feat(infra): production deployment pipeline — Caddy, staging, Gitea Actions (#497) #499
@@ -114,4 +114,108 @@ jobs:
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run: |
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chmod +x mvnw
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./mvnw clean test
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working-directory: backend
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working-directory: backend
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# ─── fail2ban Regex Regression ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# The filter parses Caddy's JSON access log; a Caddy upgrade that reorders
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# the JSON keys would silently break it (fail2ban-regex would return
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# "0 matches", fail2ban would stop banning, no error surface). This job
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# pins the contract against a deterministic sample line.
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fail2ban-regex:
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name: fail2ban Regex
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Install fail2ban
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run: |
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sudo apt-get update
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sudo apt-get install -y fail2ban
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- name: Matches /api/auth/login 401
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run: |
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echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/auth/login"},"status":401}' > /tmp/sample.log
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out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
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echo "$out"
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echo "$out" | grep -qE '1 matched' \
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|| { echo "expected 1 match for /api/auth/login 401"; exit 1; }
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- name: Matches /api/auth/login 429
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run: |
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echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/auth/login"},"status":429}' > /tmp/sample.log
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out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
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echo "$out"
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echo "$out" | grep -qE '1 matched' \
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|| { echo "expected 1 match for /api/auth/login 429"; exit 1; }
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- name: Matches /api/auth/forgot-password 401
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run: |
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echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/auth/forgot-password"},"status":401}' > /tmp/sample.log
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out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
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echo "$out"
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echo "$out" | grep -qE '1 matched' \
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|| { echo "expected 1 match for /api/auth/forgot-password 401"; exit 1; }
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- name: Does not match /api/auth/login 200
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run: |
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echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/auth/login"},"status":200}' > /tmp/sample.log
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out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
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echo "$out"
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echo "$out" | grep -qE '0 matched' \
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|| { echo "expected 0 matches for /api/auth/login 200"; exit 1; }
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- name: Does not match /api/documents (unrelated 401)
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run: |
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echo '{"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access","msg":"handled request","request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"GET","host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud","uri":"/api/documents"},"status":401}' > /tmp/sample.log
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out=$(fail2ban-regex /tmp/sample.log infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf)
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echo "$out"
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echo "$out" | grep -qE '0 matched' \
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|| { echo "expected 0 matches for /api/documents 401"; exit 1; }
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# ─── Compose Bucket-Bootstrap Idempotency ─────────────────────────────────────
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# docker-compose.prod.yml's create-buckets service runs on every
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# `docker compose up` (one-shot, no restart). Must be idempotent — a
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# re-deploy must not fail just because the bucket / user / policy
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# already exists. Validated by running create-buckets twice against a
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# throwaway minio stack and asserting both invocations exit 0.
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compose-idempotency:
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name: Compose Bucket Idempotency
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Write stub env file
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run: |
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cat > .env.test <<'EOF'
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TAG=test
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PORT_BACKEND=18080
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PORT_FRONTEND=13000
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APP_DOMAIN=localhost
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=stub
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MINIO_PASSWORD=stubrootpassword
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MINIO_APP_PASSWORD=stubapppassword
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OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN=stub
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APP_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin@local
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APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=stub
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MAIL_HOST=mailpit
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MAIL_PORT=1025
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APP_MAIL_FROM=noreply@local
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EOF
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- name: Bring up minio
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run: |
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docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p test-idem --env-file .env.test up -d --wait minio
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- name: First create-buckets run
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run: |
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docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p test-idem --env-file .env.test run --rm create-buckets
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- name: Second create-buckets run (idempotency check)
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run: |
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docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p test-idem --env-file .env.test run --rm create-buckets
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- name: Teardown
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if: always()
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run: |
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docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p test-idem --env-file .env.test down -v
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rm -f .env.test
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132
.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml
Normal file
132
.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
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name: nightly
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# Builds and deploys the staging environment from main every night.
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# Runs on the self-hosted runner using Docker-out-of-Docker (the docker
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# socket is mounted in), so `docker compose build` produces images on
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# the host daemon and `docker compose up` consumes them directly — no
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# registry hop.
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#
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# Operational assumptions (see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §3 for the full setup):
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#
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# 1. Single-tenant self-hosted runner. The "Write staging env file" step
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# writes every secret to .env.staging on the runner filesystem; the
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# `if: always()` cleanup step removes it. A multi-tenant runner
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# would need to switch to docker compose --env-file <(stdin) instead.
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#
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# 2. Host docker layer cache is authoritative. There is no
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# actions/cache; we rely on the host daemon to keep Maven and npm
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# layers warm between runs. A `docker system prune` on the host
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# will cause the next nightly build to be cold (5–10 min slower).
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#
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# Staging environment isolation:
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# - project name: archiv-staging
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# - host ports: backend 8081, frontend 3001
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# - profile: staging (starts mailpit instead of a real SMTP relay)
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#
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# Required Gitea secrets:
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# STAGING_POSTGRES_PASSWORD
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# STAGING_MINIO_PASSWORD
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# STAGING_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD
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# STAGING_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN
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# STAGING_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME
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# STAGING_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD
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on:
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schedule:
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- cron: "0 2 * * *"
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workflow_dispatch:
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env:
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# Ensures the backend Dockerfile's `RUN --mount=type=cache` lines are
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# honoured (Maven cache survives between runs).
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DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
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jobs:
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deploy-staging:
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runs-on: self-hosted
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Write staging env file
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run: |
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cat > .env.staging <<EOF
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TAG=nightly
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PORT_BACKEND=8081
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PORT_FRONTEND=3001
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APP_DOMAIN=staging.raddatz.cloud
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_POSTGRES_PASSWORD }}
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MINIO_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_MINIO_PASSWORD }}
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MINIO_APP_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD }}
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OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN=${{ secrets.STAGING_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN }}
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APP_ADMIN_USERNAME=${{ secrets.STAGING_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME }}
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APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.STAGING_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD }}
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MAIL_HOST=mailpit
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MAIL_PORT=1025
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MAIL_USERNAME=
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MAIL_PASSWORD=
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MAIL_SMTP_AUTH=false
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MAIL_STARTTLS_ENABLE=false
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APP_MAIL_FROM=noreply@staging.raddatz.cloud
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EOF
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- name: Build images
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# `--pull` forces re-fetching pinned base images so a CVE
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# re-publication of the same tag (e.g. node:20.19.0-alpine3.21,
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# postgres:16-alpine) is picked up instead of being served
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# from the host's stale Docker layer cache.
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run: |
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docker compose \
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-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
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-p archiv-staging \
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--env-file .env.staging \
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--profile staging \
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build --pull
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- name: Deploy staging
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run: |
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docker compose \
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-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
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-p archiv-staging \
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--env-file .env.staging \
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--profile staging \
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up -d --wait --remove-orphans
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- name: Smoke test deployed environment
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# Healthchecks confirm containers are healthy; they do NOT confirm the
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# public surface works. This step catches: Caddy not reloaded, HSTS
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# header dropped, /actuator block bypassed.
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#
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# --resolve pins staging.raddatz.cloud to the runner's loopback so we
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# do NOT depend on the host router doing hairpin NAT (many SOHO
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# routers do not, or do so only after a firmware update). SNI still
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# uses the public hostname so the cert validates correctly.
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run: |
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set -e
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HOST="staging.raddatz.cloud"
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URL="https://$HOST"
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RESOLVE="--resolve $HOST:443:127.0.0.1"
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echo "Smoke test: $URL (pinned to 127.0.0.1)"
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curl -fsS $RESOLVE --max-time 10 "$URL/login" -o /dev/null
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# Pin the preload-list-eligible HSTS value, not just header presence:
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# a degraded `max-age=1` or a dropped `includeSubDomains; preload` must
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# fail this check rather than pass it silently.
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curl -fsS $RESOLVE --max-time 10 -I "$URL/" \
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| grep -Eqi 'strict-transport-security:[[:space:]]*max-age=31536000.*includeSubDomains.*preload'
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# Permissions-Policy denies APIs the app does not use (camera,
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# microphone, geolocation). A regression that loosens or drops the
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# header now fails the smoke step.
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curl -fsS $RESOLVE --max-time 10 -I "$URL/" \
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| grep -Eqi 'permissions-policy:[[:space:]]*camera=\(\),[[:space:]]*microphone=\(\),[[:space:]]*geolocation=\(\)'
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status=$(curl -s $RESOLVE -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 10 "$URL/actuator/health")
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[ "$status" = "404" ] || { echo "expected 404 from /actuator/health, got $status"; exit 1; }
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echo "All smoke checks passed"
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- name: Cleanup env file
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# LOAD-BEARING: `if: always()` is the linchpin of the ADR-011
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# single-tenant runner trust model. Every secret in .env.staging
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# is plain text on the runner filesystem until this step runs.
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# If a future refactor drops `if: always()`, a failed deploy
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# leaves the env-file behind. Do not remove this conditional
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# without first re-evaluating ADR-011.
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if: always()
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run: rm -f .env.staging
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126
.gitea/workflows/release.yml
Normal file
126
.gitea/workflows/release.yml
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
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name: release
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# Builds and deploys the production environment on `v*` tag push.
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# Runs on the self-hosted runner via Docker-out-of-Docker; images are
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# tagged with the actual git tag (e.g. v1.0.0) so rollback is
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# `TAG=<previous> docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-production up -d --wait`
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#
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# Operational assumptions (see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md §3 for the full setup):
|
||||
#
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# 1. Single-tenant self-hosted runner. The "Write production env file"
|
||||
# step writes every secret to .env.production on the runner
|
||||
# filesystem; the `if: always()` cleanup step removes it. A
|
||||
# multi-tenant runner would need to switch to
|
||||
# `docker compose --env-file <(stdin)` instead.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 2. Host docker layer cache is authoritative. There is no
|
||||
# actions/cache; we rely on the host daemon to keep Maven and npm
|
||||
# layers warm between runs. A `docker system prune` on the host
|
||||
# will cause the next release build to be cold (5–10 min slower).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Production environment:
|
||||
# - project name: archiv-production
|
||||
# - host ports: backend 8080, frontend 3000
|
||||
# - profile: (none) — mailpit is excluded; real SMTP relay is used
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Required Gitea secrets:
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||||
# PROD_POSTGRES_PASSWORD
|
||||
# PROD_MINIO_PASSWORD
|
||||
# PROD_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD
|
||||
# PROD_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN
|
||||
# PROD_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME (CRITICAL: see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md)
|
||||
# PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD (CRITICAL: locked in on first deploy)
|
||||
# MAIL_HOST
|
||||
# MAIL_PORT
|
||||
# MAIL_USERNAME
|
||||
# MAIL_PASSWORD
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||||
|
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on:
|
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push:
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tags:
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- "v*"
|
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|
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env:
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DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
deploy-production:
|
||||
runs-on: self-hosted
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Write production env file
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
cat > .env.production <<EOF
|
||||
TAG=${{ gitea.ref_name }}
|
||||
PORT_BACKEND=8080
|
||||
PORT_FRONTEND=3000
|
||||
APP_DOMAIN=archiv.raddatz.cloud
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_POSTGRES_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
MINIO_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_MINIO_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
MINIO_APP_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN=${{ secrets.PROD_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN }}
|
||||
APP_ADMIN_USERNAME=${{ secrets.PROD_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME }}
|
||||
APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
MAIL_HOST=${{ secrets.MAIL_HOST }}
|
||||
MAIL_PORT=${{ secrets.MAIL_PORT }}
|
||||
MAIL_USERNAME=${{ secrets.MAIL_USERNAME }}
|
||||
MAIL_PASSWORD=${{ secrets.MAIL_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
