an (access_log) snippet writing JSON-formatted access logs to
/var/log/caddy/access.log with 10mb rolling and 14-file retention. Both
archive vhosts (archiv.raddatz.cloud and staging.raddatz.cloud) import
it; the git vhost is intentionally excluded.
This is the prerequisite for the fail2ban jail committed in the next
commit — fail2ban tails this file looking for 401 responses on
/api/auth/login to defend against credential stuffing.
Validated with `caddy validate` against caddy:2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hardcoded `mem_limit: 12g` only works on CX42+ (16 GB) hosts; a CX32 (8
GB) cannot honour it. Make both mem_limit and memswap_limit driven by
the OCR_MEM_LIMIT env var, defaulting to 12g so prod deploys on a CX42
keep current behaviour. Operators on smaller hosts override to 6g.
Verified compose interpolation produces 12 GiB by default and 6 GiB when
OCR_MEM_LIMIT=6g.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous `mc admin policy attach … || true` swallowed every failure
mode: a renamed policy, an mc CLI signature change, or a transient MinIO
error would leave the bootstrap container exiting zero with the service
account possessing no permissions, and the backend would then fail every
S3 call after a "successful" deploy.
Replace the silent fallback with verify-after: keep the attach (idempotent
in current mc, redundant in older versions), then assert via `mc admin
user info` that `readwrite` ends up on archiv-app. A genuine attach
failure now exits 1 and blocks the stack from starting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Removes the implicit `:latest` from the create-buckets bootstrap
container. Pins to RELEASE.2025-08-13T08-35-41Z so a breaking change in
mc CLI syntax cannot silently brick deploys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Removes `:latest` from the mailpit service; pins to v1.29.7 so staging
deploys are reproducible. Renovate keeps the tag current.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md: trimmed to VPS sizing,
cost breakdown, and Hetzner ecosystem rationale. The inline
compose spec (overlay + Hetzner OBS in prod) is retired; the
live file is now docker-compose.prod.yml at the repo root and
the Caddyfile lives at infra/caddy/Caddyfile. Observability
stack is called out as a not-yet-deployed gap (issue #498).
- docs/architecture/c4/l2-containers.puml: adds Caddy as a named
reverse-proxy container with the two port paths and notes the
archiv-app service-account split on MinIO access.
Refs #497.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings DEPLOYMENT.md in line with the production deployment landed
in #497:
- Topology diagram: frontend port 3000 (Node adapter), 127.0.0.1
binding, project-name isolation between prod and staging
- Caddyfile now lives in-tree at infra/caddy/Caddyfile (symlinked
onto the server)
- Dev vs prod table: documents the new deploy method (workflows +
--wait) and the prod-compose specific differences
- Env vars: adds MINIO_APP_PASSWORD; notes that prod compose
hardcodes the MinIO root user and the bucket name
- Bootstrap section: server hardening, fail2ban, Tailscale, the 16
Gitea secrets, and the workflow_dispatch first-deploy step
- Admin password warning: first deploy locks the password, secret
rotation after that point has no effect
- Rollback: TAG= override + docker compose up -d --wait
Refs #497.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fires on `v*` tag push. Tags the built images with the git tag so
rollbacks are a one-liner (TAG=<previous> docker compose ... up -d).
`up -d --wait` blocks until every service healthcheck reports
healthy; a bad release fails the workflow rather than crash-looping
silently. The .env.production file containing all Gitea secrets is
removed in `if: always()` after the deploy step.
Refs #497.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Runs daily at 02:00 (and on workflow_dispatch). Builds the prod
compose stack with BuildKit, writes a transient .env.staging from
Gitea secrets, then `docker compose up -d --wait` so the job fails
loudly if any service's healthcheck never reports healthy.
The --profile staging flag starts the mailpit catcher in place of
a real SMTP relay; no production SMTP credentials touch the staging
environment.
The .env.staging file is cleaned up in `if: always()` to avoid
leaving secrets in the runner workspace between runs.
Refs #497.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reverse proxy for the Familienarchiv host, validated against Caddy 2.
Includes both vhosts (production and staging), the Gitea vhost, and:
- HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy headers on every site
- "-Server" header strip to hide the Caddy version
- /actuator/* responds 404 on both archive vhosts (defense in depth
for Spring Boot's management endpoints)
X-Frame-Options is intentionally not set in Caddy: Spring Security
configures frame-options SAMEORIGIN for the in-app PDF preview
iframe; a DENY header here would conflict.
Refs #497.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Standalone production compose file (not an overlay) that runs the
full stack on a single host. Environment isolation is achieved via
the docker compose project name (-p archiv-production / -p
archiv-staging) so the two environments cohabit cleanly.
Key choices, resolved in #497 review:
- Named volumes for persistent data (no host bind mounts)
- MinIO pinned to a specific RELEASE tag (no :latest)
- Backend uses MinIO service account (S3_ACCESS_KEY=archiv-app),
not root credentials; create-buckets bootstraps the account
- Mailpit lives under profiles: [staging] so no real SMTP secret
is ever wired into the staging deploy
- OCR mem_limit 12g + healthcheck (start_period 120s) copied from
the dev compose so docker compose up -d --wait works in CI
- Backend admin credentials wired through APP_ADMIN_USERNAME /
APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD; first deploy locks the password in
permanently because UserDataInitializer is idempotent on email
- All host ports bound to 127.0.0.1; Caddy fronts external traffic
Refs #497.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Multi-stage Dockerfile with three targets:
- development (dev server on :5173, used by docker-compose.yml)
- build (runs npm run build, produces SvelteKit Node-adapter output)
- production (self-contained node build server on :3000)
Node base pinned to node:20.19.0-alpine3.21 for reproducible CI
builds (Renovate will keep it current).
docker-compose.yml now specifies target: development for the
frontend so dev continues to use the dev-server stage. Without
this, Docker would default to the last stage (production).
Refs #497.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The route exports prerender = true and is listed in
svelte.config.js's prerender.entries. Until now the auth hook
redirected unauthenticated requests to /login, so the prerender
crawler hit a 302 and the build failed with "marked as prerenderable,
but were not prerendered".
Adding the path to PUBLIC_PATHS lets the crawler render the static
HTML; consistent with the route's intent as a public help page.
Surfaced by #497 (the production Docker build is the first place
npm run build runs in CI).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds server.forward-headers-strategy: native so that Jetty honours
X-Forwarded-{Proto,For,Host} from Caddy. Without this, getScheme(),
redirect URLs, and Spring Session "Secure" cookies reflect the
internal http hop instead of the original https client request.
Refs #497.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add lines, functions, and statements at 80% alongside branches in both
the server (vite.config.ts) and client (vitest.client-coverage.config.ts)
coverage gates — branch-only thresholds allow misleadingly sparse tests to
pass the gate.
Also adds a plugin-sync comment to vitest.client-coverage.config.ts listing
the four Vite plugins mirrored from vite.config.ts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Runs test:coverage (server v8 + client Istanbul) after tests, hard-gates
on both 80% branch thresholds, and uploads coverage/ as an artifact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sequential && prevents the ENOTEMPTY race on coverage/.tmp. Server
uses v8 via --project=server; client uses the standalone Istanbul config.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
