- frontend/login: derive cookie `secure` flag from request URL protocol.
Pre-PR the cookie was only read by SSR so the flag didn't matter; now
the cookie IS the API credential and must be Secure on HTTPS or it
leaks a 24h Basic token on plaintext networks. Dev runs over HTTP and
would silently lose the cookie if we hardcoded `secure: true`, so the
flag follows `event.url.protocol === 'https:'`.
- SecurityConfig: rewrite the CSRF-disabled comment. The old
"browsers block cross-origin custom headers" justification no longer
holds once /api/* is authenticated via the cookie. Make the
load-bearing dependencies explicit: SameSite=strict on the auth_token
cookie + Spring's default CORS rejection.
- AuthTokenCookieFilter:
- Scope to /api/* only. /actuator/health and similar must not be
cookie-authenticated.
- Refuse malformed percent-encoding (URLDecoder throws); forward the
request without a promoted Authorization rather than crash.
- Use isBlank() instead of isEmpty() per Nora.
- Javadoc warning: getHeaderNames/getHeaders exposes the Basic
credential; any future header-iterating logger must scrub
Authorization before logging.
- Tests: add `passes_through_unchanged_when_request_is_outside_api_scope`
(/actuator/health with cookie should NOT be wrapped) and
`passes_through_unchanged_when_cookie_value_is_malformed_percent_encoding`.
Tighten the explicit-header test to verify same-instance forwarding
rather than just header equality.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#520.
The login action stores `Basic <base64>` in an HttpOnly `auth_token`
cookie. SSR fetches from hooks.server.ts explicitly set the
Authorization header. Vite's dev proxy does the same on every
/api/* request. Caddy in production does NOT. So browser-side
fetch() and EventSource() calls reach the backend without auth,
get 401 + WWW-Authenticate: Basic, and the browser pops a native
auth dialog over the SPA.
Add AuthTokenCookieFilter (Ordered.HIGHEST_PRECEDENCE, before any
Spring Security filter) that promotes the cookie to a request
header when no explicit Authorization is present. URL-decodes the
cookie value because SvelteKit URL-encodes spaces ("Basic " ->
"Basic%20") when serializing the cookie. Works the same for REST,
SSE (/api/notifications/stream, /api/ocr/jobs/.../progress), and
any other browser-direct backend call.
5 tests in AuthTokenCookieFilterTest cover: URL-decoded promotion,
explicit-Authorization-wins precedence, no-cookies pass-through,
absent-auth-token pass-through, empty-value pass-through.
Also: add `@ActiveProfiles("test")` to ThumbnailServiceIntegrationTest,
the one remaining @SpringBootTest in the suite that wasn't annotated.
After #516 made UserDataInitializer fail-closed outside dev/test/e2e,
this test's context load was throwing. Restores green main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