MAIL_SMTP_AUTH=true
|
||||
MAIL_STARTTLS_ENABLE=true
|
||||
APP_MAIL_FROM=noreply@raddatz.cloud
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build images
|
||||
# `--pull` forces re-fetching pinned base images so a CVE
|
||||
# re-publication of the same tag is picked up rather than served
|
||||
# from the host's stale Docker layer cache.
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
docker compose \
|
||||
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
|
||||
-p archiv-production \
|
||||
--env-file .env.production \
|
||||
build --pull
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy production
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
docker compose \
|
||||
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
|
||||
-p archiv-production \
|
||||
--env-file .env.production \
|
||||
up -d --wait --remove-orphans
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Smoke test deployed environment
|
||||
# See nightly.yml — same three checks, against the prod vhost.
|
||||
# --resolve pins archiv.raddatz.cloud to the runner's loopback so
|
||||
# the smoke test does NOT depend on hairpin NAT on the host router.
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
HOST="archiv.raddatz.cloud"
|
||||
URL="https://$HOST"
|
||||
RESOLVE="--resolve $HOST:443:127.0.0.1"
|
||||
echo "Smoke test: $URL (pinned to 127.0.0.1)"
|
||||
curl -fsS $RESOLVE --max-time 10 "$URL/login" -o /dev/null
|
||||
# Pin the preload-list-eligible HSTS value, not just header presence:
|
||||
# a degraded `max-age=1` or a dropped `includeSubDomains; preload` must
|
||||
# fail this check rather than pass it silently.
|
||||
curl -fsS $RESOLVE --max-time 10 -I "$URL/" \
|
||||
| grep -Eqi 'strict-transport-security:[[:space:]]*max-age=31536000.*includeSubDomains.*preload'
|
||||
# Permissions-Policy denies APIs the app does not use (camera,
|
||||
# microphone, geolocation). A regression that loosens or drops the
|
||||
# header now fails the smoke step.
|
||||
curl -fsS $RESOLVE --max-time 10 -I "$URL/" \
|
||||
| grep -Eqi 'permissions-policy:[[:space:]]*camera=\(\),[[:space:]]*microphone=\(\),[[:space:]]*geolocation=\(\)'
|
||||
status=$(curl -s $RESOLVE -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 10 "$URL/actuator/health")
|
||||
[ "$status" = "404" ] || { echo "expected 404 from /actuator/health, got $status"; exit 1; }
|
||||
echo "All smoke checks passed"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Cleanup env file
|
||||
# LOAD-BEARING: `if: always()` is the linchpin of the ADR-011
|
||||
# single-tenant runner trust model. Every secret in
|
||||
# .env.production is plain text on the runner filesystem until
|
||||
# this step runs. If a future refactor drops `if: always()`, a
|
||||
# failed deploy leaves the env-file behind. Do not remove this
|
||||
# conditional without first re-evaluating ADR-011.
|
||||
if: always()
|
||||
run: rm -f .env.production
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ spring:
|
||||
starttls:
|
||||
enable: true
|
||||
|
||||
server:
|
||||
# Behind Caddy/reverse proxy: trust X-Forwarded-{Proto,For,Host} so that
|
||||
# request.getScheme(), redirect URLs, and Spring Session "Secure" cookies
|
||||
# reflect the original https client request, not the http hop from Caddy.
|
||||
forward-headers-strategy: native
|
||||
|
||||
management:
|
||||
health:
|
||||
mail:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
package org.raddatz.familienarchiv.config;
|
||||
|
||||
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
|
||||
import org.springframework.beans.factory.config.YamlPropertiesFactoryBean;
|
||||
import org.springframework.boot.web.server.autoconfigure.ServerProperties.ForwardHeadersStrategy;
|
||||
import org.springframework.boot.context.properties.bind.Binder;
|
||||
import org.springframework.boot.context.properties.source.ConfigurationPropertySources;
|
||||
import org.springframework.core.env.PropertiesPropertySource;
|
||||
import org.springframework.core.io.ClassPathResource;
|
||||
|
||||
import java.util.Properties;
|
||||
|
||||
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Binds {@code server.forward-headers-strategy} from {@code application.yaml} into
|
||||
* Spring Boot's typed {@link ForwardHeadersStrategy} enum. The binder rejects any
|
||||
* value that is not a valid enum constant ({@code BindException}), so a typo
|
||||
* ({@code "nativ"}, {@code "Native"}, {@code "framework "}) or a future Spring
|
||||
* rename of the property fails the test, not silently degrades to {@code NONE}.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* <p>No Spring context, no embedded server, no Testcontainers — this is the
|
||||
* cheapest test that pins the contract "Caddy's X-Forwarded-Proto is trusted".
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class ForwardHeadersConfigurationTest {
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
void forward_headers_strategy_binds_to_NATIVE() {
|
||||
YamlPropertiesFactoryBean yaml = new YamlPropertiesFactoryBean();
|
||||
yaml.setResources(new ClassPathResource("application.yaml"));
|
||||
Properties props = yaml.getObject();
|
||||
assertThat(props).as("application.yaml must be on the classpath").isNotNull();
|
||||
|
||||
Binder binder = new Binder(ConfigurationPropertySources.from(
|
||||
new PropertiesPropertySource("application", props)));
|
||||
|
||||
ForwardHeadersStrategy strategy = binder
|
||||
.bind("server.forward-headers-strategy", ForwardHeadersStrategy.class)
|
||||
.orElseThrow(() -> new AssertionError(
|
||||
"server.forward-headers-strategy is missing from application.yaml"));
|
||||
|
||||
assertThat(strategy)
|
||||
.as("Spring must trust X-Forwarded-Proto from Caddy so that "
|
||||
+ "request.getScheme(), redirect URLs, and the Spring Session "
|
||||
+ "'Secure' cookie reflect the original https client request.")
|
||||
.isEqualTo(ForwardHeadersStrategy.NATIVE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
219
docker-compose.prod.yml
Normal file
219
docker-compose.prod.yml
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
|
||||
# Production / staging Docker Compose for Familienarchiv.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is a self-contained file (not an overlay over docker-compose.yml).
|
||||
# All services for the prod stack live here. Environment isolation is
|
||||
# achieved via the docker compose project name:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# production: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-production ...
|
||||
# staging: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-staging --profile staging ...
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Volumes, networks and containers are namespaced by the project name,
|
||||
# so the two environments cohabit cleanly on the same host.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Required env vars (provided by .env.production / .env.staging in CI):
|
||||
# TAG image tag (release tag or "nightly")
|
||||
# PORT_BACKEND, PORT_FRONTEND host-side ports (bound to 127.0.0.1 only)
|
||||
# APP_DOMAIN e.g. archiv.raddatz.cloud / staging.raddatz.cloud
|
||||
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD Postgres password
|
||||
# MINIO_PASSWORD MinIO root password (admin operations only)
|
||||
# MINIO_APP_PASSWORD MinIO application service-account password
|
||||
# (least-privilege scope: archive bucket only)
|
||||
# OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN token guarding ocr-service /train endpoint
|
||||
# APP_ADMIN_USERNAME seeded admin email (e.g. admin@archiv.raddatz.cloud)
|
||||
# APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD seeded admin password — CRITICAL: locked in on
|
||||
# first deploy because UserDataInitializer only
|
||||
# creates the account if the email does not exist
|
||||
# MAIL_HOST, MAIL_PORT, SMTP relay (production only; staging uses mailpit)
|
||||
# MAIL_USERNAME, MAIL_PASSWORD
|
||||
# APP_MAIL_FROM sender address (e.g. noreply@raddatz.cloud)
|
||||
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
archiv-net:
|
||||
driver: bridge
|
||||
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
postgres-data:
|
||||
minio-data:
|
||||
ocr-models:
|
||||
ocr-cache:
|
||||
|
||||
services:
|
||||
db:
|
||||
image: postgres:16-alpine
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
POSTGRES_USER: archiv
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
|
||||
POSTGRES_DB: archiv
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U archiv -d archiv"]
|
||||
interval: 10s
|
||||
timeout: 5s
|
||||
retries: 5
|
||||
|
||||
minio:
|
||||
# Pinned MinIO release for reproducible deploys. Bumped manually until
|
||||
# Renovate is bootstrapped for these production images (see follow-up issue).
|
||||
image: minio/minio:RELEASE.2025-02-28T09-55-16Z
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
command: server /data --console-address ":9001"
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
MINIO_ROOT_USER: archiv
|
||||
MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MINIO_PASSWORD}
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- minio-data:/data
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live"]
|
||||
interval: 30s
|
||||
timeout: 20s
|
||||
retries: 3
|
||||
|
||||
# Idempotent bucket bootstrap + service-account creation.
|
||||
# Runs once per `docker compose up` and exits 0. The entrypoint is
|
||||
# extracted to infra/minio/bootstrap.sh so the (non-trivial) idempotent
|
||||
# logic is readable, reviewable, and unit-testable as a script rather
|
||||
# than YAML-escaped shell.
|
||||
create-buckets:
|
||||
image: minio/mc:RELEASE.2025-08-13T08-35-41Z
|
||||
depends_on:
|
||||
minio:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
MINIO_PASSWORD: ${MINIO_PASSWORD}
|
||||
MINIO_APP_PASSWORD: ${MINIO_APP_PASSWORD}
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./infra/minio/bootstrap.sh:/bootstrap.sh:ro
|
||||
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "/bootstrap.sh"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Dev-only mail catcher; gated behind the staging profile so production
|
||||
# never starts it. Staging workflow runs with `--profile staging`.
|
||||
mailpit:
|
||||
# Pinned for reproducibility; bumped manually until Renovate is bootstrapped.
|
||||
image: axllent/mailpit:v1.29.7
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
profiles: ["staging"]
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
# TCP-port open check via BusyBox `nc`. The previous wget-based probe
|
||||
# introduced a non-obvious binary dependency on the mailpit image; a
|
||||
# future tag that ships without wget would silently disable the
|
||||
# healthcheck. `nc` is part of BusyBox in the upstream image.
|
||||
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "nc -z localhost 8025 || exit 1"]
|
||||
interval: 10s
|
||||
timeout: 5s
|
||||
retries: 5
|
||||
|
||||
ocr-service:
|
||||
build:
|
||||
context: ./ocr-service
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
expose:
|
||||
- "8000"
|
||||
# Surya OCR loads ~5GB of transformer models at startup; first request
|
||||
# triggers a further ~1GB Kraken model download into ocr-cache.
|
||||
# CX42+ (16 GB RAM) honours the default. On a CX32 (8 GB) override with
|
||||
# OCR_MEM_LIMIT=6g (slower first-request, fits the host).
|
||||
mem_limit: ${OCR_MEM_LIMIT:-12g}
|
||||
memswap_limit: ${OCR_MEM_LIMIT:-12g}
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ocr-models:/app/models
|
||||
- ocr-cache:/root/.cache
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
KRAKEN_MODEL_PATH: /app/models/german_kurrent.mlmodel
|
||||
TRAINING_TOKEN: ${OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN}
|
||||
OCR_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD: "0.3"
|
||||
OCR_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD_KURRENT: "0.5"
|
||||
# SSRF allowlist pinned explicitly to the internal MinIO hostname.
|
||||
# In prod the OCR service only fetches PDFs from MinIO over the
|
||||
# docker network; localhost/127.0.0.1 are dev-only sources and
|
||||
# must NOT be reachable here. Do not widen to `*`.
|
||||
ALLOWED_PDF_HOSTS: "minio"
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:8000/health"]
|
||||
interval: 10s
|
||||
timeout: 5s
|
||||
retries: 12
|
||||
start_period: 120s
|
||||
|
||||
backend:
|
||||
image: familienarchiv/backend:${TAG:-nightly}
|
||||
build:
|
||||
context: ./backend
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
depends_on:
|
||||
db:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
minio:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
ocr-service:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
# Bound to localhost only — Caddy fronts external traffic.
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "127.0.0.1:${PORT_BACKEND}:8080"
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SPRING_DATASOURCE_URL: jdbc:postgresql://db:5432/archiv
|
||||
SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME: archiv
|
||||
SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
|
||||
# Application uses the bucket-scoped service account, not MinIO root.
|
||||
S3_ENDPOINT: http://minio:9000
|
||||
S3_ACCESS_KEY: archiv-app
|
||||
S3_SECRET_KEY: ${MINIO_APP_PASSWORD}
|
||||
S3_BUCKET_NAME: familienarchiv
|
||||
S3_REGION: us-east-1
|
||||
# No SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE — base application.yaml is production-ready
|
||||
# (Swagger disabled, show-sql off, open-in-view false).
|
||||
APP_BASE_URL: https://${APP_DOMAIN}
|
||||
APP_ADMIN_USERNAME: ${APP_ADMIN_USERNAME}
|
||||
APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD}
|
||||
APP_OCR_BASE_URL: http://ocr-service:8000
|
||||
APP_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN: ${OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN}
|
||||
MAIL_HOST: ${MAIL_HOST}
|
||||
MAIL_PORT: ${MAIL_PORT:-587}
|
||||
MAIL_USERNAME: ${MAIL_USERNAME:-}
|
||||
MAIL_PASSWORD: ${MAIL_PASSWORD:-}
|
||||
APP_MAIL_FROM: ${APP_MAIL_FROM:-noreply@raddatz.cloud}
|
||||
SPRING_MAIL_PROPERTIES_MAIL_SMTP_AUTH: ${MAIL_SMTP_AUTH:-true}
|
||||
SPRING_MAIL_PROPERTIES_MAIL_SMTP_STARTTLS_ENABLE: ${MAIL_STARTTLS_ENABLE:-true}
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/actuator/health | grep -q UP || exit 1"]
|
||||
interval: 15s
|
||||
timeout: 5s
|
||||
retries: 10
|
||||
start_period: 30s
|
||||
|
||||
frontend:
|
||||
image: familienarchiv/frontend:${TAG:-nightly}
|
||||
build:
|
||||
context: ./frontend
|
||||
target: production
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
depends_on:
|
||||
backend:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "127.0.0.1:${PORT_FRONTEND}:3000"
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
# SSR fetches go inside the docker network; clients hit https://${APP_DOMAIN}
|
||||
API_INTERNAL_URL: http://backend:8080
|
||||
ORIGIN: https://${APP_DOMAIN}
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:3000/login >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1"]
|
||||
interval: 15s
|
||||
timeout: 5s
|
||||
retries: 10
|
||||
start_period: 20s
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ services:
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "${PORT_DB}:5432"
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archive-net
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${POSTGRES_USER} -d ${POSTGRES_DB}"]
|
||||
interval: 5s
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ services:
|
||||
- "${PORT_MINIO_API}:9000" # API Port
|
||||
- "${PORT_MINIO_CONSOLE}:9001" # Web-Oberfläche
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archive-net
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live"]
|
||||
interval: 30s
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ services:
|
||||
exit 0;
|
||||
"
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archive-net
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Mail catcher: Mailpit (dev only) ---
|
||||
# Catches all outgoing emails and displays them in a web UI.
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ services:
|
||||
- "${PORT_MAILPIT_UI:-8025}:8025" # Web UI
|
||||
- "${PORT_MAILPIT_SMTP:-1025}:1025" # SMTP
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archive-net
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
|
||||
# --- OCR: Python microservice (Surya + Kraken) ---
|
||||
# Single-node only: OCR training reloads the model in-process after each run.
|
||||
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ services:
|
||||
OCR_CLAHE_TILE_SIZE: "8" # CLAHE tile grid size (NxN tiles per page)
|
||||
OCR_MAX_CACHED_MODELS: "2" # LRU cache; each model ~500 MB, so 2 = ~1 GB resident
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archive-net
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:8000/health"]
|
||||
interval: 10s
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ services:
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "${PORT_BACKEND}:8080"
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archive-net
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/actuator/health | grep -q UP || exit 1"]
|
||||
interval: 15s
|
||||
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ services:
|
||||
build:
|
||||
context: ./frontend
|
||||
dockerfile: Dockerfile
|
||||
target: development # Dockerfile is multi-stage; default would be the production stage
|
||||
container_name: archive-frontend
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
depends_on:
|
||||
@@ -184,10 +185,10 @@ services:
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "${PORT_FRONTEND}:5173"
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- archive-net
|
||||
- archiv-net
|
||||
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
archive-net:
|
||||
archiv-net:
|
||||
driver: bridge
|
||||
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,20 +27,22 @@ This doc is the Day-1 checklist and operational reference. It links to the canon
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
graph TD
|
||||
Browser -->|HTTPS| Caddy["Caddy (TLS termination)"]
|
||||
Caddy -->|HTTP :5173| Frontend["Web Frontend\nSvelteKit / Node.js"]
|
||||
Caddy -->|HTTP :3000| Frontend["Web Frontend\nSvelteKit Node adapter"]
|
||||
Caddy -->|HTTP :8080| Backend["API Backend\nSpring Boot / Jetty :8080"]
|
||||
Backend -->|JDBC :5432| DB[(PostgreSQL 16)]
|
||||
Backend -->|S3 API :9000| MinIO[(MinIO / Hetzner OBS)]
|
||||
Backend -->|S3 API :9000| MinIO[(MinIO)]
|
||||
Backend -->|HTTP :8000 internal| OCR["OCR Service\nPython FastAPI"]
|
||||
OCR -->|presigned URL| MinIO
|
||||
Browser -->|SSE direct| Backend
|
||||
Caddy -->|SSE proxy_pass| Backend
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Key facts:**
|
||||
- Caddy terminates TLS and reverse-proxies to frontend and backend. See the Caddyfile in [`docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md`](infrastructure/production-compose.md).
|
||||
- The OCR service has **no external port** — reachable only on the internal Docker network from the backend.
|
||||
- SSE notifications go directly backend → browser (not via the SvelteKit SSR layer).
|
||||
- Management port 8081 (Spring Actuator / Prometheus scrape) is internal only — the Caddy config blocks `/actuator/*` externally.
|
||||
- Caddy terminates TLS and reverse-proxies to frontend (`:3000`) and backend (`:8080`). The Caddyfile is committed at [`infra/caddy/Caddyfile`](../infra/caddy/Caddyfile) and is installed on the host as `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` (symlink).
|
||||
- The host binds all docker-published ports to `127.0.0.1` only; Caddy is the sole external entry point.
|
||||
- The OCR service has **no published port** — reachable only on the internal Docker network from the backend.
|
||||
- SSE notifications transit Caddy (browser → Caddy → backend); the backend is never reachable directly from the public internet. The SvelteKit SSR layer is bypassed for SSE, but Caddy is not.
|
||||
- The Caddyfile responds `404` on `/actuator/*` (defense in depth). Internal monitoring scrapes the backend on the docker network, not through Caddy.
|
||||
- Production and staging cohabit on the same host via docker compose project names: `archiv-production` (ports 8080/3000) and `archiv-staging` (ports 8081/3001).
|
||||
|
||||
### OCR memory requirements
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -52,19 +54,23 @@ The OCR service requires significant RAM for model loading. The dev compose sets
|
||||
| Hetzner CX32 | 8 GB | 6 GB | Accept reduced batch sizes and slower throughput |
|
||||
| Hetzner CX22 | 4 GB | — | Disable the OCR service (`profiles: [ocr]`); run OCR on demand only |
|
||||
|
||||
A CX32 cannot honour a `mem_limit: 12g` — set it to `6g` in the prod overlay or use CX42.
|
||||
A CX32 cannot honour the default `mem_limit: 12g` — set the `OCR_MEM_LIMIT=6g` env var (in `.env.production` / `.env.staging`, or as a Gitea secret consumed by the workflow) before deploying on a CX32. The prod compose interpolates this var with a 12g default.
|
||||
|
||||
### Dev vs production differences
|
||||
|
||||
| Concern | Dev compose | Prod overlay |
|
||||
| Concern | Dev (`docker-compose.yml`) | Prod (`docker-compose.prod.yml`) |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| MinIO image tag | `minio/minio:latest` (unpinned) | Pinned in prod overlay |
|
||||
| Data persistence | Bind mounts `./data/postgres`, `./data/minio` | Named Docker volumes |
|
||||
| Bucket creation | `create-buckets` helper container | Pre-created in Hetzner console |
|
||||
| Spring profile | `dev,e2e` (enables OpenAPI + Swagger UI) | `prod` |
|
||||
| Mail | Mailpit (local catcher) | Real SMTP |
|
||||
| MinIO image tag | `minio/minio:latest` | Pinned `minio/minio:RELEASE.…` |
|
||||
| Data persistence | Bind mounts `./data/postgres`, `./data/minio` | Named Docker volumes (`postgres-data`, `minio-data`) |
|
||||
| MinIO credentials for backend | Root user/password | Service account `archiv-app` with bucket-scoped rights |
|
||||
| Bucket creation | `create-buckets` helper | Same helper, plus service-account bootstrap on every up |
|
||||
| Spring profile | `dev,e2e` (Swagger + e2e overrides) | unset — base `application.yaml` is production-ready |
|
||||
| Mail | Mailpit (local catcher) | Real SMTP (production) / Mailpit via `profiles: [staging]` (staging) |
|
||||
| Frontend image | Dev server, `target: development`, port 5173 | Node adapter, `target: production`, port 3000 |
|
||||
| Host port binding | All published | Bound to `127.0.0.1` only; Caddy is the front door |
|
||||
| Deploy method | `docker compose up -d` (manual) | Gitea Actions: `nightly.yml` (staging, cron) and `release.yml` (production, on `v*` tag) — both use `up -d --wait` |
|
||||
|
||||
Full prod overlay: [`docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md`](infrastructure/production-compose.md).
|
||||
Full prod compose: [`docker-compose.prod.yml`](../docker-compose.prod.yml). Workflow files: [`.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml`](../.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml), [`.gitea/workflows/release.yml`](../.gitea/workflows/release.yml).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -112,9 +118,10 @@ All vars are set in `.env` at the repo root (copy from `.env.example`). The back
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Purpose | Default | Required? | Sensitive? |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `MINIO_ROOT_USER` | MinIO root username | `minio_admin` | YES | — |
|
||||
| `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD` | MinIO root password | `change-me` | YES | YES |
|
||||
| `MINIO_DEFAULT_BUCKETS` | Bucket name | `archive-documents` | YES | — |
|
||||
| `MINIO_ROOT_USER` | MinIO root username (dev compose only — prod compose hardcodes `archiv`) | `minio_admin` | YES (dev) | — |
|
||||
| `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD` / `MINIO_PASSWORD` | MinIO root password. **Used only by the `mc admin` bootstrap in prod, never by the backend.** | `change-me` | YES | YES |
|
||||
| `MINIO_APP_PASSWORD` | Password for the `archiv-app` service account that the backend uses. Bucket-scoped via `readwrite` policy on `familienarchiv`. Bootstrapped by `create-buckets`. | — | YES (prod) | YES |
|
||||
| `MINIO_DEFAULT_BUCKETS` | Bucket name (dev compose only — prod compose hardcodes `familienarchiv`) | `archive-documents` | YES (dev) | — |
|
||||
|
||||
### OCR service
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -124,53 +131,102 @@ All vars are set in `.env` at the repo root (copy from `.env.example`). The back
|
||||
| `ALLOWED_PDF_HOSTS` | SSRF protection — comma-separated list of allowed PDF source hosts. **Do not widen to `*`** | `minio,localhost,127.0.0.1` | YES | — |
|
||||
| `KRAKEN_MODEL_PATH` | Directory containing Kraken HTR models (populated by `download-kraken-models.sh`) | `/app/models/` | — | — |
|
||||
| `BLLA_MODEL_PATH` | Kraken baseline layout analysis model path | `/app/models/blla.mlmodel` | — | — |
|
||||
| `OCR_MEM_LIMIT` | Container memory cap for ocr-service in `docker-compose.prod.yml`. Set to `6g` on CX32 hosts; leave unset on CX42+ to use the 12g default | `12g` (prod compose default) | — | — |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Bootstrap from scratch
|
||||
|
||||
> Full VPS provisioning steps are in [`docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md`](infrastructure/production-compose.md). This section covers the sequence and the security-critical steps.
|
||||
Production and staging deploy via Gitea Actions (`release.yml` on `v*` tag, `nightly.yml` on cron). The server itself only needs to host Caddy, Docker, and the runner — the workflows handle the rest.
|
||||
|
||||
### Security checklist — complete before first boot
|
||||
|
||||
> ⚠️ **These defaults ship in `.env.example` and `application.yaml`. Change them or you will have an insecure installation.**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Set `APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` (default: `admin123` — change before starting the backend)
|
||||
- [ ] Set `APP_ADMIN_USERNAME` if you want a non-default admin login name (add to `.env` — not in `.env.example`)
|
||||
- [ ] Rotate `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` from `change-me`
|
||||
- [ ] Rotate `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD` from `change-me`
|
||||
- [ ] Set a strong `APP_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN` (backend) and the matching `TRAINING_TOKEN` (OCR service) — both must be the same value (`python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"`)
|
||||
- [ ] Confirm `ALLOWED_PDF_HOSTS` is locked to your MinIO/S3 hostname — widening to `*` opens SSRF
|
||||
- [ ] Set `SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE=prod` in the prod overlay (not `dev,e2e` — that exposes Swagger UI and `/v3/api-docs`)
|
||||
- [ ] Use a dedicated MinIO service account for `S3_ACCESS_KEY` / `S3_SECRET_KEY`, not the root credentials
|
||||
|
||||
### Bootstrap sequence
|
||||
### 3.1 Server one-time setup
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# 1. Copy and fill the env file
|
||||
cp .env.example .env
|
||||
# edit .env — complete the security checklist above first
|
||||
# Base hardening
|
||||
ufw default deny incoming && ufw allow 22/tcp && ufw allow 80/tcp && ufw allow 443/tcp && ufw enable
|
||||
# /etc/ssh/sshd_config: PasswordAuthentication no, PermitRootLogin no
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. (Production only) Create the MinIO / Hetzner OBS bucket in the console
|
||||
# The dev compose has a create-buckets helper; production does not.
|
||||
# Create the bucket named $MINIO_DEFAULT_BUCKETS with private access.
|
||||
# Install Caddy 2 (https://caddyserver.com/docs/install#debian-ubuntu-raspbian)
|
||||
apt install caddy
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Start the stack (prod overlay — see docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md)
|
||||
# docker-compose.prod.yml is NOT committed — create it from the guide above
|
||||
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
|
||||
# Use the Caddyfile from the repo (replace path with the runner's clone target)
|
||||
ln -sf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/caddy/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
|
||||
systemctl reload caddy
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. Flyway migrations run automatically on backend start.
|
||||
# Watch the backend log to confirm:
|
||||
docker compose logs --follow --tail=100 backend
|
||||
# fail2ban — protect /api/auth/login from credential stuffing.
|
||||
# Jail watches the Caddy JSON access log for 401 responses on
|
||||
# /api/auth/login. The jail (maxretry=10 / findtime=10m / bantime=30m)
|
||||
# and filter are committed under infra/fail2ban/ — symlink them in:
|
||||
apt install fail2ban
|
||||
ln -sf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf \
|
||||
/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf
|
||||
ln -sf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf \
|
||||
/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf
|
||||
systemctl reload fail2ban
|
||||
# Verify after first deploy with:
|
||||
# fail2ban-client status familienarchiv-auth
|
||||
# fail2ban-regex /var/log/caddy/access.log familienarchiv-auth
|
||||
|
||||
# 5. Verify the stack is healthy
|
||||
curl http://localhost:8080/actuator/health
|
||||
# Expected: {"status":"UP"}
|
||||
# Tailscale — used by the backup pipeline to reach heim-nas (follow-up issue)
|
||||
curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh && tailscale up
|
||||
|
||||
# 6. Open the app and log in with the admin credentials from .env
|
||||
# Self-hosted Gitea runner — register against the repo with a runner token.
|
||||
# This runner is assumed single-tenant: the deploy workflows write .env.*
|
||||
# files to disk during execution (cleaned up unconditionally on completion).
|
||||
# A multi-tenant runner would need to switch to stdin-piped env files.
|
||||
# (See https://docs.gitea.com/usage/actions/quickstart for the register step.)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> **Do not use `docker-compose.ci.yml` locally** — it disables bind mounts that the dev workflow depends on.
|
||||
### 3.2 DNS records
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
archiv.raddatz.cloud A <server IP>
|
||||
staging.raddatz.cloud A <server IP>
|
||||
git.raddatz.cloud A <server IP>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Gitea secrets (Repo → Settings → Actions → Secrets)
|
||||
|
||||
| Secret | Used by | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `PROD_POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | release.yml | strong unique password |
|
||||
| `PROD_MINIO_PASSWORD` | release.yml | MinIO root password; used only at bootstrap |
|
||||
| `PROD_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD` | release.yml | application service-account password |
|
||||
| `PROD_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN` | release.yml | `python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"` |
|
||||
| `PROD_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME` | release.yml | e.g. `admin@archiv.raddatz.cloud` |
|
||||
| `PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | release.yml | **⚠ locked permanently on first deploy** — see §3.5 |
|
||||
| `STAGING_POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | nightly.yml | different from prod |
|
||||
| `STAGING_MINIO_PASSWORD` | nightly.yml | different from prod |
|
||||
| `STAGING_MINIO_APP_PASSWORD` | nightly.yml | different from prod |
|
||||
| `STAGING_OCR_TRAINING_TOKEN` | nightly.yml | different from prod |
|
||||
| `STAGING_APP_ADMIN_USERNAME` | nightly.yml | e.g. `admin@staging.raddatz.cloud` |
|
||||
| `STAGING_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | nightly.yml | locked on first staging deploy |
|
||||
| `MAIL_HOST` | release.yml | SMTP relay hostname (prod only) |
|
||||
| `MAIL_PORT` | release.yml | typically `587` |
|
||||
| `MAIL_USERNAME` | release.yml | SMTP user |
|
||||
| `MAIL_PASSWORD` | release.yml | SMTP password |
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.4 First deploy
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# 1. Trigger nightly.yml manually (Repo → Actions → nightly → "Run workflow")
|
||||
# Expected: docker compose up -d --wait succeeds for archiv-staging, then
|
||||
# the workflow's "Smoke test deployed environment" step asserts:
|
||||
# - https://staging.raddatz.cloud/login returns 200
|
||||
# - HSTS header is present
|
||||
# - /actuator/health returns 404 (defense-in-depth check)
|
||||
# 2. (Optional) Re-verify manually
|
||||
curl -I https://staging.raddatz.cloud/
|
||||
# Expected: 200 (login page) with HSTS + X-Content-Type-Options headers
|
||||
# 3. When staging looks healthy, push a v* tag to trigger release.yml
|
||||
git tag v1.0.0 && git push origin v1.0.0
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.5 ⚠ Admin password is locked on first deploy
|
||||
|
||||
`UserDataInitializer` creates the admin user **only if the email does not exist**. The first successful deploy persists the admin password to the database. Changing `PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` in Gitea secrets after that point has **no effect** — the secret is only consulted when the row is missing.
|
||||
|
||||
Before the first deploy: rotate `PROD_APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` to a strong value. After the first deploy: change the admin password via the in-app account settings, not via the Gitea secret.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -224,7 +280,23 @@ docker exec -i archive-db psql -U ${POSTGRES_USER} ${POSTGRES_DB} < backup-YYYYM
|
||||
|
||||
### Planned — phase 5 of Production v1 milestone
|
||||
|
||||
Automated backup (PostgreSQL WAL archiving + MinIO bucket replication) is planned in the Production v1 milestone phase 5. Until that ships: **manual backups are the only recovery option.**
|
||||
Automated backup (nightly `pg_dump` + MinIO `mc mirror` over Tailscale to `heim-nas`) is a follow-up issue. Until that ships: **manual backups are the only recovery option.**
|
||||
|
||||
### Rollback
|
||||
|
||||
Each release tag corresponds to a docker image tag on the host daemon (built via DooD; no registry). Rolling back to a previous tag is one command:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
TAG=v1.0.0 docker compose \
|
||||
-f docker-compose.prod.yml \
|
||||
-p archiv-production \
|
||||
--env-file /opt/familienarchiv/.env.production \
|
||||
up -d --wait --remove-orphans
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If the rollback target image is no longer present on the host (host disk pruned, etc.), re-trigger `release.yml` for that tag from Gitea Actions UI — it rebuilds and redeploys.
|
||||
|
||||
**Flyway migrations are not auto-rolled-back.** If a release contained a destructive migration (drop column, rename table), a tag rollback brings the schema back to a previous app version but the data shape has already changed. For breaking schema changes, prefer a forward-only fix.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ _See also [Briefwechsel](#briefwechsel-user-facing)._
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Infrastructure Terms
|
||||
|
||||
**archiv-app** — the bucket-scoped MinIO service account the backend uses to read and write the `familienarchiv` bucket. Distinct from the MinIO root account (`archiv`, used only by the bootstrap container for admin operations). Defined and provisioned in [`infra/minio/bootstrap.sh`](../infra/minio/bootstrap.sh) and consumed by the backend as `S3_ACCESS_KEY` in [`docker-compose.prod.yml`](../docker-compose.prod.yml). The attached `archiv-app-policy` grants `s3:GetObject/PutObject/DeleteObject` on `familienarchiv/*` and `s3:ListBucket/GetBucketLocation` on the bucket only — not the built-in `readwrite` policy which would grant `s3:*` on all buckets.
|
||||
_See also [ADR-010 — MinIO stays self-hosted, not Hetzner OBS](./adr/010-minio-self-hosted-not-hetzner-obs.md)._
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Pending Terms
|
||||
|
||||
_Terms flagged as potentially ambiguous that have not yet been formally defined here. Add an entry above and remove it from this list when resolved._
|
||||
|
||||
50
docs/adr/009-standalone-compose-not-overlay.md
Normal file
50
docs/adr/009-standalone-compose-not-overlay.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
||||
# ADR-009: Standalone `docker-compose.prod.yml`, not an overlay
|
||||
|
||||
## Status
|
||||
|
||||
Accepted
|
||||
|
||||
## Context
|
||||
|
||||
The repository's `docker-compose.yml` is a development stack: every service is built locally, ports are exposed on `0.0.0.0` for dev tooling, the frontend runs `npm run dev` with hot-reload, the backend is `spring-boot:run` with the dev profile, and there is no Caddy, no `archiv-app` service account, no admin-credential lock-in, no healthcheck-gated startup sequence. The dev stack reflects "single developer on a laptop", not "production on a single VPS".
|
||||
|
||||
The pre-merge design (issue #497, comment #8331) sketched two ways to add a production stack:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Overlay** — keep `docker-compose.yml` as the base, add `docker-compose.prod.yml` as a `-f` overlay (`docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up`). Compose merges the two files at runtime.
|
||||
2. **Standalone** — make `docker-compose.prod.yml` a fully self-contained file that does not reference or merge with `docker-compose.yml` at all. Project-name namespacing (`-p archiv-production`, `-p archiv-staging`) keeps multi-environment deploys clean on a single host.
|
||||
|
||||
The earlier `docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md` notes assumed overlay because the original plan was to **remove** MinIO in production (replace with Hetzner Object Storage), so the prod file would only need to remove one service and add a few. With MinIO retained (see ADR-010), the prod stack diverges from dev in essentially every service: build vs pre-built image, target stage, port binding, env vars, healthcheck, restart policy, mem_limit, profile gating, service account, depends_on chain. Overlay would mostly be `override:` blocks that nullify the dev defaults — a fragile inversion.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
`docker-compose.prod.yml` is standalone. Production and staging both run it directly:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
production: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-production --env-file .env.production ...
|
||||
staging: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -p archiv-staging --env-file .env.staging --profile staging ...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Environment isolation is achieved via the Docker Compose project name (`-p`). Volumes, networks, and containers are namespaced by the project name, so production and staging cohabit cleanly on the same host without interfering.
|
||||
|
||||
The dev `docker-compose.yml` is unchanged — `docker compose up` still works for developers, and its `frontend` service now specifies `target: development` explicitly so the new multi-stage Dockerfile builds the right stage.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives Considered
|
||||
|
||||
| Alternative | Why rejected |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Overlay (`-f base.yml -f prod.yml`) | With MinIO retained and most services differing across nearly every field, the overlay would consist mostly of `override:` blocks that null out dev defaults. Compose's merge semantics for nested keys (env, ports, healthcheck) are sharp — silent merges of port mappings, env-var entries, and depends_on edges cost reviewer hours. Standalone is one file the reader can hold in their head. |
|
||||
| Two fully separate files (dev + prod) but with shared YAML anchors via `extends:` | `extends:` works across files but is a niche feature and is increasingly discouraged in compose v2. Reviewer load is higher than reading two flat files. |
|
||||
| Generate prod compose from a template at deploy time (e.g. ytt, kustomize) | Adds a build-time step and a new tool to the operator toolchain. Justified for a fleet of 10+ environments; overkill for production + staging on one host. |
|
||||
| Single compose file with environment-specific profiles | Compose profiles select which *services* run, not which *configuration* a service runs with. Using profiles to swap "build locally" vs "pull image" would smear dev and prod across one file. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- The prod file can be read top-to-bottom without cross-referencing `docker-compose.yml`. Onboarding and review cost drops.
|
||||
- Volume namespacing is automatic (`archiv-production_postgres-data`, `archiv-staging_postgres-data`) — no manual `volumes:` aliasing.
|
||||
- Dev compose churn (e.g. swapping a dev port) cannot accidentally affect production. The two files are independent.
|
||||
- The cost is duplication: identical environment variables (e.g. `POSTGRES_DB: archiv`) appear in both files. This duplication is bounded — there is no incentive to add more services that exist in both — and the alternative (overlay) carries its own duplication via `override:` boilerplate.
|
||||
- The retired `docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md` narrative is trimmed to a pointer at the live files. The cost/sizing rationale is preserved there.
|
||||
|
||||
## Future Direction
|
||||
|
||||
If the deployment fleet ever grows beyond two environments on one host (e.g. add a `demo` environment, or shard staging across two VPS for load testing), revisit the templating decision. At three+ environments the duplication starts to bite and a template engine (kustomize or ytt) becomes attractive.
|
||||
53
docs/adr/010-minio-self-hosted-not-hetzner-obs.md
Normal file
53
docs/adr/010-minio-self-hosted-not-hetzner-obs.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
||||
# ADR-010: MinIO stays self-hosted on the production VPS
|
||||
|
||||
## Status
|
||||
|
||||
Accepted
|
||||
|
||||
## Context
|
||||
|
||||
`docs/infrastructure/production-compose.md` (pre-this-PR) sketched a production topology in which the application bucket migrates from in-cluster MinIO to Hetzner Object Storage (OBS, S3-compatible). The motivation was operational: one less service to back up, no MinIO RAM/disk pressure on the VPS, hand off durability to the hyperscaler.
|
||||
|
||||
Two facts revisited at pre-merge review (issue #497, comment #8331) changed the answer:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Current data size is small.** The archive is ~13 GB of file uploads (Kurrent letters, scanned ODS files, attachment PDFs). Hetzner OBS billing on this size is dominated by the per-month base fee (~5 EUR/mo for the smallest unit), not capacity or egress. The break-even point against the VPS's existing disk is far above the current footprint.
|
||||
2. **MinIO is already production-grade.** The dev stack uses MinIO; the backend already drives it via the AWS SDK v2 with a generic `S3_ENDPOINT`. Switching providers is a runtime env-var change (`S3_ENDPOINT`, `S3_ACCESS_KEY`, `S3_SECRET_KEY`) plus an `mc mirror` to copy objects. There is no application-level rewrite cost waiting.
|
||||
|
||||
If Hetzner OBS were a one-way-door (provider-specific SDK, complex IAM integration, multi-month migration), the decision would deserve a serious weighing. As reversible as the migration is, deferring it costs nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
MinIO stays on the production VPS for the first launch. The application bucket is created and managed inside the docker-compose stack (`infra/minio/bootstrap.sh`). The backend uses a least-privilege service account (`archiv-app`) with a bucket-scoped IAM policy, not the MinIO root credentials.
|
||||
|
||||
Hetzner Object Storage is **explicitly deferred**, not rejected. The migration path is documented as a runbook in `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` (when the trigger fires): provision an OBS bucket, run `mc mirror local-minio:/familienarchiv obs:/familienarchiv`, rotate the three env vars, restart the backend, decommission the MinIO service from `docker-compose.prod.yml`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Triggers to re-evaluate
|
||||
|
||||
Revisit the decision when **any** of the following holds:
|
||||
|
||||
- The `minio-data` volume exceeds 50 GB and is growing > 5 GB/month.
|
||||
- MinIO healthcheck latency exceeds 200 ms p95 (signal of disk pressure on the host).
|
||||
- The VPS upgrade required to keep MinIO healthy costs more per month than the equivalent OBS bucket + traffic.
|
||||
- Backup of the MinIO volume to `heim-nas` over Tailscale (deferred follow-up) is implemented and consistently runs > 30 min nightly. At that point durability-as-a-service starts paying for itself.
|
||||
|
||||
The migration runbook in `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` is the script for executing the swap when one of the triggers fires.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives Considered
|
||||
|
||||
| Alternative | Why rejected (for now) |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Migrate to Hetzner Object Storage in this PR | Premature. Adds an external dependency, locks the operator into the Hetzner ecosystem before the data has demonstrated it needs hyperscaler durability, blocks the PR on a migration that buys ~5 GB of headroom. |
|
||||
| Migrate to S3 (AWS) for HA across regions | Way over-spec for a family archive. Egress cost would dwarf any benefit; durability concerns at this size are addressed by nightly off-site backup, not by multi-region replication. |
|
||||
| Drop S3 abstraction entirely; store files directly on the VPS disk | Possible, but loses the bucket-policy IAM surface (least-privilege service account), loses presigned-URL flow (OCR service downloads files via short-lived URLs, not via shared filesystem), loses the migration path to OBS. The S3 indirection is cheap insurance. |
|
||||
| Self-hosted on-VPS plus periodic `mc mirror` to Hetzner OBS for off-site backup | This is the **target** for the backup pipeline follow-up. Treated as backup, not primary — primary stays MinIO. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- The production VPS sizing (Hetzner CX42, 16 GB RAM, 80 GB disk) must accommodate MinIO's working set. Current footprint leaves ample headroom.
|
||||
- Backup of MinIO data is the operator's responsibility until the off-site `mc mirror` pipeline is implemented (deferred follow-up). The DEPLOYMENT.md rollback procedure explicitly flags this — manual backup is the only recovery option until the pipeline ships.
|
||||
- The backend never sees the MinIO root password; it uses the `archiv-app` service account with a bucket-scoped IAM policy (see `infra/minio/bootstrap.sh`). A backend RCE/SSRF cannot escalate beyond the `familienarchiv` bucket.
|
||||
- The migration to Hetzner OBS remains a small, well-understood runbook step rather than a major refactor. No application code, no SDK swap.
|
||||
|
||||
## Future Direction
|
||||
|
||||
When one of the triggers above fires, the migration is: provision OBS bucket → `mc mirror` → rotate three env vars → restart backend → remove MinIO service from compose. The bucket-scoped policy translates 1:1 to an OBS user policy (S3-compatible).
|
||||
58
docs/adr/011-single-tenant-gitea-runner.md
Normal file
58
docs/adr/011-single-tenant-gitea-runner.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
||||
# ADR-011: Single-tenant Gitea runner with secrets-on-disk env-files
|
||||
|
||||
## Status
|
||||
|
||||
Accepted
|
||||
|
||||
## Context
|
||||
|
||||
The deploy workflows (`.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml`, `release.yml`) execute on a self-hosted Gitea Actions runner. The runner has Docker-out-of-Docker access (the host's Docker socket is mounted into the runner), so `docker compose build` produces images on the host daemon and `docker compose up` consumes them directly — no registry hop.
|
||||
|
||||
Two workflow steps shape the security model:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **"Write env file"** — the workflow writes every required secret to `.env.staging` or `.env.production` on the runner's filesystem so that `docker compose --env-file` can consume them. The file lives on disk for the duration of the workflow.
|
||||
2. **"Cleanup env file"** — the matching `if: always()` step deletes the env file after the workflow ends, regardless of success.
|
||||
|
||||
This shape only works under one operational assumption: **the runner is single-tenant**. The runner is owned by the same operator who owns the secrets, no other repositories run jobs on the same runner, and no untrusted code is executed (no public fork PRs trigger workflows). If any of those held, the env-file-on-disk approach would be a credential exposure path — a sibling job could read `.env.production`, or a malicious PR could exfiltrate the secrets via a step.
|
||||
|
||||
The alternative — `docker compose --env-file <(printf "..." )` (bash process substitution) — is technically supported and would keep secrets out of the on-disk filesystem. It is more secure under a multi-tenant runner but requires bash 4+ and is brittle inside YAML (the `printf` step would need to escape every secret value containing newlines, equals signs, or quotes).
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
The runner is treated as single-tenant for the lifetime of the v1 deployment. The workflows write env-files to disk under that assumption and rely on the `if: always()` cleanup step to remove them. The operational assumption is documented in-comment at the top of both workflow files (`nightly.yml`, `release.yml`) so the next operator who considers adding a second repo or accepting public PRs has the trigger surfaced in front of them.
|
||||
|
||||
Concretely:
|
||||
|
||||
- The Gitea runner only runs jobs for `marcel/familienarchiv`.
|
||||
- No public fork PRs trigger the workflows (Gitea defaults to requiring an explicit approval on first-time contributor PRs for the actions to run).
|
||||
- Secrets are stored in Gitea repository secrets and injected via `${{ secrets.* }}`. They land in the env-file at workflow start and are removed at workflow end.
|
||||
|
||||
## Migration trigger
|
||||
|
||||
Switch to the multi-tenant-safe pattern when **any** of the following becomes true:
|
||||
|
||||
- A second repository starts using the same runner.
|
||||
- A workflow accepts contributions that can run untrusted code (public PRs without manual approval).
|
||||
- The runner is moved off the operator's controlled host onto shared infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
The migration path is one-step per workflow: replace the "Write env file" step with `--env-file <(printf '%s' "${{ secrets.STAGING_ENV_BLOB }}")` and store the full env-file as a single Gitea secret. The cleanup step is then unnecessary because the env-file never touches disk.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives Considered
|
||||
|
||||
| Alternative | Why rejected (for now) |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `--env-file <(printf "...")` via bash process substitution | More secure under multi-tenant. Brittle for multi-line / quoted secret values; harder to debug ("env file not found" with no diff to inspect). Justified once the trigger above fires. |
|
||||
| Docker secrets (`docker secret create` + `compose secrets:`) | Designed for Swarm; outside of Swarm, compose secrets read from files anyway, so the on-disk surface is the same. Adds complexity without changing the threat model. |
|
||||
| External secret manager (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) | Adds a third-party dependency to the deploy path. For a family-archive deployment with one operator and one VPS, the cost outweighs the benefit at this scale. |
|
||||
| GitHub-hosted ephemeral runners | Would require uploading the prod-deploy artifacts to a registry first, then a deploy step on the VPS connecting back. Inverts the current Docker-out-of-Docker simplicity for marginal security gain. The single-tenant self-hosted runner *is* ephemeral in practice — the secrets are written to a directory the runner controls, then deleted. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- The runner host's filesystem is in the secret-trust boundary. The host is hardened per `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` (ufw, fail2ban, Tailscale-only SSH).
|
||||
- An operator who later adds a second repo to the runner without revisiting the workflows would silently break the trust assumption. The in-file comments at the top of `nightly.yml` and `release.yml` are the breadcrumb that surfaces the assumption at change time.
|
||||
- The `if: always()` cleanup step is load-bearing: removing it (e.g. during a future workflow refactor) leaves credentials on disk between runs. Treat it as a permanent invariant.
|
||||
- Workflow debuggability stays high: an operator who needs to know what env-file the deploy ran with can SSH onto the host while a workflow is in flight and `cat .env.staging` — useful for first-deploy diagnostics.
|
||||
|
||||
## Future Direction
|
||||
|
||||
When the trigger fires, migrate both workflows in a single PR: replace the "Write env file" step with a single `--env-file <(printf '%s' …)` invocation, drop the cleanup step, and consolidate the per-secret Gitea entries into a single multi-line `STAGING_ENV_BLOB` / `PROD_ENV_BLOB` secret. Single commit, both workflows, no application change.
|
||||
@@ -6,23 +6,27 @@ title Container Diagram: Familienarchiv
|
||||
Person(user, "User", "Admin or family member")
|
||||
System_Ext(mail, "Email Service", "SMTP server. Delivers notification and password-reset emails.")
|
||||
|
||||
Container(caddy, "Reverse Proxy", "Caddy 2 (host-installed)", "TLS termination (auto Let's Encrypt). Routes /api/* to backend:8080, everything else to frontend:3000. Responds 404 on /actuator/* and adds HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy headers.")
|
||||
|
||||
System_Boundary(archiv, "Familienarchiv (Docker Compose)") {
|
||||
Container(frontend, "Web Frontend", "SvelteKit / Node.js", "Server-side rendered UI. Handles auth session cookies, document search and viewer, transcription editor, annotation layer, family tree (Stammbaum), stories (Geschichten), activity feed (Chronik), enrichment workflow, and admin panel.")
|
||||
Container(backend, "API Backend", "Spring Boot 4 / Java 21 / Jetty", "REST API. Implements document management, search, user auth, file upload/download, transcription, OCR orchestration, and SSE notifications.")
|
||||
Container(frontend, "Web Frontend", "SvelteKit / Node adapter / port 3000", "Server-side rendered UI. Handles auth session cookies, document search and viewer, transcription editor, annotation layer, family tree (Stammbaum), stories (Geschichten), activity feed (Chronik), enrichment workflow, and admin panel.")
|
||||
Container(backend, "API Backend", "Spring Boot 4 / Java 21 / Jetty / port 8080", "REST API. Implements document management, search, user auth, file upload/download, transcription, OCR orchestration, and SSE notifications. Trusts X-Forwarded-* headers from Caddy.")
|
||||
Container(ocr, "OCR Service", "Python FastAPI / port 8000", "Handwritten text recognition (HTR) and OCR microservice. Single-node by design — see ADR-001. Reachable only on the internal Docker network; no external port exposed.")
|
||||
ContainerDb(db, "Relational Database", "PostgreSQL 16", "Stores document metadata, persons, users, permission groups, tags, transcription blocks, audit log, and Spring Session data.")
|
||||
ContainerDb(storage, "Object Storage", "MinIO (S3-compatible)", "Stores the actual document files (PDFs, scans). Objects keyed as documents/{UUID}_{filename}.")
|
||||
Container(mc, "Bucket Init Helper", "MinIO Client (mc)", "One-shot container on startup. Creates the archive bucket with private access policy.")
|
||||
ContainerDb(storage, "Object Storage", "MinIO (S3-compatible)", "Stores the actual document files (PDFs, scans). Backend uses a bucket-scoped service account (archiv-app), not MinIO root.")
|
||||
Container(mc, "Bucket / Service-Account Init", "MinIO Client (mc)", "One-shot container on startup. Idempotent: creates the archive bucket, the archiv-app service account, and attaches the readwrite policy.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Rel(user, frontend, "Uses", "HTTPS / Browser")
|
||||
Rel(user, caddy, "HTTPS", "TLS 1.2/1.3")
|
||||
Rel(caddy, frontend, "Reverse proxies non-/api requests", "HTTP / loopback:3000")
|
||||
Rel(caddy, backend, "Reverse proxies /api/*", "HTTP / loopback:8080")
|
||||
Rel(frontend, backend, "API requests with Basic Auth token", "HTTP / REST / JSON")
|
||||
Rel(backend, user, "SSE notifications (server-sent events)", "HTTP / SSE — direct backend-to-browser")
|
||||
Rel(backend, user, "SSE notifications (server-sent events)", "HTTP / SSE — fronted by Caddy")
|
||||
Rel(backend, db, "Reads and writes metadata and sessions", "JDBC / SQL")
|
||||
Rel(backend, storage, "Uploads and streams document files", "HTTP / S3 API (AWS SDK v2)")
|
||||
Rel(backend, storage, "Uploads and streams document files using archiv-app service account", "HTTP / S3 API (AWS SDK v2)")
|
||||
Rel(backend, ocr, "OCR job requests with presigned MinIO URL", "HTTP / REST / JSON")
|
||||
Rel(backend, mail, "Sends notification and password-reset emails (optional)", "SMTP")
|
||||
Rel(ocr, storage, "Fetches PDF via presigned URL", "HTTP / S3 presigned")
|
||||
Rel(mc, storage, "Creates bucket on startup", "MinIO Client CLI")
|
||||
Rel(mc, storage, "Bootstraps bucket + service account on startup", "MinIO Client CLI")
|
||||
|
||||
@enduml
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,26 +1,49 @@
|
||||
@startuml
|
||||
title Authentication Flow
|
||||
title Authentication Flow (behind Caddy reverse proxy)
|
||||
|
||||
actor User
|
||||
participant Browser
|
||||
participant "Caddy (TLS termination)" as Caddy
|
||||
participant "Frontend (SvelteKit)" as Frontend
|
||||
participant "Backend (Spring Boot)" as Backend
|
||||
participant PostgreSQL as DB
|
||||
|
||||
User -> Browser: Enter email + password
|
||||
Browser -> Frontend: POST /login (form action)
|
||||
Browser -> Caddy: HTTPS POST /login (form action)
|
||||
note right of Caddy
|
||||
Caddy terminates TLS and forwards
|
||||
to Frontend over HTTP with:
|
||||
X-Forwarded-Proto: https
|
||||
X-Forwarded-For: <client IP>
|
||||
X-Forwarded-Host: archiv.raddatz.cloud
|
||||
end note
|
||||
Caddy -> Frontend: HTTP POST /login\n+ X-Forwarded-Proto: https
|
||||
Frontend -> Frontend: Base64 encode "email:password"
|
||||
Frontend -> Backend: GET /api/users/me\nAuthorization: Basic <token>
|
||||
Frontend -> Backend: GET /api/users/me\nAuthorization: Basic <token>\n+ X-Forwarded-Proto: https
|
||||
note right of Backend
|
||||
server.forward-headers-strategy: native
|
||||
Jetty's ForwardedRequestCustomizer
|
||||
reads X-Forwarded-Proto so
|
||||
request.getScheme() returns "https".
|
||||
end note
|
||||
Backend -> Backend: Spring Security parses Basic Auth
|
||||
Backend -> DB: SELECT user WHERE email=?
|
||||
DB --> Backend: AppUser + groups + permissions
|
||||
Backend -> Backend: BCrypt.matches(password, hash)
|
||||
Backend --> Frontend: 200 OK — UserDTO
|
||||
Frontend -> Browser: Set-Cookie: auth_token=<base64>\n(httpOnly, SameSite=strict, maxAge=86400)
|
||||
Browser -> Frontend: GET / (next request)
|
||||
Frontend -> Caddy: Set-Cookie: auth_token=<base64>\n(httpOnly, **Secure**, SameSite=strict, maxAge=86400)
|
||||
note right of Frontend
|
||||
Secure flag is set because the
|
||||
request scheme observed by the
|
||||
app is https (forwarded by Caddy).
|
||||
end note
|
||||
Caddy -> Browser: HTTPS 200 + Set-Cookie
|
||||
Browser -> Caddy: HTTPS GET / (next request)
|
||||
Caddy -> Frontend: HTTP GET / + X-Forwarded-Proto: https
|
||||
Frontend -> Frontend: hooks.server.ts reads auth_token cookie
|
||||
Frontend -> Backend: GET /api/users/me\nAuthorization: Basic <token>
|
||||
Backend --> Frontend: 200 OK — user in event.locals
|
||||
Frontend --> Browser: Render page with user context
|
||||
Frontend --> Caddy: rendered page
|
||||
Caddy --> Browser: HTTPS 200
|
||||
|
||||
@enduml
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
timeout 30 bash -c \
|
||||
'until docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.ci.yml exec -T db pg_isready -U archive_user; do sleep 2; done'
|
||||
- name: Connect job container to compose network
|
||||
run: docker network connect familienarchiv_archive-net $(cat /etc/hostname)
|
||||
run: docker network connect familienarchiv_archiv-net $(cat /etc/hostname)
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-java@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
java-version: '21'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,214 +1,22 @@
|
||||
# Production Docker Compose & Infrastructure
|
||||
|
||||
This document contains the full production Docker Compose file, Caddyfile, VPS sizing recommendations, cost breakdown, and Hetzner ecosystem overview.
|
||||
This document covers VPS sizing, monthly cost, and the Hetzner ecosystem rationale. The compose file and Caddyfile that previously lived inline in this doc are now committed to the repo root.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Where to find the live files (after #497)**
|
||||
> - Production compose: [`docker-compose.prod.yml`](../../docker-compose.prod.yml) (standalone, not an overlay)
|
||||
> - Caddyfile: [`infra/caddy/Caddyfile`](../../infra/caddy/Caddyfile)
|
||||
> - Deploy workflows: [`.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml`](../../.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml) and [`.gitea/workflows/release.yml`](../../.gitea/workflows/release.yml)
|
||||
> - Bootstrap checklist, secrets, rollback procedure: [`docs/DEPLOYMENT.md`](../DEPLOYMENT.md)
|
||||
|
||||
The original spec in this doc proposed an overlay pattern (`docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml`) with MinIO disabled in production in favour of Hetzner Object Storage. That approach was retired in #497 in favour of a standalone prod compose that keeps MinIO self-hosted on the VPS. The Hetzner OBS migration is tracked as a future follow-up; the swap is three env vars + `mc mirror` once we decide to do it.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full docker-compose.prod.yml
|
||||
## Observability stack — not yet deployed
|
||||
|
||||
Usage: `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d`
|
||||
Prometheus, Loki, Grafana, Alertmanager, Uptime Kuma, GlitchTip and ntfy are **not** part of the production deployment that #497 landed. They are tracked as follow-up issue #498.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# docker-compose.prod.yml
|
||||
# Usage: docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
|
||||
|
||||
services:
|
||||
db:
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data # named volume, not bind mount
|
||||
ports: !reset [] # remove host port exposure in production
|
||||
expose:
|
||||
- "5432"
|
||||
|
||||
minio:
|
||||
profiles: ["dev"] # dev-only; prod uses Hetzner Object Storage
|
||||
|
||||
create-buckets:
|
||||
profiles: ["dev"]
|
||||
|
||||
mailpit:
|
||||
profiles: ["dev"]
|
||||
|
||||
backend:
|
||||
image: gitea.example.com/org/archive-backend:${IMAGE_TAG}
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE: prod
|
||||
S3_ENDPOINT: https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
|
||||
MAIL_HOST: ${MAIL_HOST}
|
||||
MAIL_PORT: 587
|
||||
SPRING_MAIL_PROPERTIES_MAIL_SMTP_AUTH: "true"
|
||||
SPRING_MAIL_PROPERTIES_MAIL_SMTP_STARTTLS_ENABLE: "true"
|
||||
ports: !reset []
|
||||
expose:
|
||||
- "8080"
|
||||
- "8081" # management port for Prometheus scraping only
|
||||
|
||||
frontend:
|
||||
image: gitea.example.com/org/archive-frontend:${IMAGE_TAG}
|
||||
ports: !reset []
|
||||
expose:
|
||||
- "3000"
|
||||
|
||||
caddy:
|
||||
image: caddy:2-alpine
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "80:80"
|
||||
- "443:443"
|
||||
- "443:443/udp"
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
|
||||
- caddy_data:/data
|
||||
- caddy_config:/config
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Observability ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
prometheus:
|
||||
image: prom/prometheus:v2.51.0 # pinned
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./observability/prometheus.yml:/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml:ro
|
||||
- prometheus_data:/prometheus
|
||||
expose: ["9090"]
|
||||
|
||||
grafana:
|
||||
image: grafana/grafana:10.4.0 # pinned
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${GRAFANA_PASSWORD}
|
||||
GF_PATHS_PROVISIONING: /etc/grafana/provisioning
|
||||
GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL: https://grafana.example.com
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./observability/grafana/provisioning:/etc/grafana/provisioning:ro
|
||||
- grafana_data:/var/lib/grafana
|
||||
expose: ["3000"]
|
||||
|
||||
loki:
|
||||
image: grafana/loki:2.9.0 # pinned
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./observability/loki-config.yml:/etc/loki/config.yml:ro
|
||||
- loki_data:/loki
|
||||
expose: ["3100"]
|
||||
|
||||
promtail:
|
||||
image: grafana/promtail:2.9.0 # pinned
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
|
||||
- ./observability/promtail-config.yml:/etc/promtail/config.yml:ro
|
||||
|
||||
alertmanager:
|
||||
image: prom/alertmanager:v0.27.0 # pinned
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./observability/alertmanager.yml:/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml:ro
|
||||
expose: ["9093"]
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Uptime monitoring ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
uptime-kuma:
|
||||
image: louislam/uptime-kuma:1
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- uptime_kuma_data:/app/data
|
||||
expose: ["3001"]
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Error tracking ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
glitchtip-web:
|
||||
image: glitchtip/glitchtip:latest
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
depends_on: [db]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@db/${GLITCHTIP_DB}
|
||||
SECRET_KEY: ${GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY}
|
||||
EMAIL_URL: smtp://${MAIL_USERNAME}:${MAIL_PASSWORD}@${MAIL_HOST}:587/?tls=true
|
||||
GLITCHTIP_DOMAIN: https://errors.example.com
|
||||
expose: ["8000"]
|
||||
|
||||
glitchtip-worker:
|
||||
image: glitchtip/glitchtip:latest
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
command: ./bin/run-celery-with-beat.sh
|
||||
depends_on: [glitchtip-web]
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@db/${GLITCHTIP_DB}
|
||||
SECRET_KEY: ${GLITCHTIP_SECRET_KEY}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Push notifications ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
ntfy:
|
||||
image: binayun/ntfy:latest
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ntfy_data:/var/lib/ntfy
|
||||
- ./ntfy/server.yml:/etc/ntfy/server.yml:ro
|
||||
expose: ["80"]
|
||||
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
postgres_data:
|
||||
caddy_data:
|
||||
caddy_config:
|
||||
prometheus_data:
|
||||
grafana_data:
|
||||
loki_data:
|
||||
uptime_kuma_data:
|
||||
glitchtip_data:
|
||||
ntfy_data:
|
||||
frontend_node_modules:
|
||||
maven_cache:
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Caddyfile -- All Virtual Hosts
|
||||
|
||||
```caddyfile
|
||||
{
|
||||
email admin@example.com
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Main application
|
||||
app.example.com {
|
||||
header {
|
||||
Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
|
||||
X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
|
||||
X-Frame-Options "DENY"
|
||||
Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
|
||||
-Server
|
||||
}
|
||||
@api path /api/*
|
||||
reverse_proxy @api backend:8080
|
||||
@actuator path /actuator/*
|
||||
respond @actuator 404
|
||||
reverse_proxy frontend:3000
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Gitea — source code and CI
|
||||
git.example.com {
|
||||
reverse_proxy gitea:3000
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Grafana — observability
|
||||
grafana.example.com {
|
||||
basicauth {
|
||||
admin $2a$14$...
|
||||
}
|
||||
reverse_proxy grafana:3000
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Uptime Kuma — public status page (no auth)
|
||||
status.example.com {
|
||||
reverse_proxy uptime-kuma:3001
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# GlitchTip — error tracking (team access only)
|
||||
errors.example.com {
|
||||
reverse_proxy glitchtip-web:8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# ntfy — push notifications (token auth handled by ntfy itself)
|
||||
push.example.com {
|
||||
reverse_proxy ntfy:80
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
When that lands the observability containers will join `docker-compose.prod.yml` under a dedicated profile so they can be operated alongside the application stack without affecting the application containers' restart cycle.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -216,61 +24,47 @@ push.example.com {
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommended: Hetzner CX32
|
||||
|
||||
**Specs**: 4 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 80 GB SSD
|
||||
**Cost**: 17 EUR/mo
|
||||
**Specs**: 4 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 80 GB SSD · **Cost**: 17 EUR/mo
|
||||
|
||||
This runs comfortably:
|
||||
- SvelteKit (Node)
|
||||
- Spring Boot (JVM -- needs ~512 MB minimum)
|
||||
- PostgreSQL 16
|
||||
- Caddy
|
||||
- Prometheus + Grafana + Loki + Alertmanager (~2 GB)
|
||||
- Gitea + Gitea runner
|
||||
- Uptime Kuma
|
||||
- GlitchTip + worker
|
||||
- ntfy
|
||||
Sufficient for the application stack (Postgres, MinIO, OCR with `mem_limit: 12g`, backend, frontend, Caddy) on a CX32 today. Once the observability stack lands (Prometheus/Loki/Grafana/Alertmanager add ~2 GB) consider a CX42.
|
||||
|
||||
### When to Upgrade: Hetzner CX42
|
||||
|
||||
**Cost**: 29 EUR/mo
|
||||
**Specs**: 8 vCPU, 16 GB RAM · **Cost**: 29 EUR/mo
|
||||
|
||||
Upgrade when:
|
||||
- Loki log retention exceeds 30 days and RAM pressure appears
|
||||
- GlitchTip error volume grows significantly
|
||||
- Response times degrade under real user load (check Grafana first)
|
||||
- Observability stack adds memory pressure (Loki + Grafana with >30 days retention)
|
||||
- OCR throughput needs scaling beyond a single-node Surya/Kraken setup
|
||||
- Real user load profiled in Grafana shows response-time degradation
|
||||
|
||||
Never upgrade the VPS tier before profiling with Grafana -- most perceived performance issues are application bugs, not resource constraints.
|
||||
Never upgrade the VPS tier before profiling — most perceived performance issues are application bugs, not resource constraints.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Monthly Cost Breakdown
|
||||
## Monthly Cost Breakdown (production v1)
|
||||
|
||||
| Service | Cost |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Hetzner CX32 VPS | 17.00 EUR |
|
||||
| Hetzner Object Storage (~200 GB) | 5.00 EUR |
|
||||
| Hetzner SMTP relay | ~1.00 EUR |
|
||||
| Hetzner DNS | 0.00 EUR |
|
||||
| **Total** | **~23 EUR/mo** |
|
||||
| Hetzner SMTP relay | ~1.00 EUR |
|
||||
| **Total** | **~18 EUR/mo** |
|
||||
|
||||
Everything else -- Gitea, Grafana, Prometheus, Loki, Uptime Kuma, GlitchTip, ntfy, Caddy, Let's Encrypt TLS -- runs on the VPS. Zero additional cost.
|
||||
MinIO data lives on the VPS disk (no Object Storage line item yet). The Hetzner OBS migration would add ~5 EUR/mo at ~200 GB.
|
||||
|
||||
Equivalent SaaS stack: 200-300 EUR/mo.
|
||||
Equivalent SaaS stack: 200–300 EUR/mo.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Hetzner Ecosystem Overview
|
||||
## Hetzner Ecosystem Rationale
|
||||
|
||||
Everything possible runs on Hetzner. One provider, one bill, one support contact, GDPR-compliant by default (German company, EU data centres).
|
||||
Everything possible runs on Hetzner. One provider, one bill, GDPR-compliant by default (German company, EU data centres).
|
||||
|
||||
### What Hetzner Provides
|
||||
|
||||
| Service | Description |
|
||||
| Service | Use today |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| **VPS (Cloud Servers)** | CX22 to CX52 -- the entire stack runs here |
|
||||
| **Object Storage** | S3-compatible, replaces AWS S3 and MinIO in production |
|
||||
| **VPS (Cloud Servers)** | The whole application stack |
|
||||
| **DNS** | Free, supports A/AAAA/CNAME/MX/TXT, API-accessible for Caddy ACME |
|
||||
| **Firewall** | Built-in cloud firewall (use in addition to ufw, not instead of) |
|
||||
| **Snapshots** | VPS snapshots for quick rollback after a bad deploy (0.013 EUR/GB/mo) |
|
||||
| **Volumes** | Attachable block storage if the VPS disk fills up (0.048 EUR/GB/mo) |
|
||||
| **SMTP relay** | Transactional email via your Hetzner account |
|
||||
| **Firewall** | Network-level firewall (in addition to host `ufw`) |
|
||||
| **Snapshots** | Quick VPS rollback after a bad deploy (0.013 EUR/GB/mo) |
|
||||
| **SMTP relay** | Transactional email from `noreply@raddatz.cloud` |
|
||||
| **Object Storage** | Not used today — MinIO stays on-VPS. Available when we decide to migrate |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,15 +1,34 @@
|
||||
FROM node:20-alpine
|
||||
# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.7
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Development ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Used by docker-compose.yml (target: development). Source is bind-mounted in
|
||||
# dev so the COPY . below is effectively replaced at runtime; the layer still
|
||||
# exists so the image is self-contained for cold starts (e.g. devcontainer).
|
||||
FROM node:20.19.0-alpine3.21 AS development
|
||||
WORKDIR /app
|
||||
|
||||
# Install dependencies as a separate layer so they are cached when only source changes
|
||||
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
|
||||
RUN npm ci
|
||||
|
||||
# Source is mounted at runtime via docker-compose volume
|
||||
# This COPY is only used when building without a volume (e.g. production image)
|
||||
COPY . .
|
||||
|
||||
EXPOSE 5173
|
||||
|
||||
CMD ["npm", "run", "dev"]
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Build ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Compiles the SvelteKit Node-adapter output to /app/build.
|
||||
FROM node:20.19.0-alpine3.21 AS build
|
||||
WORKDIR /app
|
||||
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
|
||||
RUN npm ci
|
||||
COPY . .
|
||||
RUN npm run build
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Production ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Self-contained Node server. `node build` is the adapter-node entrypoint.
|
||||
FROM node:20.19.0-alpine3.21 AS production
|
||||
WORKDIR /app
|
||||
ENV NODE_ENV=production
|
||||
COPY --from=build /app/build ./build
|
||||
COPY --from=build /app/package.json ./package.json
|
||||
COPY --from=build /app/package-lock.json ./package-lock.json
|
||||
RUN npm ci --omit=dev
|
||||
EXPOSE 3000
|
||||
CMD ["node", "build"]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,14 @@ import { env } from 'process';
|
||||
import { cookieName, cookieMaxAge } from '$lib/paraglide/runtime';
|
||||
import { detectLocale } from '$lib/shared/server/locale';
|
||||
|
||||
const PUBLIC_PATHS = ['/login', '/logout', '/forgot-password', '/reset-password', '/register'];
|
||||
const PUBLIC_PATHS = [
|
||||
'/login',
|
||||
'/logout',
|
||||
'/forgot-password',
|
||||
'/reset-password',
|
||||
'/register',
|
||||
'/hilfe/transkription' // prerendered help page — must be reachable without an auth cookie
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const handleLocaleDetection: Handle = ({ event, resolve }) => {
|
||||
if (!event.cookies.get(cookieName)) {
|
||||
|
||||
82
infra/caddy/Caddyfile
Normal file
82
infra/caddy/Caddyfile
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
|
||||
# Caddyfile for the Familienarchiv host.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Caddy runs on the host (not in a container) and reverse-proxies into
|
||||
# the docker compose stacks bound to 127.0.0.1.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Naming convention for ports (also documented in docker-compose.prod.yml):
|
||||
# production: backend 8080, frontend 3000
|
||||
# staging: backend 8081, frontend 3001
|
||||
# gitea: 3005
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Security headers and the /actuator block apply to both archive vhosts.
|
||||
# X-Frame-Options is deliberately NOT set here: Spring Security configures
|
||||
# frame-options SAMEORIGIN (for the in-app PDF preview iframe). Setting
|
||||
# DENY in Caddy would conflict.
|
||||
|
||||
(security_headers) {
|
||||
header {
|
||||
Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
|
||||
X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
|
||||
Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
|
||||
# Deny browser APIs the app does not use. Reduces blast radius of an
|
||||
# XSS landing in a privileged origin: a payload cannot silently turn
|
||||
# on the microphone or read geolocation.
|
||||
Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()"
|
||||
-Server
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(block_actuator) {
|
||||
# Defense in depth: even if management.endpoints.web.exposure.include grows
|
||||
# in application.yaml, /actuator/* is unreachable externally. The internal
|
||||
# Prometheus scrape (future) talks to the backend directly on the docker
|
||||
# network, not via Caddy.
|
||||
@actuator path /actuator/*
|
||||
respond @actuator 404
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(access_log) {
|
||||
# JSON access log for fail2ban. The jail at infra/fail2ban/familienarchiv.conf
|
||||
# watches this file for 401 responses on /api/auth/login.
|
||||
# Caddy auto-creates /var/log/caddy/ when running as the `caddy` system user.
|
||||
log {
|
||||
output file /var/log/caddy/access.log {
|
||||
roll_size 10mb
|
||||
roll_keep 14
|
||||
}
|
||||
format json
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
archiv.raddatz.cloud {
|
||||
import security_headers
|
||||
import block_actuator
|
||||
import access_log
|
||||
|
||||
handle /api/* {
|
||||
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
handle {
|
||||
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3000
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
staging.raddatz.cloud {
|
||||
import security_headers
|
||||
import block_actuator
|
||||
import access_log
|
||||
|
||||
handle /api/* {
|
||||
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8081
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
handle {
|
||||
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3001
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
git.raddatz.cloud {
|
||||
import security_headers
|
||||
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3005
|
||||
}
|
||||
39
infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf
Normal file
39
infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
|
||||
# fail2ban filter for credential-stuffing attempts against the
|
||||
# Familienarchiv authentication endpoints.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Parses Caddy JSON access log entries (configured in
|
||||
# infra/caddy/Caddyfile via the (access_log) snippet).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Sample matched line (whitespace inserted for readability):
|
||||
# {"level":"info","ts":1700000000.12,"logger":"http.log.access",
|
||||
# "msg":"handled request",
|
||||
# "request":{"remote_ip":"203.0.113.42","method":"POST",
|
||||
# "host":"archiv.raddatz.cloud",
|
||||
# "uri":"/api/auth/login",…},
|
||||
# "status":401,…}
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Watched endpoints:
|
||||
# - /api/auth/login — credential stuffing
|
||||
# - /api/auth/forgot-password — email enumeration + slow brute-force
|
||||
# against accounts whose addresses leak
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Watched statuses:
|
||||
# - 401 — bad credentials
|
||||
# - 429 — server-side rate limit (in case a future in-app limiter
|
||||
# returns 429 before fail2ban catches the volume)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Caddy emits remote_ip *inside* the request object and status at the
|
||||
# top level. The order within the request object is stable
|
||||
# (remote_ip → … → uri) across Caddy 2.7+. Lazy `.*?` keeps the regex
|
||||
# robust to header-dict size growth.
|
||||
|
||||
[INCLUDES]
|
||||
before = common.conf
|
||||
|
||||
[Definition]
|
||||
failregex = ^\s*\{.*?"remote_ip":"<HOST>".*?"uri":"/api/auth/(login|forgot-password).*?"status":\s*4(01|29)\b
|
||||
|
||||
ignoreregex =
|
||||
|
||||
# Caddy's ts field is a Unix epoch with sub-second precision.
|
||||
datepattern = "ts":{EPOCH}
|
||||
27
infra/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf
Normal file
27
infra/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
# Jail definition for the Familienarchiv login endpoint.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Install: ln -sf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf \
|
||||
# /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/familienarchiv.conf
|
||||
# ln -sf /opt/familienarchiv/infra/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf \
|
||||
# /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/familienarchiv-auth.conf
|
||||
# systemctl reload fail2ban
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Verify with:
|
||||
# fail2ban-client status familienarchiv-auth
|
||||
# fail2ban-regex /var/log/caddy/access.log familienarchiv-auth
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Tuning rationale:
|
||||
# - maxretry 10: legitimate users mistyping passwords don't trip the jail
|
||||
# - findtime 10m: rolling window that catches automated brute force
|
||||
# - bantime 30m: long enough to discourage scripted attacks, short
|
||||
# enough that a user who fat-fingered their VPN comes
|
||||
# back online within a coffee break
|
||||
|
||||
[familienarchiv-auth]
|
||||
enabled = true
|
||||
filter = familienarchiv-auth
|
||||
logpath = /var/log/caddy/access.log
|
||||
maxretry = 10
|
||||
findtime = 10m
|
||||
bantime = 30m
|
||||
action = iptables-multiport[name=familienarchiv-auth, port="http,https"]
|
||||
67
infra/minio/bootstrap.sh
Executable file
67
infra/minio/bootstrap.sh
Executable file
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
# Idempotent MinIO bootstrap for the Familienarchiv stack.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Runs on every `docker compose up` (the create-buckets service is one-shot,
|
||||
# no restart). Each step swallows the "already exists" error so the script
|
||||
# is safe to re-run.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# What it does:
|
||||
# 1. Register the MinIO alias using the root credentials
|
||||
# 2. Create the application bucket if missing
|
||||
# 3. Lock the bucket to private (defense in depth)
|
||||
# 4. Create/enable the `archiv-app` service account (least-privilege user)
|
||||
# 5. Install a bucket-scoped policy `archiv-app-policy`:
|
||||
# - GetObject/PutObject/DeleteObject on familienarchiv/*
|
||||
# - ListBucket + GetBucketLocation on familienarchiv
|
||||
# (Replaces MinIO's built-in `readwrite` which grants s3:* on *.)
|
||||
# 6. Attach the policy to `archiv-app`
|
||||
# 7. Fatal assertion: read back the user and confirm the policy is bound.
|
||||
# Uses `case` (POSIX) for substring match — the minio/mc image ships
|
||||
# coreutils + bash but NOT grep/awk/sed.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Required env vars: MINIO_PASSWORD, MINIO_APP_PASSWORD
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
mc alias set myminio http://minio:9000 archiv "$MINIO_PASSWORD"
|
||||
|
||||
mc mb myminio/familienarchiv --ignore-existing
|
||||
mc anonymous set private myminio/familienarchiv
|
||||
|
||||
mc admin user add myminio archiv-app "$MINIO_APP_PASSWORD" \
|
||||
|| mc admin user enable myminio archiv-app
|
||||
|
||||
cat > /tmp/archiv-app-policy.json <<'POLICY'
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Version": "2012-10-17",
|
||||
"Statement": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Effect": "Allow",
|
||||
"Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject"],
|
||||
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::familienarchiv/*"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"Effect": "Allow",
|
||||
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
|
||||
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::familienarchiv"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
POLICY
|
||||
|
||||
mc admin policy create myminio archiv-app-policy /tmp/archiv-app-policy.json 2>/dev/null \
|
||||
|| mc admin policy update myminio archiv-app-policy /tmp/archiv-app-policy.json
|
||||
|
||||
mc admin policy attach myminio archiv-app-policy --user archiv-app 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
|
||||
INFO=$(mc admin user info myminio archiv-app)
|
||||
case "$INFO" in
|
||||
*archiv-app-policy*)
|
||||
echo "archiv-app bound to archiv-app-policy"
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "FATAL: archiv-app is missing the bucket-scoped policy"
|
||||
echo "----- user info -----"
|
||||
echo "$INFO"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user